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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
Introduction 
Financial analysts play a key role in the proper functioning of markets and the maintenance of 
market liquidity and price efficiency. The ready availability of various types of financial 
information ensures appropriate pricing and helps issuers to raise capital in primary markets, and 
ensures deep and liquid secondary markets for financial instruments.  
Research produced by financial analysts provides investors with interpretation of financial and 
economic data on traded securities. Analysts synthesise raw information into readily accessible 
research. This research is used in turn by investors to help make their investment decisions or by 
intermediaries to produce investment research, advice or marketing communications. Commonly, 
there are three categories of financial analyst: sell-side, buy-side and independent. The first group 
typically work on behalf of brokerage firms, brokers or dealers, and their work consists of driving 
the investment decisions of customers.  The second group work on behalf of institutional money 
managers, i.e. people who are responsible for asset management and buying their own financial 
instruments, such as investment funds, hedge funds and so on. Their activity is aimed at orienting 
the portfolio choices of their clients. Finally, the so-called independent analysts act on their own 
behalf or on that of people who cannot be attributed to groups. Given that the their research is often 
directly provided to retail investors, sell-side analysts are usually the most common type of analyst 
to be investigated in research. 
There is no legal description of financial analysts, as indicated by the EU Forum Group: “s/he 
provides third parties (i.e. an analyst’s employer or its clients) with verbal and written analyses 
based on established financial analytical techniques. S/he is primarily responsible for, contributes 
to, or is connected with, the interpretation of economic, strategic, accounting, financial and non-
financial data relating to securities issued by companies and/or public sector issuers, and/or industry 
sectors, in order to forecast their results and assess the securities’ value for use in taking investment 
decisions.” Therefore, an analyst’s report is the final product of a process which includes the 
collection and valuation of information related to the future performance of a specific company. 
The process starts with a company’s disclosure of public information, such as its strategies, the 
competitive landscape, financial data and other non-financial factors like the quality of its 
management. Based on this information, analysts use their skills to process (through one or more 
͹  
valuation methods) heterogeneous data into valuations of the firms, which, when compared to the 
current trading price, result in a justifiable stock recommendation which is released to investors.  
This complex process of collecting and valuing information results in a written report, which 
usually contains a minimum content, including at least three summary measures on its front page: 
the actual recommendation level (i.e., buy, hold, or sell), the earnings forecast and the target price 
forecast. In addition, sometimes the full text of the report provides quantitative and qualitative 
analyses supporting the three summary measures, and the extra information disclosed here in can be 
rich and extensive. In these cases, the analysts show in a quite transparent way the valuation 
method(s) which were used to reach their final recommendation and, thus, provide the investors 
with details which help them to determine how the company valuation has been conducted.  
Finally, the investment bank which employs the analysts disseminates the report to its clients and 
thus to the market.  Therefore, financial analysts act as intermediaries between portfolio managers 
and the companies which they evaluate. 
The importance of the activity of financial analysts is evidenced by the big investments which the 
financial services industry make each year in the formal analysis of stock prices and the production 
of investment recommendations. Furthermore, investors pay great attention to these 
recommendations in order to gain information about the prospective value of securities. 
The growing influence of this ‘secondary information’ in determining the investment decisions of 
investors and, more generally, market trends has motivated the legislatures of different countries to 
act to ensure that such research is reliable and objective, and,  as a result of the corporate scandals 
of recent years, attention has focused on the preparation and dissemination of studies on securities 
(both simple and complex) carried out by financial analysts. 
The main concerns relating to how financial analysts respond to the obligation of information 
disclosure relate to the fact that their research, in many cases, is not entirely independent as they 
may face a complex mix of conflicts of interest. In fact, as demonstrated by many different studies, 
the reliability of the recommendations made by financial analysts often appear to be compromised 
by their personal interest in the securities which they are researching, due to their relationships with 
the companies involved or the banks responsible for the placement of the securities. 
In response, regulators have increased the amount of regulatory disclosure in this area. In the US, 
two major regulatory changes are worth highlighting. One is the introduction in 2000 of ‘Regulation 
Fair Disclosure’ (RegFD), which prohibits US firms from making selective disclosures. The other is 
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the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. Title V of SOX, entitled ‘Analyst Conflicts of Interest’, 
requires analysts to disclose the existence of a financial interest in or association with the firms 
which they review, reinforcing investor protection against analysts’ conflicts of interest.  
In 2003, the European Parliament adopted Directive 2003/6/EC1, known as the Market Abuse 
Directive (MAD), which is the European counterpart of the US regulations. In the EU, as in the US, 
financial institutions are required to erect a ‘Chinese Wall’ between research and other investment 
banking departments, disclose their interests (e.g. brokerage and investment banking ties) in the 
firms which they recommend and provide investors with statistics concerning their 
recommendations.  
Most previous literature on financial analysts has focused upon the US. The European context has 
been rather less studied. However, it is an interesting area of research both for its unique 
characteristics and for its differences from the American market. 
Regarding conflicts of interest, for instance, in Europe the regulations may be, to a large extent, 
ineffective. Firstly, conflicts due to investment banking ties are less acute in the EU than in the US 
as the number of European financial institutions active in both financial analysis and investment 
banking activities is fairly small. In addition, these financial institutions are mainly universal banks, 
meaning that they are more diversified in terms of revenue than their US counterparts. They are, 
therefore, expected to exert less pressure on sell-side analysts to make them issue overoptimistic 
recommendations. Secondly, European analysts differ in many respects from their US counterparts. 
Jegadeesh and Kim (2006) find that optimism in recommendations is lower in Europe than in the 
US or Canada, probably because, as shown by Clement, Rees and Swanson (2003) and Bolliger 
(2004), forecast accuracy is not a major concern in terms of their career progression. 
This thesis focuses on the European setting and aims to analyse unexplored issues of the equity 
analysis industry. Given the crucial importance of a high standard of analyst research on financial 
markets, the extremely negative effects which low quality oversights can produce (see, for example, 
the recent financial scandals) and the big efforts and resources put towards regulating financial 
analyst activity, we decided to focus our research interests specifically on the analysis of issues 
related to financial analyst activity in Europe.  
Beyond the large number of studies about financial analysts, the focus of most of the extant 
research is on theoretical issues relating to the creation and dissemination of value or the use of                                                         
1See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:096:0016:0016:EN:PDF. 
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quantitative methods, often leaving out the practical dimension of the specific valuation processes 
employed by European analysts. In other words, the numerous empirical studies on financial analyst 
forecasts have rarely studied the actual valuation processes followed by financial analysts.  
The academic research on the topic of financial analysts can be roughly divided into three main 
streams: the value of their information, the accuracy of their forecasts and conflicts of interest. 
Prior research focused on the issue of the value analysts’ information sought to analyse market 
reaction following the release of a new report, especially when the report contains a revision of an 
earnings forecast, target price or recommendation. Attention is usually focused on the price impact, 
but some studies also explore the impact on the volume which is traded.  
The pioneer works of Givoly and Lakonishok (1980) and Griffin (1976) documented significant 
abnormal returns at the same time as earning forecast revisions were released. Lys and Sohn (1990) 
found that each analyst forecast is informative regarding price, though they are preceded by other 
types of disclosure, including the forecast revisions of other analysts. Stickel (1992) highlighted that 
analyst members of II-All America research team issue more accurate forecasts, which have a more 
significant impact on short-term pricing. Gleason and Lee (2000) analysed not only the immediate 
impact of the forecast changes on prices, but also extended the time horizon of their monitoring to 
up to two years after the time of the revision, and detected a persistent price drift in each of the two 
monitored years. Womack (1996) documented a strong short-term abnormal return associated with 
upgrading recommendations and an even stronger impact from downgrading recommendations, 
plus a longer-term price drift in the direction forecast by the analyst. Various subsequent works 
have confirmed the short- and longer-term impact generated by a new report release, while 
exploring in more depth the combined and independent value of the information of different 
features of the report: earnings forecasts and recommendations (Francis and Soffer, 2003), target 
prices (Brav and Lehavy, 2003), the strengths of the arguments proposed by the analyst (Asquith et 
al., 2005), the expected accuracy and timing of forecasts, the analyst experience, broker size and 
forecast frequency (see Stickel (1992), Abarbanell et al. (1995), Mikhail et al. (1997), Clement 
(1999), Jacob et al. (1999), Park and Stice (2000), and Clement and Tse (2003)). Further details of 
this stream of literature are provided in Chapter 3. 
Papers focused on the issue of the accuracy of forecasts seek to measure and compare the 
forecasting ability of different analysts, exploring the main drivers of this ability (or inability) and 
its consistency over time. Stickel (1992) and Shina et al. (1997), for instance, documented 
systematically different levels of accuracy in earnings forecasts. Many studies have looked for a 
relationship between the accuracy of forecasts and the characteristics of individual analysts. In 
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particular, with reference to a model of ‘learning by doing‘, some have focused on the relationship 
between accuracy and the experience accumulated by an analyst who follows a specific company. 
Mikhail et al. (1997) found that accuracy improves with the experience of the analyst, either in 
general or in a specific industry. However, in failing to separate the effects of ‘learning by doing’ 
from those which are a result of better access to information provided by company management, the 
authors did not explain how this improvement in accuracy actually occurs.  
Lys and Soo (1996) evaluated accuracy in relation to some cost- and revenue-related variables. In 
particular, they showed that accuracy is positively related to public company information and the 
number of analysts covering the stock, but it is negatively correlated to the predictability of 
earnings, trading volume and the forecasting horizon since it increases when the release date of 
profits approaches. Mikhail et al. (1997) demonstrated that accuracy is negatively related to the 
forecasting horizon and positively related to the available company information. Jacob (1997) noted 
that accuracy is a sum of subsequent improvements, some of which are attributable to a ‘learning by 
doing’ process; but other factors must be added. Specifically, he considers those elements which 
affect analysts’ performance, such as, for instance, the increased availability of historical 
information, the environment in which they operate or the interests of the brokers for whom they 
work. Clement (1999) found evidence that the accuracy of earnings forecasts is positively 
associated to analysts’ experience and the size of their firm (seen as a proxy of the resources 
available), while it is negatively affected by the scope of coverage, measured by the number of 
companies and industries which are followed. Hong et al. (2000) and Jacob et al. (1999) do not 
support the ‘learning by doing’ hypothesis. Hong et al. (2000) claimed that the model based on 
‘learning by doing’ is insufficient to explain the different levels of accuracy and that a wider 
understanding of the phenomenon must be based on theories related to analysts’ reputation and their 
herding behaviour.  
Jacob et al. (1999) mentioned the work of some researchers of psychology, who believe that 
learning by experience is a difficult task and that the opportunity to make forecasts is not sufficient 
to learn how to do it. On the contrary, there is the possibility of learning the wrong things. For these 
authors, understanding the relationships between factors is crucial for the learning process. 
Consistent with earlier research, Jacob et al. (1999) demonstrated that different levels of aptitude or 
natural skills for difficult tasks, affiliation to bigger brokers or specific association with a company 
can be a source of advantage in issuing more accurate forecasts.  
Brown (2001) proposed a model which evaluates the accuracy of analysts only in the light of their 
past accuracy and showed that it works as well as that used by Clement (1999) by combining five 
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characteristics related to analysts: generic experience, specific experience related to a company, the 
number of companies and industries followed, and the size of the broker. Furthermore, some of the 
literature has analysed the link between the accuracy of forecasts and their boldness, by indicating 
how much the estimates are above or below either the previous individual forecast or the most 
recent consensus. Trueman (1994) found that analysts tend to produce estimates similar to those 
previously issued by others (herding behaviour), even though it is not always justified by the 
available information, and that they also tend to produce estimates closer to previous expectations, 
even though the information justifies more extreme predictions. Hong et al. (2000)’s study 
confirmed the tendency towards herding behaviour. Clement and Tse (2005) extend the earlier 
research and find that the forecasts of analysts who herd are better correlated to errors in forecasts 
and, therefore, less accurate. This confirms the fact that analysts  
who make bold estimates incorporate more information into their new forecasts, while analysts who 
follow the herd simply review their forecasts using the limited information they held.  
Furthermore, Clement and Tse (2005) showed that the probability of bold predictions 
increases with the time horizon, the accuracy track of the analyst, the size of broker and the 
frequency of forecasts, while it decreases with the number of industries followed. With regard to the 
relationship between boldness and the level of accuracy, the authors show that bold forecasts are 
also more accurate on average than those which follow the herd, which is probably due to the 
incorporation of important private information. Duru and Reeb (2002), dealing with accuracy in an 
international context, recognised that the international diversification of firms leads to less accurate 
and more optimistic estimates than those made in the domestic context. In these international cases, 
the forecast activity is made more difficult by lack of knowledge of the country in question. Hope 
(2003) took into account the corporate information which analysts use to make their forecasts and 
showed that the amount of disclosure is positively associated with the accuracy of their forecasts 
since it is a considerable help to understand better those corporate events not reflected in either the 
usual budget tables or accounting practices. Enforcement is also associated with a high level of 
forecast accuracy. Its importance is even greater when the companies are allowed to choose from an 
extensive set of valuation methods, which supports the assumption that encouraging or, in some 
cases, forcing managers to follow the accounting and disclosure rules reduces the analysts’ 
uncertainty and the complexity of their estimates. Several studies have analysed the accuracy of 
target prices and its determinants. However, for the time being, the literature on this subject is fairly 
inadequate. In fact, only recently has the issue of target price accuracy found the same interest as 
earnings forecasts or changes in recommendations. 
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Papers dealing with the conflict of interest issue try to test whether analysts who are more exposed 
to distorting incentives do actually provide overoptimistic and biased forecasts. Several studies have 
documented a disproportionate number of buy (relative to sell) recommendations (e.g. Elton, 
Gruber and Grossman (1986), Stickel (1995), and Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2004)) and 
others have shown that affiliated analysts make optimistic forecasts for current or potential clients 
(Michaely and Womack (1999), Dugar and Nathan (1995), and Lin and McNichols (1998)). 
Specifically, Michaely and Womack (1999) documented a significant underperformance of the buy 
recommendations issued by affiliated brokers in case of IPOs, confirming the bias suspicion. 
Jackson (2005) and Cowen et al. (2006) found that trading incentives are as strong as or even 
stronger than investment banking incentives in determining research optimism. They also 
documented the important role of reputation building as a counterbalance to analysts’ opportunistic 
behaviour. Ljungqvist et al. (2007) found that analyst firms are more accurate and less optimistic 
when covering stocks which are largely owned by institutional investors. Barber et al. (2007) 
documented a significant lower abnormal return of the buy recommendations issued by investment 
banks compared to other types of analyst firm (brokerage houses or pure research firms). Counter-
evidence emerges for hold and sell recommendations, suggesting reluctance on the part of the 
investment banks to downgrade stocks whose prospects are deteriorating. Ertimur et al. (2007) 
documented a strong positive correlation between the accuracy of earning forecasts and the 
profitability of the recommendations. Nevertheless, this correlation does not hold when considering 
the buy recommendations issued by the analysts who are more exposed to conflicting incentives. 
The authors argued that, in these cases, the issue of rosy recommendations can be seen as a good 
revenue-boosting device with low reputation costs, compared to the provision of inaccurate 
earnings forecasts. 
Therefore, as discussed earlier, one of the major aims of the analyst is to provide an assessment of 
the investment value of a particular stock; earnings forecasts are just one input into this decision 
process. As mentioned above, financial analysts need many more information inputs, which they 
insert into one or more valuation methods which summarise this information and return outputs in 
the form of investment recommendations and target prices. 
These considerations motivate the first two papers of this thesis  since they analyse, on one hand, 
whether the investors fully recognise and appreciate the different levels of information disclosure 
from the analysts, and, on the other, whether the different ways to process the input, i.e. the 
information set, can affect the accuracy of the final output, i.e. the target prices. 
Moreover, as already noted, the inputs which make up the financial analysis are drawn from a wide 
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field. Financial statements represent an important source, though financial analysts themselves 
usually recognise that they do not constitute their most important source of information. Instead, 
direct contact with the managers of the company being evaluated appears to be a predominant 
source of information. Financial analysts must know the firms they are covering. They must know 
what these firms do and know and evaluate their managers, strategies and the likely consequences. 
In order to do so, they must be experts in the industry in which these firms compete, as well as 
being knowledgeable about the position of the firms in their sector.  
These latter considerations motivate the last paper of this thesis since it aims to explore the role of 
proximity of financial analysts to what we named industrial ‘hubs of expertise’ to explain the 
performance of financial analysts.  
Therefore, this thesis is structured as three different empirical contributions to the literature on 
financial analysts. 
The first empirical paper is entitled ‘Financial analysts’ accuracy: do valuation methods matter?’ 
Here we analyse equity research reports as evidence of how analysts carry out their valuation tasks. 
The aim of the research is to find more evidence on the performance of an observable outcome of 
the equity research report: the target price. 
As reported above, the literature has already demonstrated that there are some variables 
affecting the accuracy of the output of the reports, but just a handful number of prior studies have 
analysed the impact of ‘structural’ variables, such as valuation methods. For the most part, earlier 
research on financial analysts was based on commercial financial databases (e.g. I/B/E/S or First 
Call), collecting just a small proportion of the overall information which is potentially included in a 
report. Usually, these datasets catalogue only the most basic elements of a report, such as earnings 
forecasts, target prices and analysts’ recommendations, but they do not provide other additional 
elements which supporting the valuation procedure. However, the full body of a report, at least in 
some cases, could be more exhaustive and include details of the additional information used by the 
analysts, such as accounting forecasts, valuation methods, qualitative analysis, actualisation rates or 
market risk premium or other justifications. The only way to find this information is to read the text 
of the reports and code the content by hand. The expectation is that the hypotheses and assumptions 
on which many methods are based could lead analysts to greater discretion in the choice of 
parameters for their models and, therefore, lead them to different levels of accuracy. 
With this in mind, we downloaded about 2,200 reports from the Investext database, collecting the 
full text of the financial analysts’ reports. We examined the European market, looking at reports 
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over a three-year period (from January 2007 to April 2009) for the 50 companies included in the 
EuroStoxx50 Index. We carefully read the full text of all of the reports and coded by hand the 
information about the valuation methods used by the analysts to evaluate the companies.  
In order to analyse the effects of different valuation methods on the predictive performance of 
the reports, we examine in detail and catalogue the methods (named and unnamed) used by 
analysts. Furthermore, since analysts often use two or more methods simultaneously, whenever 
possible, we try to identify the primary one, that is, the valuation method upon which the final 
recommendation relies more heavily. All of the methods not explicitly defined or indicated as 
‘primary’ have been classified as ‘secondary’. 
We run fixed effect regressions where we assume that the dependent variable is the accuracy of the 
target price and include as independent variables both the respective valuation methods and a group 
of control variables suggested by the existing literature.  
The main results are interesting and can be summarised as follows. First, consistent with 
expectation, the target prices supported by the disclosure of the valuation methods are as accurate as 
those issued without contemporaneous disclosure of the valuation method upon which they are 
based. 
Second, the accuracy of the target price decreases when the target price is based on a primary 
method. In other words, this result suggests that analysts can obtain accurate performance by simply 
combining a few selected techniques, instead of using only one method to assess company value. 
Third, we focus on primary methods and define as ‘absolute’ methods those which include 
financial, income-based, net assets-based and hybrid methods (such as the EVA approach). On the 
contrary, we define the ‘relative’ approach as those methods which require an active market making 
fair prices (the market is always right), and including market ratio methods. The results suggest that 
there are no differences between the accuracy associated with the ‘relative’ or ‘absolute’ methods.  
Lastly, analysis of the different classes of valuation method shows that they lead to the same 
level of accuracy, apart from the net asset method which is visibly poorer. This result is consistent 
with the theories which argue that this kind of method is ‘inferior’ since it is static and, therefore, 
does not capture both future opportunities and the different levels of risk of the evaluated company.  
The second empirical paper is entitled ‘Transparency and Market Impact of Security Analyst 
Recommendations’ and it investigates whether the level of transparency in financial analyst 
disclosure, conditional on the release of other information, is value-relevant for capital markets. As 
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illustrated above, much of the prior research has focused on whether analyst reports contain useful 
information and affect market efficiency. However, the majority of these studies are only based on 
the minimum content of the reports (recommendations and target prices) or on the forecasts of 
earnings, which are usually collected from commercial datasets (e.g. Womack (1996), Gleason and 
Lee (2000), Mikhail et al. (1997)). Generally, these studies have not measured the value of analyst 
recommendations when the recommendations are released concurrently with other report 
information, i.e. the methods of valuation. Asquith et al. (2005) represent a noticeable exception in 
this context. They investigated the association between market returns and the content of analyst 
reports using a set of about 1,100 reports issued by members of the Institutional Investor All-
American Research Team from 1997 to 1999. Their findings show that there is no correlation 
between specific types of valuation methodology used by analysts and market reaction. 
Although this paper is strongly related to Asquith et al. (2005), it proposes a new and original 
approach by extending the analysis and providing new empirical evidence. The degree of 
transparency is not a straightforward measure: we define it assuming that a report is transparent 
when the valuation methods used to perform the analysis are clearly disclosed by the analyst. 
Conversely, a report is opaque when the valuation methods are not disclosed or are unclear.  
Financial analysts’ reports are not usually freely available to the market. Although Investext is 
a very comprehensive database, some investment brokerage houses do not make their research 
publicly available and do not provide reports to this database. Therefore, the analysis could be 
jeopardised by this selection bias. We focus on the Italian setting as, in this respect, Italy represents 
a uniquely advantageous research setting. The Italian market has a mandatory rule requiring all 
investment banks, both domestic and international, issuing research reports on Italian-listed firms to 
deposit them with the Italian Stock Exchange. Thus, all of these reports are available to investors. 
We have taken advantage of this regulation and analysed 4,603 research reports issued by 50 
different investment banks in relation to 28 Italian-listed firms over a four-year period (2000-2003). 
The full text of the reports has been carefully examined and the different report information - both 
the summary measures and, whenever possible, the valuation methods used - catalogued by hand. 
The report sample was then divided into two different categories: low (opaque) and high 
(transparent) disclosure level reports. 
In order to test the transparency of the reports, an event study was performed. This 
methodology allows for the verification of market efficiency by incorporating new information, 
such as measuring the effects on the stock return of the event in correspondence to the event date, 
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that is, the date on which the report was issued. In Italy, this corresponds, by definition, to the date 
on which the information is made available to the clients of brokerage firms.  
Overall, the results partially replicate the findings of previous research, showing that changes 
of recommendation are significantly associated with the market reaction to the release of an 
analyst’s report. The results also show that the target prices may contain important information for 
the market, depending on how bold and unconventional the forecasts (target prices) are. In 
particular, we find that the market reaction to analysts’ change of recommendation is stronger 
(greater R2) when the target prices move away from the consensus price than when they move 
towards the consensus target price for that stock. This result may indicate that the change of 
recommendation effect is partly driven by analysts’ tendencies to herd. In fact, a convincing 
explanation for the relevance of the target price boldness proxy can be shown by behavioural 
herding models. In these models, observable actions by agents act as signals of the quality of an 
agent’s private information. Thus, everything else being equal, actions which differ markedly from 
what many other agents (analysts) do lead the market to assess the agent with the unconventional 
action as more likely to be ‘smarter’ than the others. 
However, our findings add new information about the source and nature of market reaction to the 
release of analysts’ reports. Our results, in fact, indicate that market reaction is not symmetric and 
the cause of this asymmetry is the level of transparent disclosure in the report. This means that, in 
general, markets react consistently to the signals provided by recommendations and target prices, 
but they also modify their reaction depending on the additional information provided. Interestingly, 
positive investor reaction to good news is unrelated to the level of information disclosed by 
analysts. On the contrary, they only trust negative news when they are provided with the supporting 
elements which enable the understanding of the valuation procedures underlying the estimates. 
We then investigate whether the results are affected by other variables, such as the reputation of the 
broker or when other information is released contemporaneously with the analyst report (the 
confounding effect). However, neither of these variables is found to be statistically significant. 
The third empirical paper is entitled ‘Proximity to hubs of expertise in financial analyst forecast 
accuracy’. In this paper, we assert that the research on analysts’ accuracy should be shifted towards 
analysis of the set of information which is available to analysts and, furthermore, we argue that the 
location of the analysts is a fundamental affecting factor. 
Only a handful of papers investigate, either directly or indirectly, the relationship between the 
location of analysts and their performance. Although the literature argues that local analysts issue 
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more accurate forecasts since they have an informational advantage over analysts who are located 
elsewhere, the results are still inconclusive. 
The purpose of this study is related to this latter idea but it introduces and proposes a new concept 
of proximity. Drawing on international industrial economics-based research, network analysis and 
cluster theories, this work aims to explore the roles of proximity, industrial hubs of expertise and 
country-specific knowledge in explaining financial analysts’ performance.  
Industrial clusters constitute important knowledge spillovers, creating formal or informal networks 
amongst firms, higher education and research institutions. In such a hub, information can easily 
flow and propagate. I propose that physical proximity to these hubs is an advantage for many 
economic and financial agents, as well as financial analysts. 
We hypothesise that previously unstudied aspects of analysts’ characteristics, specifically, their 
geographical location with respect to the hubs of expertise around countries, could be the reason for 
the inconclusive findings in prior literature. 
We test our hypothesis by collecting both macroeconomic data, in order to identify the hubs of 
expertise, and financial analysts’ data, specifically earnings forecasts, research dates and details 
about the analysts’ location. The final filtered sample of 205 matched observations relates to 33 
firms across seven countries and ten sectors over four years (2004 to 2008). 
Specifically, we first establish the location of the hubs of expertise over the country and industry of 
the sample and then test whether the accuracy in the financial analyst forecasts depends on the 
location of analysts with respect to the hubs of expertise identified.  
The results obtained are consistent with the hypothesis. In order to establish the robustness of this 
approach, we employed different measures of both earnings forecast accuracy and proxies of 
proximity. Even though they are preliminary and possibly in part biased by sample selection issues 
until additional industrial and time data can be collected, overall, these results are interesting in that 
they confirm the benefit of being part of a network, whether formal or informal, where information, 
knowledge and expertise can be easily shared. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
Paper 1 
Financial Analyst Accuracy: Do valuation methods matter? 
 
1. Introduction 
In this paper we examine how different ways to evaluate a company influence the accuracy of the 
valuation output, the target price. Our aim is to investigate the task of valuation by sell-side analysts 
by examining the valuation methods actually used and testing whether different methods have 
different impacts on the accuracy of the target price.  
We know that finance theory and professional practice propose alternative approaches to the 
evaluation of a company.  The traditional distinction is between valuation methods based on the 
fundamentals of the company (future cash flows, earnings and so on) and the market ratios 
approach, which is based on the company’s market multiples. Furthermore, within each class of 
method, there are different ways to apply it. Analysts also frequently use some low-cost 
simplifications of the traditional methods, leading to quick and less accurate value estimates than 
would have been arrived at with the full implementation of the original models. There are, 
therefore, a variety of methods for company valuation used by practitioners. Different methods may 
be applied at the same time in the same report in order to arrive at a target price which is the 
average result of the various estimation techniques used, while in other cases, the target price is the 
result of the application of just one method, sometimes checked with other control methods. We try 
to detect whether different choices of valuation process and technique bring the same final result 
and this is measured in terms of the accuracy of the target prices. 
Through hand coding the valuation content of a sample of 1,650 reports, issued by 53 different 
international investment brokerage houses and covering a total of 48 companies across 20 different 
sectors, we find that the accuracy of target prices decreases when the target price is based solely on 
a main method. Thus, we argue that the analysts can obtain better accuracy performance by simply 
combining a few selected techniques, instead of using just one method to evaluate a company. 
Furthermore, we show that methods based on company fundamentals and those based on market 
multiples lead to similar levels of accuracy. Among the different classes of evaluation method, there 
are no superior methods in terms of output performance, the one standout being the net asset 
method as it gives a visibly poorer accuracy level. This latter evidence is consistent with those 
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theories arguing that this method is ‘inferior’ since it is static and does not capture future 
opportunities and the different levels of risk of the evaluated company.  
Therefore, in summary, we argue that in order to improve forecast accuracy, analysts need to assess 
company value by choosing and applying a set of different methods, combining them and getting 
the average value, but regardless of the specific technique chosen. 
This paper is mainly related to the literature on target prices and the determinants of their accuracy, 
providing new empirical evidence. Prior literature has shown that analysts differ in their ability to 
forecast. However, the empirical research has focused mainly on market reaction to analysts’ 
earnings, recommendations and revisions. Analysis of the accuracy of target prices and the 
relevance of valuation models in the valuation process are relatively unexplored areas of accounting 
and finance research. Only a small number of studies have focused on the relationship between the 
valuation methods used by sell-side analysts in their reports and target price accuracy (e.g. 
Demirakos et al. (2004), Demirakos (2009) and Asquith et al. (2005)), and the results are still 
inconclusive and contradictory.  
By looking at an extended sample of international analysts’ reports covering European companies, 
this study assesses the performance of different company valuation methodologies and helps to fill 
a gap in the literature by proposing a new approach for analysing and classifying the valuation 
methods used in financial analysts’ reports. 
The importance of equity research is well known. Brokerage houses and investment banks issue 
thousands of reports on a yearly basis, providing trading advice to investors and forecasts 
concerning the future market price of listed stocks. The figures on equity research spending are 
impressive. Johnson (2006) showed that equity research by investment banks has reached over US 
$20 billion in 2006. Furthermore, both The Wall Street Journal and the Institutional Investor (II) 
annually award an ‘oscar’ to the best financial analyst on the basis of the performance of the reports 
issued.  
Accuracy is, therefore, the key feature of the output of equity research. However, since the reports 
are not freely available, studies analysing how the valuation methods used influence the target price 
accuracy are rare. Consequently, this study may help fill an important gap in the literature. 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses the main results obtained by prior literature; 
Section 3 describes the theoretical framework; Section 4 reports the data and data classification 
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criteria; Section 5 presents the research design; Sections 6 and 7 report the empirical results, their 
discussion and interpretation; and Section 8 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Literature review 
Sell-side analysts issue reports about the equity valuation of companies. The more verifiable 
elements of these reports are earnings forecasts, stock recommendations and target prices.  
Earlier studies have mainly focused on the market reaction to analysts’ earnings, recommendations 
and revisions (see also Chapter 1). Despite the empirical evidence which shows the relevance of 
target prices to the market (see, for instance, Asquith et al. (2005) or Brav and Lehavy (2003)), the 
research on the accuracy of target prices is still scant and inconclusive. This paper is mainly related 
to the literature on target prices and the determinants of their accuracy, providing new empirical 
evidence.  
A possible reason for the poor attention given to the target price is that earnings forecasts, 
recommendations and target price revisions convey homogeneous information to investors, leading 
to the same market reaction. However, Francis and Soffer (1997), Brav and Lehavy (2003) and 
Asquith et al. (2005) do not confirm this evidence. They report that target prices convey new 
information to the market, independent from recommendations and earnings forecasts. For instance, 
Brav and Leavy (2003) show market reaction to target prices which is both unconditional and 
conditional on stock recommendations and earning forecast revisions.  Similarly, Asquith et al. 
(2005) demonstrate that the market reacts to target price revisions regardless of earnings forecasts 
revisions. Furthermore, target price revisions cause a market reaction which is greater than that 
determined by an equivalent revision in the earnings forecast.  
Since target prices are relevant for the market, part of the academic interest in them has focused on 
the drivers of their accuracy. The empirical evidence shows a certain variability in target price 
accuracy. For instance, Asquith et al. (2005) and Bradshaw and Brown (2006) report a good level of 
target price accuracy over a time horizon of 12 months (in at least 50% of cases the target prices are 
then reached by the market stock prices are, while De Vincentiis (2010) shows a poor level of 
accuracy (above the 30% of cases are successful). There are multiple factors which have the 
potential to affect this variability and the empirical results are controversial.  
Part of the literature has focused on the features of forecasts, such as the well-documented bias in 
estimates and the level of analysts’ optimism. The main empirical results show that forecasts which 
are highly inflated with respect to the current market price are more difficult to achieve (Asquith et 
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al. (2005), Bradshaw and Brown (2006), Bonini et al. (2009), Demirakos et al. (2009) and De 
Vincentiis (2010)).  
Another part of the literature has focused on firm, stock and analyst characteristics which affect 
target price accuracy. Specifically, company size, loss-making firms and company coverage are 
positively associated with target accuracy, while stock momentum is negatively related (Bonini et 
al. (2009) and De Vincentis (2010)).  
Finally, only a few studies have analysed how the tools used by analysts to reach the target price, 
i.e. the valuation models, can affect the accuracy of the forecast.  
Financial analysts can adopt several different valuation methods to evaluate companies, which are 
usually categorised into two different macro-classes: single-period valuation methods, i.e. market 
multiples, and multi-period valuation methods, such as discounted cash flow (DCF) and residual 
income methods (RIM). Empirical research has shown that financial analysts prefer single-period 
earnings models, such as market multiples (Barker (1999), Block (1999), Bradshaw (2002), 
Demirakos et al. (2004) and Asquith et al. (2005)) as they are simple to apply. Analysts adopt more 
complex and time-consuming multi-period models to value companies which are characterised by 
high level of uncertainty due to their highly volatile earnings or unstable growth (Demirakos et al., 
2004). Imam et al. (2008) reported that sell-side analysts increased their preference for DCF models 
only in recent years, probably influenced by their clients and their valuation preferences. 
Corporate finance theory and the main financial analysis textbooks suggest estimating a company’s 
value using, whenever possible, multi-period valuation methods, the reason being that they should 
better capture its fair value (Penman (2003) and Koller et al. (2005)). Using ‘superior’ valuation 
methods should, therefore, lead to more accurate target prices. This theory is only partially 
confirmed in practice. Bradshaw (2004) shows that the analysts who issue more accurate earnings 
forecasts and who employ rigorous valuation methods such as RIM get better target prices. 
Similarly, Gleason, Johnson, and Li (2007) followed Bradshaw (2004) and inputted analyst 
earnings forecasts into price-to-earnings-growth (PEG) and RIM in order to generate pseudo target 
prices, and found that RIM is a superior method in terms of target prices accuracy. Gleason et al. 
(2006, 2008) found evidence which suggests that market ratio methods produce less accurate and 
more unreliable target prices than DCF. On the other hand, Demirakos et al. (2009) compared the 
DCF and the price-to-earnings (PE) ratio approaches and found that it is more likely to arrive at the 
target price by using the PE ratio (69.88%) rather than the DCF method (56.28%). However, this 
result holds only for a very short time horizon. Measuring accuracy over a period of 12 months 
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shows, in fact, that the market ratios approach is no longer the most accurate. Asquith et al. (2005) 
do not find any significant correlation between valuation methods and target accuracy. Specifically, 
they fail to demonstrate the superiority of the DCF method with respect to other methods. The 
probability of getting the target price within 12 months is almost the same, regardless of the specific 
method used (48.8% used the market ratio approach and 52.3% DCF). Even less successful are 
those analysts who employ the Economic Value Added approach. Finally, Liu, Nissim and Thomas 
(2002) tested the valuation accuracy of several market ratios and found that the PE approach based 
on forecast earnings has the greatest accuracy.  
The results of this stream of research remain inconclusive and, therefore, the topic needs further 
investigation. This paper tries to produce new empirical evidence on this relevant issue and aims to 
enrich the existing literature by investigating how different unexplored features of the procedures 
followed by analysts to assess the company value can affect target price accuracy. 
 
 
3. Theoretical framework 
The task of sell-side analyst evaluation is a complex process. It starts with the collection of 
economic and company information, followed by the processing of this qualitative and quantitative 
data, and it ends with the production of forecasts to be inputted into one or more valuation methods, 
giving the target prices. Finally, depending on the comparison between the company valuation and 
the market price, the analyst issues an investment recommendation (buy, hold, sell and so on).  
Finance theory and professional practice propose alternative approaches to the evaluation of a 
company.  The traditional distinction is between valuation based on the fundamentals of the 
company (future cash flows, earnings and so on) and the market ratios approach, which is based on 
the market multiples of a company. Penman (2001) gives a definition of the fundamental analysis as 
a five-step process consisting of: 1) knowing the business through the strategic analysis; 2) 
analysing the accounting and non-accounting information; 3) specifying, measuring and forecasting 
the value relevant payoffs; 4) converting the forecast to a valuation; and 5) trading on the valuation. 
In contrast to fundamental analysis, the market multiple approach requires an active market of fair 
stock prices. A fundamental valuation can be done without reference to a market.2  
                                                        
2In reality, the discount rate and the market risk premium, the basic elements for the fundamental analysis, do require an 
active market. 
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With respect to the quality of the different methods, finance theory considers the company 
fundamentals-based valuation methods to be superior tools for the evaluation of a company in 
comparison to the market multiples approaches. Therefore, finance textbooks recommend their use 
whenever possible as they bring a more reasonable and well-grounded estimation of company 
value. Thus, market multiples are indicated as control methods, to be used as a second step in 
estimating a range of control company values.  
Given this theoretical difference between the methods, this paper aims to investigate better whether 
different approaches to valuation can have a different impact on the output of the valuation process 
conducted by practitioners. Specifically, we test whether different valuation practices affect the 
accuracy of target prices.  
In order to do this, we analyse the distribution of valuation methods adopted by financial analysts 
amongst different industries and the differences in valuation practices over the years. Then, we test 
whether there is a link between the method of valuation method and the final output. 
Asquith et al. (2005), for instance, found no correlation between valuation methods and their 
accuracy in predicting target prices. However, this study suffers from a selection bias issue as it 
only focuses on celebrity analysts, excluding others. Demirakos et al. (2009) did not find significant 
differences in target price performance depending on the specific model used. However, this 
research was based on a small sample of sell-side analyst reports only covering UK companies. 
Furthermore, they did distinguish between DCF and PE methods and did not consider the wide 
range of methods which analysts use and personalise. 
If a relationship exists, it would be of great interest because it would show that target prices, and 
thus investment recommendations, are linked to the specific criteria chosen for the analysis. Even if 
there is only a partial relationship or indeed no relationship at all, it would, nevertheless, be an 
interesting result. On one hand, for example, the lack of a relationship should rationally mean that 
every method employed by analysts should achieve the same result, as expressed by the 
recommendation or target price. However, this lack of relationship could also indicate that valuation 
methods are regarded as ‘tools’ for achieving a predetermined result, which is consistent with the 
conflict of interest hypothesis. Bradshaw (2002), for example, finds that valuations based on price 
earnings multiples and expected growth are more likely to be used to support favourable 
recommendations, while qualitative analysis (which is less verifiable) of a firm is more likely to be 
associated with less favourable recommendations. In other words, the analyst evaluates firms 
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regardless of the best criteria which could be used and only afterwards does he or she select the 
method which better argues and supports the expected result. 
First, in line with Bradshaw (2002), we test whether analysts’ reticence in disclosing the methods 
used for company valuation is related to the accuracy of their estimates. Our expectation is to find 
no significant relationship as, in the absence of opportunistic behaviour, the analyst should disclose 
the valuation method used, regardless of the level of boldness of the estimate. The first hypothesis 
tested is, therefore, the following: 
H1: Analysts who make explicit the valuation methods which they use are more accurate than those 
who do not disclose the specific tools which they use to arrive at their estimate of companies.. 
Then, we verify whether the different valuation practices which go towards the estimation of the 
final target price can produce more or less accurate target prices. By analysing the actual reports of 
the financial analysts, it is possible to distinguish between  the target prices which have been 
obtained as a result of the linear combination of different methods and those which have been 
obtained by applying a ‘primary’ method and then checked by the implementation of other control 
methods. Since the valuation methods require subjective estimations and assumptions about a 
company’s future, our expectation is that target prices which have been obtained as the result of an 
average of different techniques are more accurate than those based on a primary method considered 
as superior and a set of control methods. 
The specification of the second hypothesis is therefore: 
H2: Target prices derived from an average of different valuation methods are more accurate than 
those obtained with one primary method which is then checked by other valuation techniques. 
The third hypothesis follows on from H2. Specifically, we test whether the accuracy level of the 
sub-sample of target prices based on just one primary method can change if this method is the only 
one implemented by the analyst or if it is considered to be superior amongst a set of different 
methods used as controls. The specification of the third hypothesis is: 
H3: Target prices based on only one valuation method have a different accuracy level depending on 
the analyst’s choice of method. 
We then focus on the type of valuation method used in the report. Our aim is to test whether a 
hierarchy exists amongst different valuation criteria. According to finance theory, our expectations 
should be that alternative fundamental valuation methods should yield the same results when 
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applied to the same set of data. At the same time, market multiple approaches should be inferior to 
fundamental valuation methods and thus perform worse. However, among the fundamental 
valuation methods, some of them could be more appropriate for the evaluation of specific 
companies than others. For instance, insurance and utility stocks are often considered to be ‘nearly 
bond’ because the future cash flows that such stocks generate are usually positive and easy to 
predict, and the payout ratio is high and constant. Therefore, the discounted cash flow or dividend 
discounted models, which are close to those usually used for bond valuation, could be preferable for 
company valuations. Conversely, banking and especially manufacturing stocks are more similar to 
dynamic companies which operate in a much more competitive environment and exposed to higher 
technological risk. It is much more difficult for an analyst to forecast the future cash flow, profits 
and dividends of these types of stock by applying methods belonging to fundamental analysis; it is 
much easier to collect data from the market using the growth rate of future cash flows, profits and 
dividends implied in the market ratios. 
The set of hypotheses for testing different levels of analysis is therefore: 
H4: The specific types of valuation method (DCF, DE, NAV and so on) used in the report overall 
have different impacts on target price accuracy. In other words, we test whether some methods are 
better than others in obtaining more accurate estimates. 
H5: At the macro category level, target prices resulting from fundamentals-based methods are more 
accurate than those derived from market multiple-based methods. 
H6: The latter hypothesis is also verified in correspondence to primary valuation methods. In other 
words, we investigate whether the general finance textbook suggestion of using fundamentals-based 
methods instead of market multiple methods make sense in terms of estimate performance. 
 
 
4. Sample selection & description 
4.1. Sample selection 
 
Most of the earlier research on financial analysts is based on commercial financial databases (e.g. 
I/B/E/S or First Call), collecting only a small proportion of the overall information which is 
potentially included in a report. Usually, these datasets catalogue the basic elements of a report, 
such as earnings forecasts, target prices and analyst recommendations, but do not provide any other 
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additional elements which support the valuation procedure. The full body of the report, at least in 
some cases, could be much more exhaustive than this and include the additional information used 
by the analysts, such as accounting forecasts, valuation methods, qualitative analysis, actualisation 
rates, market risk premium or other justifications. The only way to discover this information is to 
read the text of the reports and to code their content by hand.  
For our purposes, we downloaded approximately 2,200 reports from Investext, a database which 
contains the full text of financial analyst reports. We examined the European market, collecting 
reports over a three-year period (from January 2007 to April 2009) for the 50 companies and 20 
industries included in the EuroStoxx50 Index.  
Some of the reports have been excluded from the analysis because they were too short or did not 
contain any relevant information for this analysis. Therefore, the final sample consists of 1,650 
reports issued by 53 international investment brokerage houses, covering a total of 48 companies 
across 20 sectors. Each report was read in its entirety and its content coded by hand.  The aim was 
to identify the valuation models employed by the analysts and, in particular, which of them was 
chosen to be the main one used in the valuation task.  
Some of the variables were easy to classify (e.g. report date, analyst’s name, target prices and so 
on), while others (e.g. valuation methods) needed more attention in order to be successfully 
classified. 
With regard to the recommendations issued, since we refer to the original ones issued by the 
analysts, caution needed to be used in their classification. Most analysts use a three-level scale (i.e., 
‘buy’, ‘hold’ and ‘sell’), while others use a larger scale, which also includes ‘strong buy’ or ‘strong 
sell’. Furthermore, some analysts use different terminology, such as ‘market perform’ or ‘market 
outperform’, ‘reduce’, ‘add’ and so on. We reduced all of the recommendations to three different 
categories, classifying them depending on their meaning, that is, good, bad or neutral. 
For firm-level data, such as company market capitalisation, P/BV ratios, the industry code and the 
time series of stock prices, we used Datastream. 
 
4.2. A structured analysis of the evaluation methods used in the reports 
The identification and classification of the valuation methods used by analysts was a complex 
procedure. Differently from Asquith et al. (2005), in the reports which we analysed, the analysts 
seldom explained the specific valuation methods used for the company.  
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Furthermore, the analysts often combine different methods and approaches, creating new ones or 
personalising valuation procedures, probably in order to fit them to the firm-specific characteristics 
of the companies analysed better. This forced us to deduce, whenever possible, the methods from 
the reports by building a structured framework to capture their variety and reduce the different (and 
more or less sophisticated) procedures to some known evaluation methods. 
Initially, we started from the theoretical ranking proposed for valuation methods by most of the 
finance books which identifies the following five classes of method: net assets-based methods, cash 
flow-based methods, earnings-based methods, hybrid methods and market ratios methods. 
However, during our empirical work, several valuation methods emerged to a more significant 
extent than expected and we needed to add some specifications about each class. Analysts 
frequently use low cost simplifications of the traditional techniques leading to quick and less 
complex value estimates than those which would be achieved by fully implementing the original 
models. For instance, within the net asset methods, we included the net asset value approach (NAV) 
and the embedded value (EV) and appraisal value (AV) methods.3 We classified as ‘earnings-based 
methods’ discounted shareholder profit (DSP) and discounted earnings (DE), but also other 
heuristic methods.4 Among these heuristic methods, one is based on the ROIC index, another one 
named Warranty Equity Valuation (WEV) and finally, one called Required ROE (RR).5 We included 
in ‘financial methods’ the dividend discounted model (DDM), discounted cash flows (DCF), the 
Gordon growth model (GGM), the adjusted present value (APV) and a particular model based on 
the actualisation of cash flow which is used by a small number of brokers called HOLT-CFROI.6 
We named as ‘hybrid models’ the economic value added (EVA) and regulatory asset based methods 
                                                        ͵ The NAV approach considers the underlying value of the company assets net of its liabilities. In this approach, the 
book value is adjusted by substituting the market value of individual assets and liabilities for their carrying value on the 
balance sheet. This approach is most applicable in the context of asset holding companies, real estate holding 
companies or natural resources companies. EV is the valuation of a company’s current in-force value without taking 
into account its capacity to generate new business. It is then a minimum value for the company. The embedded value 
can then be adjusted by adding the estimated value of future new sales in order to obtain the AV of the company. Both 
the EV and the AV approaches are particularly appropriate for the evaluation of the insurance industry. 
4 According to both DSP and DE, the value of a company’s stock is calculated on an accounting basis and is equal to 
the present value of all of the expected future profits or earnings, discounted at the shareholders’ required rate of return. 
5 The warranty equity evaluation method establishes that the value of equity (E) is given by this formula: E = (ROE – g) 
/ (COE – g). P/BV, where ROE is the return on equity, g is long term growth rate, COE is the cost of equity and P/BV is 
price to book value. ROE required is the same as WEV, but g is equal to zero.  
6 The financial method category is a multi-criteria framework including cash flow-based methods. DDM considers cash 
flow as company dividends, DCF free cash flow, GGM is a specification of DDM which assumes a constant dividend 
growth rate and APV first estimates the value of an unlevered firm to consider the net effect on value of both the 
benefits and costs of borrowing. HOLT-CFROI is the acronym of Cash Flows Return on Investment and is a model 
originally developed in 2002 by HOLT Value Associates, based in Chicago. Basically, it is an inflation-adjusted 
indicator for measuring a company’s ability to generate cash flows. 
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(RAB)7 which are particularly used by the energy companies to estimate the value of net invested 
capital. With regard to market ratio methods, we included the approaches of both comparable 
companies and trades.8  
Table 1 summarises the classification of these methods. 
Insert Table 1 
Furthermore, since analysts often adopt two or more methods to evaluate a firm simultaneously, 
whenever possible we tried to identify the main one, that is, the valuation method upon which the 
final recommendation relies on most. All of the methods not explicitly defined or indicated as 
‘primary’ have been classified as ‘secondary. 
 
5. The research design 
In order to analyse the effects on the predictive performance of the reports of the different valuation 
methods, we run some industry fixed effects regressions. We assumed target price accuracy as the 
dependent variable and, as independent variables, both of the alternative variable specifications 
related to the valuation method issue and a group of control variables, as the main literature 
suggests. By including industry fixed effects in our regressions, we control for average differences 
across industries. 
With regard to the dependent variable, in order to control for the possibility that the results could be 
biased by the accuracy measure, we repeated the analysis using two alternative proxies of the target 
prices performance from those proposed by the main literature.9 The first (FE1), derived from De 
Vincentiis [2010], is calculated as: 
  
FE1 =
TP − Pmax12m
Pt
 upward
TP − Pmin12m
Pt
 downward
⎧ 
⎨ ⎪ ⎪ 
⎩ ⎪ ⎪ 
⎫ 
⎬ ⎪ ⎪ 
⎭ ⎪ ⎪           (1)
 
                                                         
7 Both the EVA and RAB methods are approaches which adjust the NAV approach with the present value of future 
company performances.  
8 The market multiple approaches consider the market value of companies similar to the company being valued, as 
observed either in the trading prices of publicly traded companies or the purchase prices in business sales, with respect 
to earnings, cash flow or the book value of those businesses. 
9 We also used a naive measure of target price accuracy (ACC) used in Bradshaw and Brown (2006]). According to 
their definition, a target price can be assumed to be accurate if it is achieved by the market price 365 days after the 
forecast. However, since the results were not robust, we did not report this analysis. 
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where FE represent the forecast error, TP is the target price, Pmax12m (Pmin12m) is the maximum 
(minimum) market stock price recorded during the 12 months following the report date and Pt is the 
current market stock price. 
The second accuracy measure (FE2), derived from Bradshaw and Brown (2006]), Bonini et al. 
(2009) and De Vincentiis (2010) is instead: 
FE2 = TP − P+365
Pt             (2)
 
where FE is the forecast error, TP is again the target price, Pt is the current market price and P365 is 
the stock price registered in the market 365 days after the forecast date. 
We report and discuss only the results based on FE1 because of their comparability with those 
obtained with FE2. 
With regard to the independent variables, in order to test the first hypothesis, that is, whether 
analysts’ disclosure of their valuation methods is related to the accuracy of their estimates, we 
distinguish between the reports which disclose the valuation methodology used and those which do 
not. So, the variable DISCLOSED_NOTDISCLOSED is equal to 1 if a valuation method is 
disclosed in the report, 0 otherwise. Our expectation is that, because of the conflicts of interest 
which beset financial analysts, their accuracy level is greater whether the valuation methodology 
used is made explicit. Hiding the valuation procedure could be a tool to justify, for instance, a price 
decided a priori by the broker and not supported by any of the valuation techniques.  
Secondly, we focus on the hierarchy among the methods in order to test whether the target prices 
which are derived as an average of different valuation methods are more accurate than those 
obtained by the use of one main method and then checked by other secondary valuation techniques. 
So, we distinguish between primary and secondary methods through the PRIMARY_SECONDARY 
dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if there is a primary valuation method, 0 otherwise. 
Furthermore, we focus only on those reports which contain an explicit main valuation method. We 
define the PRIMARY dummy variable as equal to 1 if the analyst uses only that main method to 
evaluate the company and 0 if the method is selected as primary in a group of other, secondary 
methods.  
We then investigate the effect of the type of valuation method used on the accuracy achieved more 
specifically. In order to test the fourth hypothesis, we include the different method categories 
(financial, income-based, net asset, hybrid and market ratios methods) in the regression 
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specification.10 We define five dummy variables, each representing one specific method category, 
respectively: M_FIN, M_INC, M_NAV, M_HYB and M_MRATIO. Each dummy gives the value of 1 
to the category it represents, 0 otherwise. Conceptually, all of the five dummies can be inserted 
simultaneously into the model since the analyst can theoretically use all of the methods at the same 
time, so all of the dummies can assume value equal to 1. 
In order to test the fifth hypothesis, we only focus on the primary methods, we distinguish between 
the methods based on company fundamentals (such as financial, income-based, hybrid and net 
asset) and those based on company market multiples. Thus, the regression includes the dummy 
FUNDAMENTAL_MULTIPLE, which is equal to 1, if the analyst uses a fundamentals-based 
method, 0 if he or she uses a market ratios approach. Then, we include the dummy of each method 
category again in the model specification, this time equal to 1, if the analyst uses that specific 
method as the main valuation method (MM_FIN, MM_INC, MM_NAV, MM_HYB and 
MM_MRATIO). As we just focus on the primary methods, only one dummy per report can assume 
the value of 1, i.e. a report has only one primary valuation method. Hence, in this case, we insert 
only four out of five dummies as the others residually define the last one. 
With regard to the control variables, we first insert the boldness of the target price (BOLDNESS). 
This is the absolute value of the difference between the target price and the current stock price, 
scaled by the current stock price. We expect that the larger the absolute difference between the 
target price and the current price, the more difficult it is to meet the target price. Consistent with the 
literature, we expect a negative association between target price accuracy and boldness.  
The second control variable included in the regressions is price volatility (VOL), which is a proxy 
for the difficulty in predicting the company value. This is measured as the standard deviation of 
company prices for each of the three years considered. Based on option pricing theory, Bradshaw 
and Brown (2006) predicted that target price accuracy is higher for stocks with higher price 
volatility. However, consistent with Demirakos et al. (2009), we expect a negative association 
between a firm’s risk and the accuracy of the forecast. This is because, although it is easier for the 
target price of a highly volatile stock to be met at some point during a 12- month forecast horizon, it 
is more challenging for the analyst to predict the price of a volatile stock at the end of that period. 
SIZE is another control variable which we use in the various regression specifications. This is the 
natural logarithm of the firm’s market capitalisation on the report’s date of issue. We expect a 
positive association between target price accuracy and firm size and a negative association between                                                         
10 For the method classification, see section 4. 
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forecast error measures and size, based on the argument that it is easier for an analyst to value a 
large, mature and well-established firm, which has readily available information about its future 
prospects. On the other hand, small firms are less complicated in structure but usually operate in 
niche markets and their future performance is more uncertain. For these reasons, we expect that 
SIZE is positively related to accuracy and negatively correlated to forecast error. 
The GROWTH variable, measured by the price-to-book-value ratio, represents the growth 
associated with the firm. As more stable companies are also more predictable than those with 
greater growth opportunities, we expect a negative association between this variable and target 
price accuracy. 
Then, we include the accuracy of earnings forecasts in the model.  Consistent with the results 
obtained by Loh and Mian (2006), Gleason et al. (2006) and Ertimur et al. (2007), our expectation 
is that we will find a positive relationship between the accuracy of the earnings forecasts and the 
target price. The prediction is that a more accurate input forecast (earnings forecast) should provide 
a better output forecast (target price) in terms of accuracy. In order to measure the accuracy of 
earnings forecasts, we use two measures proposed by the main literature. Specifically, we calculate 
both the Absolute Forecast Error (AFE) and Proportional Mean Absolute Forecast Error (PMAFE) 
measured as the following ratios: 
 
PMAFEijt = AFE ijt − AAFE jt
AAFE jt
(-1)        (3) 
 
where EPSijt is the actual earnings per share of company j, in year t, AVG(EPSijt) the average 
earnings per share forecast issued by analyst i in relation to company j during year t and Pj the mean 
price of the stock during year t. 
AFE ijt = ACTUAL jt − FORECASTijt
ACTUAL jt          (4) 
 
where AFEijt is defined above and MAFEjt is the mean absolute error of all of the analysts of 
company j during year t. 
We also include three other control variables. The first  (FORAGE) is strictly related to earnings 
forecast accuracy and the forecast horizon and is measured as the time interval between the forecast 
date and the end of the fiscal year. This variable should capture the effects of factors which impact 
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upon the accuracy of earnings forecasts, but which are unexplained by earnings forecast errors. Our 
expectation, in line with the literature, is to find that this variable has a negative impact on target 
price accuracy. 
The second control variable is year dummies to distinguish between the different years when 
reports are issued (D_2007, D_2008 and D_2009). This variable aims to capture the unexplained 
effects of time-related factors which have the potential to modify the dependent variable, but which 
are not revealed by the regressions. 
The third and final control variable is the analyst’s nationality (NAZ), which controls for the effect 
of nationality. The aim of this is to understand whether a coincidence of analyst and company 
nationality can improve the level of target price accuracy. It is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 
when the analyst’s nationality coincides with that of the company, 0 otherwise. We expect a 
positive correlation between price accuracy and the nationality variable as we assume that there is 
less information available to analysts on foreign companies than there is on domestic firms. 
Table 2 summarises the definition of the variables used in the analysis. 
Insert Table 2 
 
6. Results 
6.1. Descriptive results 
 
This section reports the main descriptive statistics of the variables of the model.  
Table 3 reports the main descriptives with regard to the dependent variable of the regression 
models, the measures of forecast accuracy, distinguishing by year and recommendation type (Panel 
A) and by valuation method features (Panels B to F). 
Insert Table 3 
First, consistent with prior empirical evidence, Panel A and B show that, on average, forecast errors 
fluctuate, but maintain a constant positive sign, indicating a general excess of optimism through all 
of the years, regardless of the specific recommendation issued.  
Panel C focuses on the relationship between forecast errors and disclosure of the valuation method. 
As illustrated, the mean forecast errors (both FE1 and FE2) do not change substantially between the 
reports which disclose their valuation method(s) and those which do not. 
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Similarly, Panels D shows that there is no significant evidence of the superior performance of those 
forecasts which were obtained as a result of an average of different valuation methods rather than 
those made with only one primary method.  
Focusing on the different method categories, and consistent with prior literature, both the methods 
based on company fundamentals and those based on market multiples perform in a similar way in 
terms of forecast accuracy (see Panel E). Furthermore, we cannot clearly discriminate whether some 
specific methods outperform the others from the simple descriptive analysis as the forecast errors 
grouped by method depend on the specific forecast error measure used (Panels F and G). For 
instance, the hybrid methods are the most accurate, according to FE1 but, according to FE2, they 
are ranked third. However, this consideration does not apply to NAV-based methods. The mean 
forecast errors based on these methods are in fact higher according to both measures (FE1=45% and 
FE2=64%). 
An analysis of forecast errors by sector is reported in Graph 1. 
Insert Graph 1 
 
Overall, the different sectors are ranged around a mean forecast error of 20-30% according to FE1, 
and 30-45% according to FE2. The top value is 60%, by the automobile sector. Other sectors which 
are quite difficult to predict seem to be the banking and the insurance industries. 
Graph 2 shows different boldness classes with respect to target price accuracy. In the lowest 
boldness class (between 0% and 10%), the forecast error is approximately 30% (28% with FE1 and 
33% with FE2). The difference between FE1 and FE2 increases in the intermediate boldness 
classes but returns to a similar level for very high boldness (>70%). In the latter class, the means of 
both FE1 and FE2 are very high (approximately 65% of the stock value at the time of the issue of 
the report). 
Insert Graph 2 
With regard to the independent variables in the regression models, Table 4 reports the main 
descriptive statistics of the control variables by year, while Table 5 summarises the main statistical 
features of the different valuation method variables.  
Insert Table 4 
Insert Table 5 
As indicated in Table 5, in our sample only 39% of reports express the valuation method(s) used for 
analysis, meaning that in about 60% of cases, the investor does not know how the target price has 
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been estimated. This means that, in these latter cases, the valuation procedure is just a black box for 
investors. With regard to the group of ‘transparent’ reports, in approximately 40% of cases the 
analysts are explicit about the main valuation methodology adopted. Approximately 38% of cases 
are in line with the finance textbooks which suggest checking the estimate of company value with 
just one method (the main one) with a set of control methods (secondary ones). In the other 62% of 
cases, there is no main method and the target price is a simple average of the application of different 
techniques. Furthermore, at odds with the theory, in about 67% of cases, the analysts obtain the 
target price by applying only one method, without any further checks (see Table 5). 
In relation to the choice of valuation method made by the financial analyst, Graphs 3, 4 and 5 show 
a breakdown of the methods across different years and industries.  
 
Insert Graph 3  
Insert Graph 4 
Insert Graph 5 
 
As illustrated above, the trend of the methods used over the three years examined changed. 
Specifically, in 2007 the proportions of the market ratios approach and the other valuation 
procedures based on the fundamentals of a company were clearly unbalanced. In that year, analysts 
reduced the market ratios approach considerably and favoured the other methods. In 2009, the 
proportions of the two approaches were more balanced. Generally, the analysts used market ratios 
as the ‘control’ secondary method in the majority of cases (53.33% in 2007, 69.39% in 2008 and 
67.36% in 2009). 
Graph 4 shows that among the fundamentals-based methods, the most frequently used by analysts 
to justify their target prices are financial methods (from 63.6% in 2007 to 98.3% in 2009). The 
hybrid method (27.3%) and the income-based methods (9.1%) are frequent in 2007, but decrease in 
the following two years.  
Graph 5 reports the different valuation methods across different industries. In line with other studies 
(see, for instance, Abrosetti Stern Stewart Italia (2008) and Bertinetti et al. (2006)), market ratios 
are the most used amongst all of the sectors overall. There are some exceptions, however. For 
instance, analysts evaluating the banking sector prefer the market ratios approach (80%), whilst in 
other sectors, such as technology hardware and equipment, utilities and electricity, and energy and 
oil, they prefer fundamental analysis. Net asset value methods are preferred for the evaluation of the 
insurance sector, while the automotive sector is characterised by financial methods. 
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To conclude the descriptive analysis, Tables 6 and 7 report the Pearson and Spearman correlations 
among the variables, respectively. No multicollinearity issues seem to arise.   
Insert Table 6 
Insert Table 7 
 
6.2. Inferential analysis 
 
In this section, we test our research hypothesis. Specifically, we investigate whether the accuracy of 
target prices depends on the financial analyst’s choice of valuation method, controlling for variables 
at both firm and analyst level. 
The results, obtained using a naïve accuracy measure (ACC) did not show any systematic 
relationship between the variables, and the determination coefficient was close to zero. Therefore, 
we decided not to report this set of results, focusing only on the other two measures of accuracy, 
used alternatively (FE1 and FE2).11 
In order to test the first research hypothesis, we run the following fixed-effect regression 
model:
ijtjtijtjti
VARIABLESiCONTROLEDNOTDISCLOSDISCLOSEDACCURACY εββα +++= _2_1 (5) 
where i, the fixed effect, represents the sector, t the year and j the single analyst. With respect to the 
variables, the dependent variable is forecast error while the independent variables are 
DISCLOSED_NOTDISCLOSED, indicating whether or not the report discloses the valuation 
method(s) used, and the set of control variables specified and defined above. 
Table 8 provides the results of different specifications of the model, obtained with a bottom-up 
procedure. Specifically, the columns show that that VOL, PMAFE and FORAGE are not significant, 
while the other control variables are significant at 5%. In particular, BOLDNESS and GROWTH are 
positively (negatively) related with forecast error (accuracy), while SIZE has a negative (positive) 
impact. The DISCLOSED_NOTDISCLOSED variable is statistically insignificant in all of the 
model specifications, meaning that the presence of a valuation method does not affect the level of 
accuracy. 
Insert Table 8                                                         
11 As mentioned earlier, we only report the results based on FE1 as comparable to those obtained with FE2 in this 
paper. 
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We then test the second hypothesis, investigating the relationship between target price accuracy 
(FE1) and the ranking of the primary and secondary valuation models, represented by the 
PRIMARY_SECONDARY variable. As control, we add the chosen set of control variables. 
Therefore, the tested equation is: 
ijtjtijtjti
VARIABLESiCONTROLSECONDARYPRIMARYACCURACY εββα +++= _2_1 (6) 
Table 9 reports the results.  
Insert Table 9 
The different model specifications show evidence that VOL, PMAFE and FORAGE are 
insignificant, but PRIMARY_SECONDARY is significantly positive, indicating that target prices 
based on a main valuation method are systematically less accurate than those based on a group of 
methods. 
We then substitute in equation (6) the PRIMARY_SECONDARY variable with the PRIMARY 
variable, capturing whether the primary valuation technique is also the only one used in the report 
(PRIMARY=1) or whether it is chosen from amongst others considered to be superior by the analyst 
(PRIMARY=0). In other words, we test the following equation and report the results in Table 10: 
ijtijtijtijt VARIABLESCONTROLPRIMARYACCURACY εββα +++= _21     (7) 
The columns confirm the prior evidence and specify the previous results. In fact, the set of control 
variables is consistent with the previous signs, while the PRIMARY variable is not statistically 
significant.  
Insert Table 10 
This means that the forecasts based on only one primary valuation method are in general less 
accurate, regardless of whether it is chosen from amongst others or used as uniquely. 
Furthermore, we focus on the specific valuation methods used and examine whether or not target 
price accuracy is dependent on the specific technique used, regardless of the ranking between the 
consideration of primary or secondary methods. Hence, the model that we test is the following: 
ijtijtijtijt VARIABLESCONTROLMETHODSVALUATIONACCURACY εββα +++= __ 21 (8) 
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where VALUATION METHOD/S is a matrix of the five dummy variables defined above and 
represents the different evaluation methods categories. Table 11 reports the findings.  
Insert Table 11 
The control variables confirm the results of the previous regressions (Columns (2), (3) and (4)), 
while the evaluation method dummies are insignificant (Columns (1) and (4)), with the exception of 
the M_NAV variable, which has a positive and statistically significant coefficient.  
This means that, in general, the accuracy of target prices is independent of the different valuation 
techniques, with the exception of NAV-based prices which are systematically less accurate than 
those based on the other methods. 
In the following regressions, the analysis focused only on methods considered as primary by 
analysts in their reports. The reason is that the target prices often are the output of a main valuation 
method, sometimes accompanied by other control methods. In these cases, if the valuation methods 
were different in terms of forecasting power, then they should affect the accuracy of the target price 
in a clearer way. Hence, we first aggregate the various methods in two macro-categories of 
methods: those based on company fundamentals and those on the comparison with market prices, 
that is, market multiple approaches. We define the FUNDAMENTAL_MULTIPLE dummy variable 
by this distinction. Table 12 reports the results of the following regression: 
ijtijtijtijt VARIABLESCONTROLMULTIPLELFUNDAMENTAACCURACY εββα +++= __ 21 (9) 
Insert Table 12 
The variable FUNDAMENTAL_MULTIPLE is not significant, indicating that, with regard to the 
accuracy of price forecasts, valuation techniques based on market multiples are the equivalent of 
more conceptually sophisticated methods, such as, for instance, DCF. 
Secondly, we disaggregate the primary methods and test the following regression: 
ijtijtijtijt VARIABLESCONTROLMETHODPRIMARYOFTYPEACCURACY εββα +++= ____ 21  (10) 
where TYPE OF PRIMARY METHOD is a matrix of vector variables (dummies), each representing 
the specific type of method used as a main valuation technique. 
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As already discussed, we only insert four out of five dummy variables in the model because of the 
problem of over-identification. For this reason, we run five different regressions, excluding one of 
the dummies in turn. Table 13 reports the results of this model. 
Insert Table 13 
Overall, the empirical findings document that financial, income-based, hybrid and market ratios 
methods lead to similar levels of accuracy, but perform better than the net asset value method. 
A significance test run on the difference between the coefficients confirms this latter result. 
 
7. Discussion of the results 
The regression outputs allow the comparison of the results obtained using the two different 
accuracy measures. 
The determination coefficient (R2 adj) is always not very high. However, this evidence is consistent 
with prior literature. The factors influencing the accuracy of target prices can be various and each 
study aims to analyse the relationship between the dependent variable and a specific small group of 
independent variables.  
With regard to the signs of the control variables, when significant they are consistent with our 
expectations: BOLD, VOL, GROWTH and PMAFE are negatively correlated with accuracy, while 
SIZE is positively correlated. Specifically, with regard to forecast-related variables, these results 
indicate that the greater the difference between the forecast and the current stock price (greater 
boldness), the lower the probability that the forecast will be achieved (less accuracy)., Focusing on 
the accuracy of earnings forecasts, the results show that less precise earnings forecasts lead to less 
accurate target prices, which is consistent with prior literature and expectations.  
With regard to firm-specific variables, the findings suggest that stable companies are easier to 
predict. Furthermore, the stock volatility coefficient confirms that the more volatile stock prices are, 
the more difficult it is to forecast a value 12 months ahead.  
At odds with our expectations, the nationality of analysts (NAZ) is not statistically significant in any 
of our model specifications, indicating that this variable does not add any useful information to our 
analysis. 
͵ͻ  
The age of the forecast is not significant in any of the model specifications. This result is partially in 
line with expectations as this variable mainly refers to the age of the earnings forecast. However, 
we decided to include it in the analysis since we did not find any significant correlation between 
this and PMAFE. It had the potential to affect the  accuracy of the prediction as an individual 
element. 
Focusing on the main variables of interest in this study, that is, the variables related to valuation 
methods, as expected, DISCLOSED_NOTDISCLOSED is not significant with both the dependent 
variables. This means that the disclosure of the valuation method used in a report is not related to 
the level of target price accuracy (Table 8). This result is in line with the descriptive analysis: with 
both the accuracy measures, the mean forecast error is similar regardless of the disclosure of the 
valuation method. Therefore, there is no evidence to support the initial hypothesis that a hidden 
valuation is worst than a disclosed one. We argue that analysts can base their estimations on very 
rigorous and precise procedures, but they can decide not to disclose them as they prefer to keep the 
data and procedure used private. Another explanation can be derived from the reputation effect, 
which assures analysts strong credibility even when they issue black-box reports. 
In the second level analysis, introducing ranking among the valuation methods (primary and 
secondary), the results are consistent with our expectations and theory (see Section 3) overall. They 
show that the target prices only based  on one method are systematically inferior to others (see 
Table 9). This result holds regardless of whether the main method is the only one used or it is 
chosen as primary from a set of others (Table 10). The message of these results is that in order to 
obtain a more accurate forecast, it is better to choose the right combination of different methods. 
Hence, the problem can be shifted as it is worth not choosing the right model, but taking advantage 
of the benefits and merits of different methods. 
In the analysis of the different method categories, the only method which is different from the 
others in terms of target price accuracy is the net asset value method. This method leads to 
significantly less accurate estimates than those obtained with others (Tables 11 and 12). Therefore, 
divergent from both our expectations and finance theory, diverse valuation approaches 
(fundamental valuation methods vs market multiple approaches) do not exhibit different 
performance in the forecast of target prices. On the contrary, as expected, different fundamental 
valuation methods yield the same results when applied to the same sets of data. The exception of 
the NAV method can be explained by its features, which are backward oriented and do not capture 
the future profitability of the company, the main driver of value. However, this latter consideration 
cannot be generalised out of this sample because of the few observations related to net asset value 
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methods (only 5% of the sample presents this valuation technique). 
 
8. Conclusions 
This study analyses the full text of financial analyst reports and aims to understand whether the 
choice of a specific evaluation method affects target price accuracy. 
The diffusion of numerous, often personalised, techniques and the frequent use of the market ratios 
approach to estimate the future value of a company lead the author to speculate whether different 
methods should be considered as equivalent to each other or whether there are factors which 
differentiate them in terms of final result.  
After the recent financial scandals, which have highlighted the poor reliability of the forecasts 
issued by financial analysts, the issue of target price accuracy is very timely and bears investigation, 
particularly the variable of valuation methods, which has so far been neglected.  
The expectation is that both the hypothesis and the assumptions of methods could lead analysts to 
greater discretion in their choice of model parameters and, therefore, lead them to different levels of 
accuracy. 
The literature has already demonstrated that there are some variables which affect the output of the 
reports, but only a handful number of prior studies have analysed the impact of ‘structural’ elements 
of a company valuation, such as valuation methods. Furthermore, prior results are scant and 
inconclusive. Some of these studies do not find any evidence to support the notion that different 
methods display varying abilities in the forecast of company value, while others show that a 
superior forecasting performance is associated with more rigorous techniques. This study provides 
new empirical evidence on this issue as it adopts a wider perspective and considers different 
features of the actual valuation procedure followed by financial analysts.  
We use a sample of 1,650 reports, issued between 1 January 2007 and 30 April 2009, and two 
measures of target price accuracy, based on forecast errors.  
In relation to our research hypothesis, we find that target prices supported by the disclosure of the 
valuation methods used are as accurate as those issued without contemporaneous disclosure. 
Moreover, the accuracy of the target price decreases when the target price is based on a main 
method. We argue that this result suggests that analysts evaluating companies can obtain more 
accurate performances by simply combining a few wisely chosen techniques, instead of using only 
one method. 
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Furthermore, when considering primary methods only, there are no significant differences in the 
accuracy associated with methods based on company fundamentals and those on market multiples.  
Lastly, our analysis of the different types of valuation method shows that they lead to the same level 
of accuracy. This is a relevant result since it indicates that the development of a complex and time-
consuming company fundamental analysis in the hope of achieving better company evaluation is 
not enough.  The market and fundamental approaches do not differ significantly in the accuracy 
levels of their results, apart from the net asset method, which leads to a visibly poorer accuracy 
level. This result is consistent with those theories which have labelled this method ‘inferior’ since it 
is static and does not capture either potential future opportunities or the different levels of risk of 
the evaluated company.  
Overall, this research indicates that target price accuracy does not depend on the choice of specific 
valuation method, but on the valuation procedure adopted by the analysts. In other words, our 
empirical evidence suggests that in order to improve the accuracy of their forecasts, analysts need to 
assess company value by choosing and applying a set of different methods, combining them and 
obtaining an average value, regardless of the specific technique chosen. Therefore, as we find no 
differences in the performance ability of the methods, we do not confirm the finance textbooks’ 
theory of a hierarchy amongst methods, promoting the multi-period valuation models as superior. If 
the method is not so important for accuracy, this rationale may also justify the widespread use 
among analysts of market ratios approaches or other low-cost techniques in order to achieve their 
conclusions on company value.   
Furthermore, this research, although with some limitations, provides results which could be a 
starting point for future analysis. For instance, since the literature has only been focused on the 
contraposition between financial and market ratios methods, it could be interesting to extend this 
field of research to all of the valuation methodologies and, in particular, to analyse the forecasting 
ability of the net assets-based methods, which are often used to evaluate insurance companies. 
It could also be interesting to re-analyse the numerous reports which do not explicitly disclose the 
valuation methods adopted in them. These reports could be without an explicit valuation method 
merely because they are an update of a recent report, in which case the target prices would be 
estimated starting from the previous valuation procedure. For this reason, the econometric analysis 
should be repeated following a new reports classification, whereby the reports without an explicit 
valuation procedure could be associated with the last available method(s) disclosed by the same 
analyst. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. The method classification. 
Method class Method technique 
Net Assets based Methods (NAV) Embedded Value (EV) and Appraisal Value 
(AV). 
Earnings-based Methods Discounted Shareholder Profit (DSP), 
Discounted Earnings (DE), heuristic methods 
(WEV, RR). 
Cash flows-based Methods Dividend Discounted Model (DDM), 
Discounted Cash Flows (DCF), Gordon 
Growth Model (GGM), Adjusted Present 
Value (APV), HOLT-CFROI. 
“Hybrid” Methods” Economic Value Added (EVA), Regulatory 
Asset Based methods. (RAB). 
Market ratios Methods Comparables companies and comparable trades
Notes. This table summarizes the method classification criteria followed. The NAV approach considers the underlying 
value of the company assets net of its liabilities. In this approach, the book value is adjusted by substituting the market 
value of individual assets and liabilities for their carrying value on the balance sheet. This approach is most applicable 
in context of asset holding companies, real estate holding companies or natural resources companies. The Embedded 
Value is the valuation of a company’s current in-force value without taking into account its capacity to generate new 
business. it is then a minimum value for the company. The Embedded Value can be then adjusted by adding the 
estimated value of future new sales to obtain the Appraisal Value of the company. Both the EV and the AV approaches 
are particularly indicated to evaluate the insurance industry. 
According to both the DSP and the DE, the value of a company stock is calculated on a n accounting basis and it is 
equal to the present value of all expected future profits or earnings, discounted at the shareholders required rate of 
return. Warranty equity evaluation method establishes that the value of equity (E) is given by this formula: E = (ROE – 
g) / (COE – g) . P/BV, where ROE is return on equity, g is long term growth rate, COE is the cost of equity and P/BV is 
price to book value. ROE required is the same of WEV, but g is equal to zero.  
The financial method category is a multicriteria framework including cash flows-based methods. The DDM considers as 
cash flows company dividends, the DCF the free cash flows, the GGM is a specification of the DDM model, assuming a 
constant dividend growth rate; the APV estimates first the value o fan unlevered firm to consider the net effect on value 
of both the benefits and the costs of borrowing. The HOLT-CFROI is the acronym for Cash Flows Return on 
Investment and it is a model originally developed in 2002 by HOLT Value Associates, based in Chicago. Basically it is 
an indicator inflation-adjusted to measure the company ability to generate cash flows. 
Both EVA and RAB methods are approaches that adjust the NAV approach with the present value of future company 
performances.  
The market multiple approaches consider the market value of business companies similar to the company being valued, 
as observed either in trading prices of publicly traded companies or the purchase prices in the business sales, with 
respect to earnings or cash flows or book value of those business. 
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Table 2. Summary of variable definitions. 
Variable name Description Measure 
FE1 
First proxy for the forecast error 
FE1 =
TP − Pmax12m
Pt
 upward
TP − Pmin12m
Pt
 downward
⎧ 
⎨ ⎪ ⎪ 
⎩ ⎪ ⎪ 
⎫ 
⎬ ⎪ ⎪ 
⎭ ⎪ ⎪ 
 
FE2 
Second proxy for the forecast error
 
FE2 = TP − P+365
Pt
 
DISCLOSED_NOTDISCLOSED Indicating those reports disclosing the valuation 
methodology from those without any explanation of 
the methods used 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if in the report a valuation 
method is disclosed, 0 otherwise. 
PRIMARY_SECONDARY Indicating the method hierarchy (primary vs 
secondary) in the report.  
Dummy variable equal to 1 if there is a primary 
valuation method, 0 otherwise. 
PRIMARY Indicating those reports using just a primary valuation 
method to get the target price. 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the analyst uses just a 
main method to evaluate the company, 0 if the method 
is selected as primary in a group of other, secondary, 
methods. 
M_FIN, M_INC, M_NAV, 
M_HYB, M_MRATIO 
Set of variables indicating the different kinds of 
valuation methodologies used in the report 
Set of dummy variables representing the kind of 
method/s used in the report (M_FIN is the financial 
method, M_INC is an earnings-based method, M_NAV 
a NAV-based method, M_HYB represent the hybrid 
methods, M_RATIO indicates the market ratios 
methods). Each dummy gives value 1 to the category it 
represents, 0 otherwise. 
FUNDAMENTAL_MULTIPLE Variable indicating methods based on company 
fundamentals and methods based on company market 
multiples 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the analyst uses a 
fundamentals-based method, 0 if he/she uses a market 
ratios approach. 
MM_FIN, MM_INC, MM_NAV, 
MM_HYB, MM_MRATIO 
Set of variables indicating the different kinds of 
valuation methodologies used in the report as main 
method. 
Set of dummy variables representing the kind of main 
method used in the report. Each dummy gives value 1 
to the category it represents, 0 otherwise. (MM_FIN is 
the financial method, MM_INC is an earnings-based 
method, MM_NAV a NAV-based method, MM_HYB 
represent the hybrid methods, MM_RATIO indicates 
the market ratios methods) 
BOLDNESS Indicating the analyst boldness with respect to the 
prices. 
It is measured as the absolute value of the difference 
between the target price and the current stock price 
scaled by the current stock price 
VOL Indicating the price volatility. It is the standard deviation of company prices for each 
of the three years considered 
SIZE Indicating the company size. It is the natural logarithm of the firm’s market 
capitalization at the report issuing date 
GROWTH Indicating the company growth. It is the price-to-book-value ratio 
PMAFE First proxy for earnings forecasts. 
PMAFE ijt = AFE ijt − AAFE jt
AAFE jt
AFE Second proxy for earnings forecasts. 
AFE ijt = ACTUAL jt − FORECASTijt
ACTUAL jt
FORAGE It is a proxy for the forecast age. It is measured as the time interval between the forecast 
date and the fiscal year end 
NAZ It is a proxy for the analyst nationality. It is a dummy variable It is a dummy variable that is 
equal to 1 when the analyst nationality coincides with 
the company one, 0 otherwise. 
Notes. This table summarizes the definition of the variables used in the regression models. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics on target price accuracy 
 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics on target price accuracy – by analyst’s recommendation type 
Recommendation 
Type 
Positive 
Reccomendation 
Neutral 
Reccomendation 
Negative 
Reccomendation Total 
 FE1 FE2 FE1 FE2 FE1 FE2 FE1 FE2 
No. 945 945 356 356 223 223 1524 1524 
Mean 0.317 0.404 0.329 0.363 0.294 0.401 0.317 
0.39
4 
Std. Dev. 0.353 0.299 0.486 0.309 0.304 0.338 0.382 
0.30
8 
Median 0.24 0.36 0.2 0.29 0.19 0.3 0.23 0.34 
Max 6 2.38 6.75 2.29 1.89 1.72 6.75 2.38 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Skewness 7.321 
1.822 
7.334 
2.027 
1.817 
1.375 
7.234  
1.77
3 
Kurtosis 100.288 
9.803 
89.124 
9.514 
6.914 
4.823 100.19
5   
8.63
8 
Panel B. Descriptive statistics on target price accuracy – by year  
Year 2007 2008 2009 Total 
 FE1 FE2 FE1 FE2 FE1 FE2 FE1 FE2 
No. 162 162 753 753 614 614 1524 1524 
Mean 0.247 0.461 0.288 0.410 0.372 0.358 0.317 
0.39
4 
Std. Dev. 0.296 0.366 0.260 0.304 0.502 0.292 0.382 
0.30
8 
Median 0.16 0.4 0.22 0.36 0.25 0.29 0.23 0.34 
Max 1.48 1.99 2.37 2.33 6.75 2.38 6.75 2.38 
Min 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Skewness 2.736 1.618 2.349 1.752 7.160 1.813 7.234 
1.77
3 
Kurtosis 10.655 6.278 12.515 9.331 79.195 8.590 
100.19
5 
8.63
8 
Notes. Table 3 reports the main descriptives on forecast accuracy measures. Panel A and B report some descriptive 
statistics on the target price accuracy measures, distinguished by recommendation type and report year. The variable 
definitions are reported in Table 2. 
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Panel C. Descriptive statistics on target price accuracy – by level of disclosure of the valuation method used 
 DISCLOSED_NOTDISCLOSED=0 DISCLOSED_NOTDISCLOSED =1 TOTAL 
  No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min 
FE1 840 0.321 0.328 0.24 4.74 0 584 0.310 0.457 0.21 6.75 0 1424 0.316 0.386 0.23 6.75 0 
FE2 840 0.405 0.324 0.35 2.38 0 584 0.371 0.276 0.315 2.29 0 1424 0.391 0.306 0.34 2.38 0 
Panel D. Descriptive statistics on target price accuracy – by hierarchy of valuation methods 
  PRIMARY_SECONDARY =0 PRIMARY_SECONDARY =1 TOTAL 
  No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min 
FE1 361 0.285 0.256 0.21 1.49 0 231 0.345 0.651 0.21 6.75 0 592 0.308 0.454 0.21 6.75 0 
FE2 361 0.370 0.250 0.33 1.27 0.01 231 0.372 0.309 0.3 2.29 0 592 0.371 0.274 0.32 2.29 0 
  PRIMARY=0 PRIMARY=1 TOTAL 
  No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min 
FE1 78 0.287 0.275 0.205 1.46 0.01 154 0.372 0.773 0.215 6.75 0 232 0.344 0.650 0.21 6.75 0 
FE2 78 0.412 0.301 0.375 1.59 0.01 154 0.354 0.313 0.285 2.29 0 232 0.373 0.309 0.305 2.29 0 
Panel E. Descriptive statistics on target price accuracy – by fundamental-based and multiple-based valuation methods 
  FUNDAMENTAL_MULTIPLE =0 FUNDAMENTAL_MULTIPLE =1 TOTAL 
  No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min 
FE1 110 0.398 0.860 0.22 6.75 0 123 0.293 0.367 0.2 2.53 0.01 233 0.343 0.649 0.21 6.75 0 
FE2 110 0.393 0.282 0.345 1.59 0.01 123 0.356 0.331 0.28 2.29 0 233 0.373 0.309 0.31 2.29 0 
Panel F. Descriptive statistics on target price accuracy – by type of valuation method 
  M_FIN=0 M_FIN=1 TOTAL 
  No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min 
FE1 315 0.343 0.563 0.22 6.75 0 269 0.271 0.281 0.2 2.53 0 584 0.310 0.457 0.21 6.75 0 
FE2 315 0.393 0.270 0.35 2.29 0.01 269 0.345 0.282 0.28 1.82 0 584 0.371 0.276 0.315 2.29 0 
  M_INC=0 M_INC=1 TOTAL 
  No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min 
FE1 577 0.310 0.459 0.21 6.75 0 7 0.267 0.227 0.21 0.76 0.1 584 0.310 0.457 0.21 6.75 0 
FE2 577 0.370 0.276 0.31 2.29 0 7 0.489 0.249 0.56 0.76 0.13 584 0.371 0.276 0.315 2.29 0 
  M_NAV=0 M_NAV=1 TOTAL 
  No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min 
FE1 559 0.303 0.452 0.21 6.75 0 25 0.448 0.551 0.26 2.37 0.04 584 0.310 0.457 0.21 6.75 0 
FE2 559 0.359 0.261 0.31 1.82 0 25 0.641 0.426 0.51 2.29 0.15 584 0.371 0.276 0.315 2.29 0 
  M_HYB=0 M_HYB=1 TOTAL 
  No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min 
FE1 570 0.312 0.461 0.21 6.75 0 14 0.198 0.184 0.13 0.53 0.02 584 0.310 0.457 0.21 6.75 0 
FE2 570 0.370 0.277 0.31 2.29 0 14 0.416 0.213 0.385 0.8 0.07 584 0.371 0.276 0.315 2.29 0 
  M_MUL=0 M_MUL=1 TOTAL 
  No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min 
FE1 96 0.311 0.395 0.23 2.53 0.01 488 0.309 0.468 0.21 6.75 0 584 0.310 0.457 0.21 6.75 0 
FE2 96 0.358 0.351 0.285 2.29 0 488 0.374 0.259 0.33 1.59 0.01 584 0.371 0.276 0.315 2.29 0 
Panel G. Descriptive statistics on target price accuracy – by type of main valuation method 
  MM_FIN=0 MM_FIN=1 TOTAL 
  No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min 
FE1 118 0.404 0.852 0.22 6.75 0 114 0.281 0.324 0.2 2.53 0.01 232 0.344 0.650 0.21 6.75 0 
FE2 118 0.414 0.330 0.35 2.29 0.01 114 0.331 0.282 0.275 1.82 0 232 0.373 0.309 0.305 2.29 0 
  MM_INC=0 MM_INC=1 TOTAL 
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Notes. This table (Panel B to G) report the main descriptive statistics on the target price accuracy measures, grouped by 
the valuation method characteristics of the report used in this study. The variable definitions are reported in Table 2. 
 
Panel H. Other descriptive statistics on target price accuracy – by report valuation method features 
 DISCLOSED_NOTDISCLOSED =0 DISCLOSED_NOTDISCLOSED =1 
 skewness kurtosis p1 p5 p25 p75 p95 p99 skewness kurtosis p1 p5 p25 p75 p95 p99 
FE1 4.209998 43.776 0 0.02 0.11 0.41 0.945 1.41 8.741532 111.675 0.01 0.03 0.1 0.38 0.86 1.46 
FE2 1.903732 9.137 0.01 0.04 0.17 0.53 1.02 1.65 1.611262 8.403 0.01 0.04 0.16 0.51 0.89 1.24 
 PRIMARY_SECONDARY =0 PRIMARY_SECONDARY =1 
 skewness kurtosis p1 p5 p25 p75 p95 p99 skewness kurtosis p1 p5 p25 p75 p95 p99 
FE1 1.606958 5.931 0.01 0.03 0.1 0.39 0.8 1.22 7.358732 66.769 0.01 0.02 0.1 0.36 0.98 2.53 
FE2 0.85305 3.328 0.02 0.05 0.17 0.51 0.89 1.07 2.200216 11.304 0.01 0.04 0.16 0.5 0.85 1.59 
 PRIMARY=0 PRIMARY=1 
 skewness kurtosis p1 p5 p25 p75 p95 p99 skewness kurtosis p1 p5 p25 p75 p95 p99 
FE1 2.25932 8.787 0.01 0.05 0.11 0.35 0.96 1.46 6.477379 49.678 0.01 0.02 0.1 0.36 1.01 6 
FE2 1.08061 4.675 0.01 0.03 0.17 0.6 1.02 1.59 2.725243 14.640 0.01 0.04 0.15 0.46 0.83 1.82 
 FUNDAMENTAL_MULTIPLE=0 FUNDAMENTAL_MULTIPLE =1 
 skewness kurtosis p1 p5 p25 p75 p95 p99 skewness kurtosis p1 p5 p25 p75 p95 p99 
FE1 6.281608 44.299 0.01 0.02 0.11 0.36 0.98 6 3.809336 21.152 0.01 0.02 0.1 0.35 0.96 2.37 
FE2 1.351354 5.5780 0.02 0.06 0.18 0.54 0.95 1.3 2.674807 14.001 0.01 0.03 0.13 0.45 0.83 1.82 
 M_FIN=0 M_FIN=1 
 skewness kurtosis p1 p5 p25 p75 p95 p99 skewness kurtosis p1 p5 p25 p75 p95 p99 
FE1 8.186869 86.807 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.42 0.86 1.49 3.166292 19.812 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.34 0.87 1.33 
FE2 1.682951 10.181 0.03 0.07 0.2 0.56 0.85 1.08 1.594552 6.823 0.01 0.03 0.14 0.46 0.9 1.24 
 M_INC=0 M_INC=1 
 skewness kurtosis p1 p5 p25 p75 p95 p99 skewness kurtosis p1 p5 p25 p75 p95 p99 
FE1 8.719091 110.884 0.01 0.02 0.1 0.38 0.87 1.46 1.685403 4.402 0.1 0.1 0.11 0.29 0.76 0.76 
FE2 1.635258 8.5016 0.01 0.04 0.16 0.5 0.9 1.24 -0.5852587 1.801 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.7 0.76 0.76 
 M_NAV=0 M_NAV=1 
  No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min 
FE1 230 0.345 0.653 0.21 6.75 0 2 0.170 0.085 0.17 0.23 0.11 232 0.344 0.650 0.21 6.75 0 
FE2 230 0.373 0.310 0.305 2.29 0 2 0.365 0.332 0.365 0.6 0.13 232 0.373 0.309 0.305 2.29 0 
  MM_HYB=0 MM_HYB=1 TOTAL 
  No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min 
FE1 227 0.346 0.656 0.21 6.75 0 5 0.234 0.220 0.08 0.48 0.07 232 0.344 0.650 0.21 6.75 0 
FE2 227 0.370 0.310 0.3 2.29 0 5 0.512 0.293 0.65 0.8 0.07 232 0.373 0.309 0.305 2.29 0 
  MM_MUL=0 MM_MUL=1 TOTAL 
  No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min 
FE1 122 0.294 0.368 0.2 2.53 0.01 110 0.398 0.860 0.22 6.75 0 232 0.344 0.650 0.21 6.75 0 
FE2 122 0.355 0.332 0.28 2.29 0 110 0.393 0.282 0.345 1.59 0.01 232 0.373 0.309 0.305 2.29 0 
  MM_NAV=0 MM_NAV=1 TOTAL 
  No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min No. Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min 
FE1 231 0.335 0.638 0.21 6.75 0 1 2.370 . 2.37 2.37 2.37 232 0.344 0.650 0.21 6.75 0 
FE2 231 0.365 0.283 0.3 1.82 0 1 2.290 . 2.29 2.29 2.29 232 0.373 0.309 0.305 2.29 0 
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 skewness kurtosis p1 p5 p25 p75 p95 p99 skewness kurtosis p1 p5 p25 p75 p95 p99 
FE1 9.255953 121.626 0.01 0.02 0.1 0.38 0.84 1.26 2.234125 7.470 0.04 0.09 0.12 0.4 1.49 2.37 
FE2 1.282099 5.634 0.01 0.04 0.16 0.5 0.85 1.17 2.373052 9.999 0.15 0.24 0.39 0.84 1.04 2.29 
 M_HYB=0 M_HYB=1 
 skewness kurtosis p1 p5 p25 p75 p95 p99 skewness kurtosis p1 p5 p25 p75 p95 p99 
FE1 8.68665 109.91 0.01 0.03 0.1 0.38 0.87 1.46 0.7789851 2.034 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.36 0.53 0.53 
FE2 1.630386 8.442 0.01 0.04 0.16 0.51 0.9 1.24 0.0693842 2.229 0.07 0.07 0.27 0.57 0.8 0.8 
 M_MUL=0 M_MUL=1 
 skewness kurtosis p1 p5 p25 p75 p95 p99 skewness kurtosis p1 p5 p25 p75 p95 p99 
FE1 3.599761 19.076 0.01 0.02 0.075 0.38 0.97 2.53 9.293103 119.2 0.01 0.03 0.1 0.38 0.84 1.43 
FE2 2.823189 14.014 0 0.02 0.14 0.445 0.97 2.29 0.9911456 4.035 0.02 0.05 0.17 0.535 0.88 1.08 
 MM_FIN=0 MM_FIN=1 
 skewness kurtosis p1 p5 p25 p75 p95 p99 skewness kurtosis p1 p5 p25 p75 p95 p99 
FE1 6.099276 42.883 0.01 0.02 0.1 0.39 1.02 6 3.774152 23.224 0.01 0.02 0.1 0.34 0.96 1.33 
FE2 2.245488 11.664 0.02 0.06 0.18 0.57 1.02 1.59 2.021524 9.552 0.01 0.02 0.13 0.44 0.83 1.24 
 MM_INC=0 MM_INC=1 
 skewness kurtosis p1 p5 p25 p75 p95 p99 skewness kurtosis p1 p5 p25 p75 p95 p99 
FE1 7.34038 66.456 0.01 0.02 0.1 0.36 0.98 2.53 0 1 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.23 0.23 0.23 
FE2 2.189838 11.2405 0.01 0.04 0.16 0.5 0.85 1.59 0 1 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.6 0.6 0.6 
 MM_HYB=0 MM_HYB=1 
 skewness kurtosis p1 p5 p25 p75 p95 p99 skewness kurtosis p1 p5 p25 p75 p95 p99 
FE1 7.309883 65.801 0.01 0.02 0.11 0.35 0.98 2.53 0.4079907 1.168 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.47 0.48 0.48 
FE2 2.240929 11.501 0.01 0.04 0.16 0.49 0.85 1.59 -0.6554944 1.979 0.07 0.07 0.37 0.67 0.8 0.8 
 MM_NAV=0 MM_NAV=1 
 skewness kurtosis p1 p5 p25 p75 p95 p99 skewness kurtosis p1 p5 p25 p75 p95 p99 
FE1 7.748807 72.716 0.01 0.02 0.1 0.35 0.97 2.53 . . 2.37 2.37 2.37 2.37 2.37 2.37 
FE2 1.598129 7.093 0.01 0.04 0.16 0.5 0.85 1.3 . . 2.29 2.29 2.29 2.29 2.29 2.29 
 MM_MUL=0 MM_MUL=1 
 skewness kurtosis p1 p5 p25 p75 p95 p99 skewness kurtosis p1 p5 p25 p75 p95 p99 
FE1 3.791858 20.984 0.01 0.02 0.1 0.35 0.96 2.37 6.281608 44.299 0.01 0.02 0.11 0.36 0.98 6 
FE2 2.669866 13.913 0.01 0.03 0.13 0.45 0.83 1.82 1.351354 5.578 0.02 0.06 0.18 0.54 0.95 1.3 
Notes. Panel G reports other descriptive statistics on the target price accuracy measures, grouped by the valuation 
method characteristics of the report used in this study. The variable definitions are reported in Table 2. 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics of the control variables of the models 
2007 
 BOLDNESS FORAGE PMAFE VOL GROWTH SIZE NAZ 
No. 168 132 132 171 171 171 147 
Mean 0.22 190.90 0.02 4.31 2.71 10.81 0.69 
Std. Dev. 0.34 95.55 0.54 3.53 1.69 0.45 0.46 
Median 0.14 192 0 3.45 2.18 10.87 - 
Max 1.61 354 1.72 13.69 7.69 11.6 1 
Min -0.16 21 -0.97 0.12 1.18 9.45 0 
Skewness 2.67 0.01 0.67 0.79 1.69 -0.93 -0.84 
Kurtosis 10.34 1.85 3.34 2.48 4.80 4.03 1.71 
p1 -0.13 24 -0.95 0.12 1.29 9.45 0 
p5 -0.06 46 -0.83 0.76 1.34 9.91 0 
p25 0.03 103.5 -0.4 1.31 1.51 10.6 0 
p75 0.29 257 0.295 7.04 3.15 11.12 1 
p95 1.2 340 0.97 11.42 7.06 11.45 1 
p99 1.6 353 1.46 12.88 7.66 11.57 1 
2008 
 BOLDNESS FORAGE PMAFE VOL GROWTH SIZE NAZ 
No. 753 671 681 813 805 805 774 
Mean 0.36 100.97 0.01 6.10 1.85 10.33 0.39 
Std. Dev. 0.33 71.00 0.52 5.77 1.27 0.64 0.49 
Median 0.3 85 0.02 4.43 1.38 10.4 - 
Max 2.95 358 4.41 24.29 6.55 11.67 1 
Min -0.37 0 -1 0.33 0.26 7.63 0 
Skewness 1.993 1.440 2.359 1.734 1.443 -1.075 0.450 
Kurtosis 12.627 5.413 17.081 5.663 4.681 4.687 1.203 
p1 -0.18 8 -0.95 0.33 0.35 8.24 0 
p5 -0.07 16 -0.77 0.62 0.51 9.2 0 
p25 0.16 52 -0.24 2.08 0.93 10.01 0 
p75 0.5 146 0.17 8.46 2.36 10.79 1 
p95 0.89 272 0.63 20.4 4.58 11.17 1 
p99 1.45 342 2.13 24.29 6.12 11.37 1 
2009 
 BOLDNESS FORAGE PMAFE VOL GROWTH SIZE NAZ 
No. 614 557 550 666 663 663 643 
Mean 0.31 306.29 0.00 3.97 1.30 9.99 0.35 
Std. Dev. 0.34 30.06 0.54 3.33 0.87 0.75 0.48 
Median 0.27 308 -0.01 2.495 1.12 10.04 - 
Max 3.12 359 6.46 11.32 4.16 11.51 1 
Min -0.55 160 -1 0.09 0.03 5.71 0 
Skewness 1.782 -0.774 3.522 0.861 1.284 -1.511 0.622 
Kurtosis 12.188 5.020 39.603 2.547 4.418 8.666 1.387 
p1 -0.3 208 -0.95 0.09 0.2 7.87 0 
p5 -0.12 259 -0.77 0.38 0.35 8.55 0 
p25 0.1 287 -0.3 1.27 0.68 9.68 0 
p75 0.47 328 0.25 5.91 1.73 10.39 1 
p95 0.93 353 0.74 11.24 3.2 11.04 1 
p99 1.33 358 1.58 11.32 3.9 11.46 1 
Total 
 BOLDNESS FORAGE PMAFE VOL GROWTH SIZE NAZ 
No. 1535 1360 1363 1650 1639 1639 1564 
Mean 0.32 193.79 0.01 5.05 1.72 10.24 0.40 
Std. Dev. 0.34 114.79 0.53 4.82 1.26 0.71 0.49 
Median 0.27 170 0 3.81 1.36 10.3 - 
Max 3.12 359 6.46 24.29 7.69 11.67 1 
Min -0.55 0 -1 0.09 0.03 5.71 0 
Skewness 1.924 -0.092 2.690 39.751 1.781 -1.292 0.396 
Kurtosis 11.816 1.411 25.619 1603.309 6.787 7.018 1.157 
p1 -0.24 12 -0.95 0.12 0.29 8.11 0 
p5 -0.09 26.5 -0.77 0.47 0.395 8.96 0 
p25 0.11 78 -0.28 1.76 0.87 9.91 0 
p75 0.46 307 0.21 7.04 2.135 10.75 1 
p95 0.92 343 0.74 12.88 4.33 11.18 1 
p99 1.45 356 1.82 24.29 6.47 11.47 1 
Notes. This table reports the descriptive statistics (grouped by year and reported in total) of the control variables used in 
the different model specifications. Specifically, as reported in Table 2, BOLDNESS is the target price boldness and is 
measured as the absolute value of the difference between the target price and the current price scaled by current price; 
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VOL indicates the market price volatility measured as the standard deviation of company prices for each of the three 
years considered; SIZE indicates the natural logarithm of the firm’s market capitalization at the report issuing date; 
GROWTH is the company price-to-book-value ratio; PMAFE is the Proportional Mean Absolute Forecast Error and is 
the earnings forecast accuracy measure. It is computed as: 
PMAFE ijt = AFE ijt − AAFE jt
AAFE jt
 (-1) 
 
It measures the difference between the absolute forecast error (AFE) of analyst i forecasting earnings for firm j in the 
fiscal year t and the average absolute forecast error across all analyst forecasts of firm j’s fiscal year t earnings, 
expressed as a fraction of the average absolute forecast error across all analyst forecasts of firm j’s fiscal year t 
earnings. PMAFE controls for firm-year effects by subtracting the mean absolute forecast error, AAFE , from the 
analyst’s absolute forecast error. Deflating by AAFE reduces heteroskedasticity in forecast error distributions across 
firms (Clement (1999)). Multiplying by -1 ensures that higher values for PMAFE correspond to higher levels of 
accuracy. 
FORAGE is the time interval (in number of days) between the forecast date and the fiscal year end, while NAZ is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 whether the analyst’s nationality coincides with the company nationality, 0 otherwise. 
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics on the main independent variables of the models 
Year   DISCLOSED_NOTDISCLOSED PRIMARY_SECONDARY PRIMARY FUNDAMENTAL_MULTIPLE MM_FIN MM_INC MM_HYB 
2007 No. 166 85 33 33 33 33 33 
  
% 
(=1) 51.20% 38.82% 39.39% 33.33% 21.21% 3.03% 9.09% 
2008 No. 746 258 90 91 90 90 90 
  
% 
(=1) 34.18% 34.50% 68.89% 60.44% 55.56% 0.00% 3.33% 
2009 No. 612 262 111 111 111 111 111 
  
% 
(=1) 41.99% 42.37% 72.97% 52.25% 51.35% 0.90% 0.00% 
Total No. 1524 605 234 235 234 234 234 
  
% 
(=1) 39.17% 38.51% 66.67% 52.77% 48.72% 0.85% 2.56% 
Year   MM_NAV MM_MRATIO M_FIN M_INC M_NAV M_HYB M_MRATIO 
2007 No. 33 33 85 85 85 85 85 
  
% 
(=1) 0.00% 66.67% 50.59% 2.35% 12.94% 4.71% 91.76% 
2008 No. 90 90 255 255 255 255 255 
  
% 
(=1) 1.11% 40.00% 43.53% 1.18% 3.14% 2.75% 80.78% 
2009 No. 111 111 257 257 257 257 257 
  
% 
(=1) 0.00% 47.75% 46.30% 0.78% 3.50% 2.33% 83.27% 
Total No. 234 234 597 597 597 597 597 
  
% 
(=1) 0.43% 47.44% 45.73% 1.17% 4.69% 2.85% 83.42% 
Notes. This table reports the descriptive statistics (grouped by year and reported in total) of the main independent 
variables of the models. They synthesize the report valuation methods features. Specifically, as reported in Table 2, 
DISCLOSED_NOTDISCLOSED is a dummy variable assuming value equal to 1 whether in the report has a 
distinguishable valuation method, 0 otherwise. PRIMARY_SECONDARY  is equal to 1 if there’s a primary valuation 
method, 0 otherwise; the PRIMARY variable is equal to 1 if the analyst uses just that method to evaluate the company, 0 
if the method is chosen as primary in a group of other secondary methods; M_FIN, M_INC, M_NAV, M_HYB, 
M_MRATIO indicate different methods categories, respectively financial methods, income-based ones, net asset 
methods, hybrid and market ratios methods. Each variable is a dummy assuming value 1 in correspondence to the 
category it represents, 0 otherwise; FUNDAMENTAL_MULTIPLE is a variable assuming value equal to 1 if the analyst 
uses an absolute method (such as a financial method, an income based method, a hybrid or a net asset method, 0 if 
he/she uses a market ratios approach).;MM_FIN, MM_INC, MM_NAV, MM_HYB, MM_MRATIO are dummy variables 
representing the main valuation method used by the analyst. Each one is equal to 1 whether the analyst uses that 
specific method as main valuation method.  
ͷͲ  
Table 6. The correlation matrix among variables.  
Panel A - The Pearson’s correlation. 
 FE1 FE2 DISCLOSED_ 
NOTDISCLOSED 
PRIMARY_ 
SECONDARY 
PRIMARY M_FIN M_INC M_NAV M_MRATIO M_HYB
FE1 1          
FE2 0.4617* 1         
DISCLOSED 
_NOTDISCLOSED 
-0,0148 -
0.0551*
1        
 
PRIMARY 
_SECONDARY 
0,064 0,0034 0.1026* 1       
 
PRIMARY 
0,0624 -0,0883   1      
M_FIN -
0.0785* 
-
0.0857*
 0.1665* -0.3348* 1     
M_INC -0,0102 0,047  -0,0237 -0.1313* -
0.0687*
1    
M_NAV 0,0644 0.2069*  0,0494 -0.3185* -
0.0923*
0.1230* 1   
M_MRATIO -0,0017 0,0217  -0.3165* -0.4761* -
0.4315*
0,0486 0,035 1  
M_HYB -0,0384 0,0258  -0,0057 -0,0887 -0,0359 -0,0186 0.1526* -0.0861* 1 
FUNDAMENTAL 
_MULTIPLE 
-0,0814 -0,0606   -0.1634* 0.7701* 0,0877 -
0.1940* 
-0.6351* 0.1658*  
MM_FIN -0,0953 -
0.1338*
  -0.1270* 0.8643* -0,0905 -
0.2098* 
-0.6170* -0,121 
MM_INC -0,0249 -0,0025   -0.1313* -0,1047 1.0000* -0,0234 0,0625 -0,0163
MM_MRATIO 0,0804 0,0614   0.1634* -
0.7782*
-0,0882 0.1934* 0.6397* -
0.1668*
MM_HYB -0,0251 0,0667   -0,0574 -
0.1829*
-0,0151 -0,0409 -0,0658 0.9238* 
BOLD 0.3770* 0.3416* -0.1293* -0,0341 0,0248 -0,0541 -0,0493 0,0657 0,0245 0,0629 
FORAGE 0.0921* -0,0162 0.0888* 0.0758* -0,0155 0,0075 0,0326 0,0188 0,0491 0,0496 
PMAFE 0,0262 0.1035* -0.0492* 0 0,0479 0,0117 -0,0187 -0,0199 -0,0485 -0.0582  
VOL 0.0569* 0.1883* -0,028 0,0581 -0,0813 -
0.1411*
-0,0119 0,0607 0,0495 -0.0462  
GROWTH -
0.2277* 
-
0.1749*
0.0886* 0,0666 -0,0469 0.1488* 0,0012 -
0.0904* 
-0,0519 -
0.0697*  
SIZE -
0.3878* 
-
0.1898*
-0,0288 -0,0016 -0.1333* 0,0619 0.0696* -0,0379 0,0341 0,0226 
NAZ 0,021 0.0830* -0.1279* -0.0797* -0.1698* -0,0036 -0,0001 0.0973* 0.0842* 0,0319 
 
Panel B - The Pearson’s correlation. 
 FUNDAMENTAL
_MULTIPLE 
MM_FIN MM_INC MM_MRATIO MM_HYB BOLD FORAGE PMAFE VOL GROWTH SIZE NAZ
FUNDAMENTAL 
_MULTIPLE 
1            
MM_FIN 0.9259* 1           
MM_INC 0,0882 -0,0905 1          
MM_MRATIO -1 -0.9259* -0,0882 1         
MM_HYB 0.1541* -0.1581* -0,0151 -0.1541* 1        
BOLD 0,0066 0,0058 -0,0429 -0,0074 0,008 1       
FORAGE -0,0599 -0,0584 -0,046 0,0576 0,0659 -
0.0916*
1      
PMAFE 0,0799 0,1059 -0,0783 -0,0799 -0,0489 0,0311 0.1270* 1     
VOL -0.1253* -0.1270* -0,0749 0.1257* 0,043 0.0460* -0.1249* 0,0109 1    
GROWTH 0,0968 0.1240* -0,0085 -0,0945 -0,052 -
0.2329*
-0.1227* 0.0471* -
0.0992* 
1   
SIZE 0,0171 -0,0117 0,0322 -0,0175 0.1627* -
0.1479*
-0.1472* 0.0742* 0,022 0.3878* 1  
NAZ -0,1027 -0.1670* 0,0427 0,1027 0.1814* 0.1060* -0,0027 0,0297 0.0898* -0.0542* 0.0569* 1 
ͷͳ  
Notes. These panels (A and B – Table 6) report the correlation matrix of the different model specification variables. It is 
based on the Pearson’s correlation definition. Some of the correlations are missing because of the variables definition. 
All the variables have been defined above. 
* denotes significance at the 10% 
 
Table 7. The correlation matrix among variables.  
Panel A - The Spearman’s correlation. 
 FE1 FE2 DISCLOSED_ 
NOTDISCLOSED
PRIMARY 
_SECONDARY
PRIMARY M_FIN M_INC M_NAV M_MRATIO M_HYB 
FE1 1          
FE2 0.4955*  1         
DISCLOSED_ 
NOTDISCLOSED 
-0.0569*  -0,0403 1        
 
PRIMARY 
_SECONDARY 
-0,0014 -0,0298  0.1026* 1       
PRIMARY -0,0125 -0.1155* . . 1      
M_FIN -0.0721*  -
0.1164* 
.    0.1665*  -0.3348* 1     
M_INC 0,0001 0,061 . -0,0237 -0.1313* -0.0687* 1    
M_NAV 0,0551 0.1770* . 0,0494 -0.3185* -0.0923* 0.1230* 1   
M_MRATIO 0,0128 0,0651 . -0.3165* -0.4761* -0.4315* 0,0486 0,035 1  
M_HYB -0,0572 0,0476 . -0,0057 -0,0887 -0,0359 -0,0186 0.1526* -0.0861* 1 
FUNDAMENTAL 
_MULTIPLE 
-0,0613 -0,1056 . . -0.1634* 0.7701* 0,0877 -0.1940* -0.6351* 0.1658* 
MM_FIN -0,0611 -0.1505* . . -0.1270* 0.8643* -0,0905 -0.2098* -0.6170* -0.1210*
MM_INC -0,0321 0,0041 . . -0.1313* -0,1047 1.0000* -0,0234 0,0625 -0,0163 
MM_MRATIO 0,0594 0,108 . . 0.1634* -0.7782* -0,0882 0.1934* 0.6397* -0.1668*
MM_HYB -0,0282 0,0896 . . -0,0574 -0.1829* -0,0151 -0,0409 -0,0658 0.9238* 
BOLD 0.3102* 0.1991* -0.1515* -0,0356 -0,0018 -0,0623 -0,0605 0.0691* 0,0311 0,0577 
FORAGE 0.0779* 0,0007 0.0730* 0,057 -0,009 -0,006 0,0264 0,0157 0,044 0,0518 
PMAFE 0,0095 0.0926* -0.0544* -0,0287 0,0547 -0,0156 -0,0023 -0,0204 -0,0198 -0,0648 
VOL 0.0527* 0.1335* -0,0081 0.0791* -0.1091* -0.1276* -0,0157 0,0243 0,0578 -0,0548 
GROWTH -0.2836* -0.1905* 0.1166* 0.1231* -0.1242* 0.2087* 0,0374 -0.0799* -0.0699* -0,0456 
SIZE -0.2034* -0.0690* -0,0379 0,012 -0.1256* 0,0394 0.0797* 0,0309 0,0349 0,0438 
NAZ 0,0274 0.0960* -0.1279* -0.0797* -0.1698* -0,0036 -0,0001 0.0973* 0.0842* 0,0319 
Panel B - The Spearman’s correlation. 
 FUNDAMENTAL
_MULTIPLE 
MM_FIN MM_INC MM_MRATIO MM_HYB BOLD FORAGE PMAFE VOL GROWTH SIZE NAZ
FUNDAMENTAL 
_MULTIPLE 
1            
MM_FIN 0.9259*  1           
MM_INC 0,0882 -0,0905 1          
MM_MRATIO -1   -0.9259* -0,0882 1         
MM_HYB 0.1541*  -0.1581*  -0.0151  -0.1541* 1        
BOLD 0,0364 0,0321 -0,0592 -0,0372 0,0163 1       
FORAGE -0,0429 -0,0528 -0,0554 0,0419 0,0988 -
0.0950*
1      
PMAFE 0,0838 0,1013 -0,0694 -0,0839 -0,0411 0.0596* 0.1731* 1     
VOL -0.1451* -0.1572* -0,095 0.1473* 0,0696 -0,0152 -0.0644* 0,0442 1    
GROWTH 0,1052 0.1183* 0,0219 -0,1019 -0,0099 -
0.2847*
-0.1018* 0.0954* 0,02 1   
SIZE -0,0077 -0,0613 0,0275 0,0064 0.2028* -
0.0782*
-0.1435* 0.1324* 0,0377 0.4842* 1  
NAZ -0,1027 -0.1670* 0,0427 0,1027 0.1814* 0.1249* 0,0002 0,0086 0.0971* -0.0666* 0.0827* 1 
ͷʹ  
Notes. These panels (A and B – Table  7) report the correlation matrix among of the different model specification 
variables. It is based on the Spearman’s correlation definition. Some of the correlations are missing because of the 
variables definition. All the variables have been defined above. 
* denotes significance at the 10% 
 
Table 8. The effect on the target price accuracy of the valuation methods disclosure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES FE1 FE1 FE1 FE1 
     
BOLD  0.364*** 0.394*** 0.386*** 
  (0) (0) (0) 
FORAGE  0.000255 0.000280*  
  (0.109) (0.0907)  
PMAFE  0.0267 0.0155  
  (0.125) (0.440)  
VOL  0.00294 0.00376  
  (0.238) (0.152)  
GROWTH  0.0917*** 0.0996*** 0.0898*** 
  (9.43e-08) (1.26e-08) (2.31e-10) 
SIZE  -0.346*** -0.348*** -0.311*** 
  (0) (0) (0) 
D_2008  -0.109*** -0.0973**  
  (0.00358) (0.0118)  
D_2009  -0.103** -0.0823*  
  (0.0250) (0.0816)  
NAZ  -0.00682 0.00402  
  (0.736) (0.849)  
DISCLOSED_NOTDISCL
OSED 
-0.0109  0.0277 0.0270 
 (0.599)  (0.165) (0.129) 
Constant 0.321*** 3.623*** 3.578*** 3.209*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
     
Observations 1,424 1,275 1,213 1,424 
R-squared 0.000 0.287 0.298 0.281 
Number of sector 20 20 20 20 
pval in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes. This table reports the main results of equation (5), testing the effect on the target price accuracy of the valuation 
methods disclosure. Table 2 defines all the variables used. 
 
 
 
ͷ͵  
 
Table 9. The effect on the target price accuracy of the valuation method hierarchy disclosure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES FE1 FE1 FE1 FE1 
     
BOLD  0.364*** 0.384*** 0.371*** 
  (0) (5.15e-10) (2.02e-10) 
FORAGE  0.000255 0.000294  
  (0.109) (0.265)  
PMAFE  0.0267 -0.00885  
  (0.125) (0.794)  
VOL  0.00294 0.0107**  
  (0.238) (0.0231)  
GROWTH  0.0917*** 0.129*** 0.117*** 
  (9.43e-08) (1.71e-05) (2.50e-06) 
SIZE  -0.346*** -0.464*** -0.427*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
D_2008  -0.109*** -0.109*  
  (0.00358) (0.0702)  
D_2009  -0.103** -0.110  
  (0.0250) (0.141)  
NAZ  -0.00682 -0.00534  
  (0.736) (0.888)  
PRIMARY_SECONDARY 0.110***  0.104*** 0.116*** 
 (0.00635)  (0.00300) (0.000514) 
Constant 0.266*** 3.623*** 4.656*** 4.305*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
     
Observations 592 1,275 541 592 
R-squared 0.013 0.287 0.360 0.334 
Number of sector 20 20 20 20 
pval in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes. This table reports the main results of equation (6), testing the effect on the target price accuracy of the valuation 
methods hierarchy disclosure. Table 2 defines all the variables used. 
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Table 10. The effect on the target price accuracy of the main and unique valuation method 
disclosure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES FE1 FE1 FE1 FE1 
     
BOLD  0.364*** 0.805*** 0.821*** 
  (0) (0) (0) 
FORAGE  0.000255 6.51e-06  
  (0.109) (0.988)  
PMAFE  0.0267 0.0133  
  (0.125) (0.815)  
VOL  0.00294 0.00405  
  (0.238) (0.655)  
GROWTH  0.0917*** 0.235*** 0.178*** 
  (9.43e-08) (1.90e-05) (2.38e-05) 
SIZE  -0.346*** -0.747*** -0.684*** 
  (0) (0) (0) 
D_2008  -0.109*** -0.193*  
  (0.00358) (0.0622)  
D_2009  -0.103** -0.0654  
  (0.0250) (0.580)  
NAZ  -0.00682 0.184***  
  (0.736) (0.00839)  
PRIMARY 0.101  -0.0723 -0.0543 
 (0.289)  (0.237) (0.343) 
Constant 0.277*** 3.623*** 7.400*** 6.805*** 
 (0.000285) (0) (0) (0) 
     
Observations 232 1,275 210 232 
R-squared 0.005 0.287 0.694 0.650 
Number of sector 20 20 20 20 
pval in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes. This table reports the main results of equation (7), testing the effect on the target price accuracy of the main and 
unique valuation method disclosure. Table 2 defines all the variables used. 
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Table 11. The effect on the target price accuracy of different valuation methods  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES FE1 FE1 FE1 FE1 
     
BOLD  0.364*** 0.396*** 0.382*** 
  (0) (4.66e-10) (1.55e-10) 
FORAGE  0.000255 0.000292  
  (0.109) (0.282)  
PMAFE  0.0267 -0.0114  
  (0.125) (0.745)  
VOL  0.00294 0.0111**  
  (0.238) (0.0227)  
GROWTH  0.0917*** 0.127*** 0.108*** 
  (9.43e-08) (3.35e-05) (1.87e-05) 
SIZE  -0.346*** -0.459*** -0.418*** 
  (0) (0) (0) 
D_2008  -0.109*** -0.119*  
  (0.00358) (0.0561)  
D_2009  -0.103** -0.104  
  (0.0250) (0.185)  
NAZ  -0.00682 -0.0132  
  (0.736) (0.737)  
M_FIN -0.0198  -0.00885 -0.0163 
 (0.678)  (0.839) (0.681) 
M_INC -0.157  0.0214 0.00813 
 (0.363)  (0.892) (0.955) 
M_NAV 0.174*  0.112 0.190** 
 (0.0961)  (0.249) (0.0290) 
M_MRATIO -0.0657  -0.0534 -0.0503 
 (0.257)  (0.301) (0.295) 
M_HYB -0.311**  -0.0594 -0.106 
 (0.0161)  (0.636) (0.328) 
Constant 0.375*** 3.623*** 4.690*** 4.319*** 
 (4.62e-09) (0) (0) (0) 
     
Observations 584 1,275 531 584 
R-squared 0.016 0.287 0.353 0.329 
Number of sector 20 20 20 20 
pval in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes. This table reports the main results of equation (8), testing the effect on the target price accuracy of different 
valuation methods used. Table 2 defines all the variables used. 
ͷ͸  
 
Table 12. The effect on the target price accuracy of the “absolute” and “relative” valuation 
methods  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES FE1 FE1 FE1 FE1 
     
BOLD  0.364*** 0.807*** 0.826*** 
  (0) (0) (0) 
FORAGE  0.000255 -3.09e-05  
  (0.109) (0.944)  
PMAFE  0.0267 0.0220  
  (0.125) (0.704)  
VOL  0.00294 0.00452  
  (0.238) (0.618)  
GROWTH  0.0917*** 0.228*** 0.175*** 
  (9.43e-08) (2.96e-05) (2.52e-05) 
SIZE  -0.346*** -0.739*** -0.678*** 
  (0) (0) (0) 
D_2008  -0.109*** -0.203**  
  (0.00358) (0.0488)  
D_2009  -0.103** -0.0641  
  (0.0250) (0.589)  
NAZ  -0.00682 0.185***  
  (0.736) (0.00812)  
FUNDAMENTAL 
_MULTIPLE 
-0.0607  -0.0631 -0.0954 
 (0.549)  (0.360) (0.115) 
Constant 0.375*** 3.623*** 7.328*** 6.756*** 
 (7.45e-08) (0) (0) (0) 
     
Observations 233 1,275 210 233 
R-squared 0.002 0.287 0.693 0.653 
Number of sector 20 20 20 20 
pval in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes. This table reports the main results of equation (9), testing the effect on the target price accuracy of “absolute” 
and “relative” valuation methods. Table 2 defines all the variables used. 
 
 
 
 
ͷ͹  
Table 13. The effect on the target price accuracy of different kinds of main valuation methods 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES FE1 FE1 FE1 FE1 FE1 
      
MM_FIN -0.923** 0.0709  0.228 -0.104 
 (0.0364) (0.738)  (0.407) (0.102) 
MM_INC -1.152** -0.157 -0.228  -0.332 
 (0.0249) (0.639) (0.407)  (0.220) 
MM_MRATIO -0.820* 0.175 0.104 0.332  
 (0.0601) (0.407) (0.102) (0.220)  
MM_HYB -0.994**  -0.0709 0.157 -0.175 
 (0.0441)  (0.738) (0.639) (0.407) 
MM_NAV  0.994** 0.923** 1.152** 0.820* 
  (0.0441) (0.0364) (0.0249) (0.0601) 
BOLD 0.836*** 0.836*** 0.836*** 0.836*** 0.836*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
GROWTH 0.175*** 0.175*** 0.175*** 0.175*** 0.175*** 
 (2.99e-05) (2.99e-05) (2.99e-05) (2.99e-05) (2.99e-05) 
SIZE -0.658*** -0.658*** -0.658*** -0.658*** -0.658*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Constant 7.380*** 6.386*** 6.457*** 6.229*** 6.560*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
      
Observations 232 232 232 232 232 
R-squared 0.662 0.662 0.662 0.662 0.662 
Number of sector 20 20 20 20 20 
pval in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes. This table reports the main results of equation (10), testing the effect on the target price accuracy of different 
types of main valuation methods used. Table 2 defines all the variables used. 
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Graphs 
 
Graph 1. Target Price Accuracy across sectors 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 2. Target Price Accuracy across different recommendation categories 
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Graph 3. Percentage of different categories of valuation approaches over the years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 4. Percentage of different kinds of methods over the years 
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Graph 5. Percentage of different categories of methods across sectors 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Paper II 
Transparency and the Market Impact of Security Analyst Recommendations 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper investigates whether the level of transparency in the disclosures of financial analysts, 
conditional on the release of other information, is value-relevant for capital markets. According to 
the part of literature on company disclosure showing that the quality of the information disclosed is 
more value relevant than its quantity, our expectation is that analysts who disclose more relevant 
details about how they evaluate a company make the monitoring of companies by shareholders 
easier and generate greater market reaction. 
An analyst report is the final product of the analyst’s work which includes the collection and 
valuation of information related to the future performance of a specific company. The process starts 
with the company’s disclosure of public information, such as their strategies, the competitive 
landscape, financial data and other non-financial factors, for example the quality of their 
management. With this information, analysts use their skills to process, through the use of one or 
more valuation methods, these heterogeneous data into a valuation of the firm. Then, by comparing 
their estimates to current trading prices, their forecasts result in a stock recommendation. This 
complex process of collecting and evaluating information results in a written report, which usually 
contains a minimum content, including at least three summary measures on its front page, that is, 
the actual recommendation level (i.e., buy, hold or sell), the earnings forecast and the target price 
forecast. In addition, sometimes the full text of the report can provide quantitative and qualitative 
analyses supporting the three summary measures. The further disclosed information of this 
additional part can be rich and extensive. In these cases, the analysts may show in a more or less 
transparent way the valuation method(s) which they have used to arrive at their final 
recommendation and, thus, provide the investors with the details of how the company valuation has 
been conducted. The degree of disclosure transparency in a report is not a straightforward measure. 
In general terms, disclosure is different from transparency. An analyst can disclose many company 
details, but investors are still left in the dark. Too much disclosed information has the potential to 
add noise to the observed equity returns, thereby making it difficult to assess company value. 
Therefore, the amount of information disclosed by an analyst should be irrelevant for the market. 
͸ʹ  
On the other hand, how the analyst estimates company value should be relevant. In other words, we 
assume that the relevant information is that which is included in the report and thus translated into 
specific model assumptions by the analysts in their valuation procedures. From this perspective, the 
valuation method is important, as it is the synthesis of the information selected by the analyst. It is 
meta-information.  
Under this assumption, the method of disclosure is a key indicator of the transparency of a report. 
This assumption is also supported by the European Commission in Directive 2003/125/EC, known 
as the Market Abuse Directive (MAD), the European counterpart of the US regulations on the fair 
disclosure and transparency of the financial markets, which requires investment banks to summarize 
adequately “…any basis of valuation or methodology used to evaluate a financial instrument or an 
issuer of a financial instrument, or to set a price target for a financial instrument” (article 4, 
Directive 2003/125/EC).  
Therefore, we define a report as transparent when the valuation methods used to perform the 
analysis are clearly disclosed by the analyst. Conversely, in this framework, a report is opaque 
when the valuation methods are not disclosed. A set of criteria is developed to measure this level 
and reduce the subjectivity of assessment, and it has been cross-checked by different researchers.  
Our results partially replicate the findings of prior literature, showing that changes of 
recommendation are significantly associated with market reaction to the release of analysts’ reports. 
Results also show that the target prices may contain important information for the market, 
depending on how bold and unconventional the forecasts (target prices) are. However, these 
findings add new information about the nature and the source of the market reaction to the release 
of analysts’ report. We show that market reaction is not symmetric and what causes this asymmetry 
is the level of disclosure transparency in the report. This means that, in general, markets react 
consistently to the signal provided by recommendations and target prices, but they also modify their 
reaction depending on the additional information provided. Interestingly, the positive reaction of 
investors to good news is unconditional with regard to the level of information disclosed by 
analysts. However, they only trust negative news when they are provided with the supporting 
elements which enable their understanding of the valuation procedures which underpin the 
estimates. 
We then investigate whether the results are affected by other variables, such as the broker’s 
reputation and/or the confounding effect derived from information releases which occur 
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contemporaneously with the analyst’s report. However, none of the variables used as a reputation 
measure or confounding effect proxy are statistically significant. 
Although prior literature has documented that analyst reports usually trigger a significant market 
reaction around their release, it remains unclear which part of informational content of financial 
reports is relevant in terms of value for the capital market. Much of the previous analysis is only 
based on the minimum content of the reports (recommendations and target prices) or on the 
forecasts of earnings usually collected from commercial datasets (e.g. Womack (1996), Gleason and 
Lee (2000), Mikhail et al. (1997)). However, generally, these studies have not measured the value 
of analyst recommendations when these recommendations are released concurrently with other 
report information. Asquith et al. (2005) represent a noticeable exception in this context. They 
investigated the association between market returns and the content of analyst reports and their 
findings show that there is no correlation between the specific type of valuation methodology used 
by analysts and market reaction. However, examination of the justifications made to support 
investment recommendations, show that they provide significant information to the market. This 
result suggests that the investors are sensitive to the level of disclosure made by analysts, but the 
potential effect of this transparency on the stock market beyond quantity of disclosure is still an 
open empirical question. Although this paper is strongly related to Asquith et al. (2005), our study 
helps to fill a gap in the literature by providing a direct analysis of the relationship between the 
level of disclosure made by analysts and market reaction. Furthermore, it proposes a different 
definition of disclosure transparency, based on a new foundation and tests whether this notion may 
be relevant in determining how informative analyst research is. The dataset allows us to obtain 
more general results, dealing with the issue of selection bias, as characterised in Asquith et al. 
(2005)’s research. The authors, in fact, concentrated their analysis only on celebrity analysts, 
excluding others. Moreover, they collected reports from Investext, a commercial database which 
contains only those reports which investment banks are willing to make publicly available. 
Financial analyst reports are not usually freely available to the market. Therefore, the sample does 
not include the reports of famous investment banks which are relevant to the market, such as 
Goldman Sachs. From this perspective, Italy represents a uniquely advantageous research setting as 
the Italian market operates with a mandatory rule imposed on all investment banks, both domestic 
and international, which issue research reports on Italian-listed firms, to deposit them with the 
Italian Stock Exchange. Thus, these reports are available to all investors. We take advantage of this 
prescription and analyse 4,603 research reports issued by 50 different investment banks in relation 
to 28 Italian-listed firms over a four-year time range (2000-2003). We carefully read the full text of 
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the reports and catalogue by hand the information therein, both the summary measures and, 
whenever possible, additional information provided in the valuation methods used. 
It is well documented that the disclosure of information is important in order to mitigate asymmetric 
information and agency problems. Financial analysts are important information providers in capital 
markets. Providing valuable research for investors, they facilitate optimal capital allocation and 
reduce information asymmetry. Therefore, analysis of the transparency of their disclosures is 
helpful for both investors and the regulators in the better control of the financial analyst profession. 
Furthermore, this study may also be important for the financial services industry in order to 
optimise the huge resources which it invests in security research and the issue of reports. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 supplies a review of the issues 
addressed in the literature; Section 3 outlines the development of the research hypothesis; Section 4 
describes the data used and the sample selection procedures; Section 5 provides an overview of the 
research methodology; Section 6 reports the empirical results; and Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature review 
Security analyst reports have already been the subject of extensive empirical and experimental 
research and there has also been considerable academic research on the value provided by financial 
analysts in reviewing company disclosures and in making their own disclosures on the firm. 
Research on the role of financial analysts in capital markets indicates that they play a valuable role 
in improving market efficiency. This paper is related to that field of research. Early investigations 
were primarily focused on the information provided to investors from two summary measures 
issued by analysts: earnings forecasts and investment recommendations. Most of these studies show 
that research reports are worthy and can improve market efficiency by conveying new information 
to the market. For example, Givoly and Lakonishok (1980) and Griffin (1976) documented 
significant abnormal returns at the same time as earning forecast revisions were released. Lys and 
Sohn (1990) found that each analyst forecast was informative on price, though preceded by other 
types of disclosure, including the forecast revisions of other analysts. Stickel (1992) highlighted that 
analyst members of the II-All American team issued more accurate forecasts which had a more 
significant impact on short-term pricing. Gleason and Lee (2000) analysed not only the immediate 
impact of the forecast changes on prices, but extended the time horizon of their monitoring up to 
two years after the time of the revision and detected a persistent price drift in each of these two 
years. 
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Research on revisions in analyst recommendations has also found a positive association between 
abnormal returns and the direction of a change of recommendation. For example, Womack (1996) 
analysed investment recommendations in the US market. In examining the time around the changes 
of recommendation, it was found that extra returns were registered after the issue of 
recommendations.  
More recent research demonstrates that the documented market reaction also depends on some 
features either of the analysts or their forecasts, such as the expected accuracy and timing of 
forecasts, the analyst’s experience, the broker’s size and the frequency of forecasts (see Stickel 
(1992), Abarbanell et al. (1995), Mikhail et al. (1997), Clement (1999), Jacob et al. (1999), Park 
and Stice (2000) and Clement and Tse (2003)). 
Particularly interesting for this research are the studies looking more in depth at report content and 
the properties which cannot be found in the commercial datasets, either through surveys or content 
analysis. Hill and Knowlton (1984), Previts et al. (1994) and Hirst et al. (1995) showed that analysts 
do not limit their studies to accounting information (so-called financial reports) but use much else. 
The application of a methodology based on questionnaires, interviews and, in particular, content 
analysis, allows a quick but inflexible and superficial filing of the reports’ content. Given these and 
the other potential limitations of using such a methodology for the evaluation of the value of 
different valuation models to investors, a perspective focusing on the actual practices of equity 
analysts represents an alternative and better way to analyse the issue. Such a perspective is adopted 
in this paper, similarly to Asquith et al. (2005). They analysed the complete text of a sample of 
1,126 actual analyst reports, summarising their content and then examining the reaction of the 
market to many of their features. In the first part of the work, their study replicated previous 
research analysing the market reaction to earnings forecasts, target prices, recommendations and 
revisions. The authors then demonstrated that other information, such as the arguments used by 
analysts to justify their reports, is also important and, if incorporated into the analysis, reduces and, 
in some models, eliminates the significance of the information available in earnings forecasts and 
revisions of recommendation. Their analysis also controlled for the simultaneous release of other 
information and showed that analyst reports do not merely repeat corporate information releases, 
but they convey independent news to the market. By examining whether the market’s reaction 
differs by report type (i.e., upgrade, reiteration or downgrade), the results showed that the 
information provided in a report is more important for downgrades than for upgrades. Furthermore, 
the authors examined the accuracy of price targets and the importance of the valuation methodology 
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used by the analysts. With regard to the latter, the authors failed to observe any systematic 
association between it and either the market’s reaction or the probability of achieving a price target.  
Though strongly related to Asquith et al. (2005)’s work, this paper differs from it in several ways. 
First, Asquith et al. adopted an analytical approach, though not exhaustive, to test how a list of 
quantitative and qualitative report information could affect market reaction. Specifically, their 
results show that the amount and consistency of the information supporting the investment 
recommendations are relevant to value. We, however, adopt a synthetic approach, defining the 
transparency of a report by looking at the disclosure of the method of valuation.    
Furthermore, on a horizontal level, this work assumes a wider perspective since we analyse a 
significantly larger dataset. This structure of data allows us to cope with the problem of selection 
bias, which is characterised in Asquith et al.’s research. Since they employed only the top-ranked 
US analysts, they incurred a selection bias issue with respect to the valuation methods used by the 
analysts. The larger size of our dataset and the heterogeneity of this data allow us to obtain more 
generalised results.  
 
3. Research hypothesis development  
Investors require value-relevant information on the future profitability of a company in order to 
assess its equity value correctly. However, information asymmetries and agency problems prevent 
managers from providing investors with value-relevant information in an effective manner. One 
solution to this problem is represented by financial analysts, who can compensate for this 
inefficiency by disclosing and elaborating on their analysis. The effectiveness of their disclosure 
can be measured by the market reaction to the dissemination of the information therein.  
As documented by prior literature on company disclosure, not only the quantity, but also the quality 
of disclosures is relevant for the capital markets.12 Financial analysts are important intermediaries 
for company information. As discussed earlier, prior research has analysed how their investment 
recommendation, earnings forecast and target price releases affect the market. Similar to the 
importance of company disclosure, we investigate whether the level of disclosure of financial 
analyst reports, measured in terms of their transparency, influences the market reaction to their 
release.  
                                                        
12 See Verrecchia (2001) for a comprehensive review of the topic. 
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Our expectation is also supported by the laws regulating the financial analyst profession. With 
regard to the US, two major regulatory changes are worth mentioning: the Regulation Fair 
Disclosure (RegFD, October 2000) prohibits US firms from making selective disclosures and the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Section 501 (SOX501, July 2002), reinforces investors’ protection against 
analysts’ conflicts of interest. In the same vein, in 2003, the European Parliament adopted Directive 
2003/6/EC, known as the Market Abuse Directive (MAD), which is the European counterpart of the 
US regulations. The legislation makes it compulsory for analysts to disclose their interests, i.e. 
brokerage and investment banking ties, in the firms they recommend and to provide investors with a 
summary of “any basis of valuation or methodology used to evaluate a financial instrument or an 
issuer of a financial instrument, or to set a price target for a financial instrument” (MAD, Article 4, 
Point B).  The regulator’s aim is to confront analysts’ conflicts of interest, thereby making their 
forecasts more reliable. This imposition suggests that in order to protect investors, there is a need to 
regulate financial analysts’ disclosures to increase the amount of value-relevant information 
(recommendations, target prices and valuation methodologies) available to the public.  
Therefore, our main research question is to investigate the relationship between the practice of 
analyst disclosure and market reaction, conditional on the presence of basic information, namely 
investment recommendations and target prices.  
In general terms, an analyst can disclose many company details, but investors can still be left in the 
dark. If a disclosure provides low-quality incremental information, then it is likely to increase the 
level of noise, thereby making it difficult for investors to assess company value. Therefore the 
amount of information disclosed by an analyst should be irrelevant for the market (i.e. the quantity 
of disclosure). Conversely, how the analyst arrives at their estimate of the value of a company 
should be relevant. In other words, we assume that the relevant information is that which is 
contained in the reports and, thus, translated into specific model assumptions by the analysts during 
their valuation procedures. From this perspective, the method of valuation is important as it is the 
synthesis of the information selected by the analyst. It is meta-information. Working under this 
assumption, disclosure of the method is the key indicator of the report’s transparency (i.e. the 
quality of disclosure).  
Therefore, our expectation is to find a positive relationship between the level of transparency and 
market reaction. If an analyst discloses more relevant details about the information set used to 
evaluate a company, he or she facilitates the monitoring of companies by shareholders. Investor 
knowledge about the valuation method used should make the analyst forecasts appear more justified 
and reliable, which should be reflected in the market reaction.  
͸ͺ  
 
4. Sample selection and description 
Most of the earlier research on financial analysts was based on commercial financial databases (e.g. 
I/B/E/S or First Call), collecting only a small proportion of the overall information which could be 
included in a report. Usually, these datasets catalogue the basic elements of a report, such as 
earnings forecasts, target prices and analyst recommendations, but do not provide any other 
additional elements to support the evaluation procedure. On the contrary, the full body of the report, 
at least in some cases, could be more exhaustive and include the additional information used by 
analysts, such as accounting forecasts, valuation methods, qualitative analysis, discount rates, 
market risk premium or other justifications. The only way to find this information is to read the text 
of the reports and to code their content by hand.  
As analyst reports are not usually available to the general investor public and because commercial 
datasets are not exhaustive, we need an alternative database to answer to our research questions. In 
this respect, Italy represents an advantageous and unique13 research setting since a mandatory rule 
imposed on all of its investment banks which issue reports on firms listed on the Italian stock 
exchange makes it compulsory for them to submit the reports to the Security and Exchange 
Commission - the Consob - and to the managing company of the stock exchange - Borsa Italiana. 
Analysts have to send their reports on the day of issue to Consob, while they have to send it to 
Borsa Italiana within 60 days. Once the reports have been received, Borsa Italiana has to publish 
them on its website immediately. Thereafter, they become freely available to the general investor. 
We collected and coded by hand 4,603 research reports issued by sell-side analysts working 
for 50 different intermediaries and covering 28 Italian blue chip companies belonging to four 
different industries over a four-year time period (2000-2003) to show the potential variation in 
analyst valuation practices. 
With regard to the recommendations issued, since we refer to the original ones given by the 
analysts, caution is needed with regard to their classification. Most analysts use a three-level scale 
(i.e., ‘buy’, ‘hold’ and ‘sell’), while others use a larger scale, including ‘strong buy and ‘strong sell’. 
Furthermore, some analysts use different terminology such as ‘market perform’ and ‘market 
outperform’, ‘reduce’, ‘add’ and so on. We reduce all of the possible recommendations to three 
different categories: good, bad or neutral news. We also record all of the changes in 
recommendation. As shown in Table 1 and consistent with the previous literature on analyst                                                         
13 As far as we know, the Italian regulatory system on financial analysts is unique. 
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optimistic bias (see, e.g., Dugar and Nathan (1995), Michaely and Womack (1999), Darrough and 
Russel (2002) and De Bondt and Thaler (1990)), more of the recommendations are positive (over 
50%) than neutral (34.62%). There are negative recommendations in only a few cases (about 10% 
of the total).  
Insert Table 1 
In order to define the level of disclosure transparency, we focus on the analysts’ disclosure of their 
method of valuation. Since valuation methods are the synthesis of all of the information used by 
analysts to evaluate a company, we assume that the level of transparency of valuation methods can 
act as a proxy for the level of transparency of report disclosure. Therefore, in this research, the 
identification and analysis of the valuation methods is essential. Using this assumption, we divide 
the report sample into two different categories: a low and a high level of disclosure of valuation 
methodology. Following this rule, reports providing investors with enough information to 
understand the valuation methodology used were classified as high disclosure reports and the others 
as low disclosure reports (for further details, see Section 5 below). 
This classification is necessary since, different from Asquith et al. (2005),14 our set of analysts 
seldom explains the specific valuation method employed. About the 35% of the reports are simply 
black boxes, stating just the final recommendations and target prices, not indicating how they have 
been assessed. 
Finally, in order to identify the announcement date, we use the report date, on the assumption that  
it represents the actual date on which the report is made available for the market. 
Table 2 presents a frequency summary for several of the data which we collected from each report. 
The frequencies reported are organised by industry, year and broker.  
Insert Table 2 
 
5. Research design 
In order to test the informative value of the transparency of financial analyst reports, we perform an 
event study. This methodology allows for the verification of the market’s efficiency in                                                         
14 The authors found that approximately 99% of analysts mention the use of at least some sort of earnings multiple (e.g., 
a price-to-earnings ratio, EBITDA multiple or a relative price-to-earnings ratio). Only 12.8% of analysts report using 
any variation of discounted cash flow in computing their price targets. 
͹Ͳ  
incorporating new information by measuring the effects on stock returns on the event date, that is, 
the report issue date. In Italy, this corresponds, by definition, to the date on which the information is 
made available to brokerage firms’ clients.  
The market reaction to the level of disclosure in the reports depends on whether they convey new 
information. If this is the case and the market is efficient, abnormal stock returns should quickly 
disappear after the event. Around each event, we define a 21-day window in which the abnormal 
stock returns are calculated. The abnormal returns for stock i at time t (
itAR ) are estimated using 
a market model using an estimation window of 121 days preceding the event window (Campbell et 
al. (1997)). 
In order to assess the persistence of the impact around the event date and the overall effect of the 
issue of the report, we aggregate the abnormal returns, obtaining the CAR (Cumulative Abnormal 
Return) over three different windows: the pre-event window (-5 to -2 days), the around-the-event 
window (-1 to +1 days) and the post-event window (+2 to +5 days). All of the results have been 
tested by running the parametric tests proposed by Brown and Warner ((1980) and (1985)).  
In the OLS regression models, we use as a dependent variable the around-the-event CARit (-1 to +1 
days), where i represent the firm evaluated and t the report issue date.15  
These empirical analyses require us to use both the variables provided in the examined analyst 
reports and several others not directly provided in these documents as independent variables. Some 
of them (model variables) summarise the report content and are used to define the analyst’s 
disclosure transparency level, whilst others (control variables) control for other potential effects on 
market reaction. Therefore, we include firm-specific, analyst-specific and report-specific control 
variables. 
Among the model variables, firstly, we replicate previous studies by including the final message of 
the report, such as target prices and recommendations (see Model (1)). Specifically, we add to the 
regression’s recommendation dummies (DGOODit, DBADit and DNEUit), based on the three-class 
classification described above (see Section 3). Secondly, we compute the changes of 
recommendation (upgrades and downgrades) for firm i at time t and insert them in the models using 
dummy variables both for downgrades (DDWit) and upgrades (DUPit). Finally, we suppose that                                                         
15 The more correct procedure should be to perform a panel data analysis instead of a simple linear regression. The 
panel data regression would allow us to consider the identity and the not observable features of the analyst (or of the 
group of analysts) writing the report. In my case it’s not straightforward to figure out the panel as we have an 
unbalanced panel data, due to the nature of the data that are not regular over the time. The procedure of dummy 
variables (LSDV) is not practicable as well because we would have too many dummies. 
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another market-relevant attribute of the synthetic information of reports is the boldness of the 
analyst’s target price. Our boldness measure (BOLDNESSit) is calculated as the current target price 
divided by the average target price (the consensus) for the company i in year t, minus 1. 
 
CARit(−1;+1)= β1DUPit + β 2DDWit + β3DGOODit + β 4DBADit + β5DNEUit+ β6BOLDNESSεit  (1) 
Market reaction is measured by three-day market returns centred on the report’s release date, CAR(-
1;+1). This allows for possible delays by brokerage firms in delivering their reports to Borsa 
Italiana SPA or for leaks of information prior to their public release.  
Then, to test the specific hypothesis, we run a different model considering whether the report 
provides the investors with additional information or not. We expect to record different stock price 
reactions in correspondence to the different levels of disclosure of report information (see Model 2).  
We divide the report sample into two categories: low and high levels of disclosure. The former are 
labelled opaque and the latter transparent. The first category includes those analyst reports which do 
not disclose any information other than summary measures, i.e. only investment recommendations 
and target prices, whereas the second refers to those reports which disclose the different evaluation 
methods used in the analysis and provide details to help understand the valuation procedure. 
Therefore, we define two dummy variables (OPAQUEit and TRANSPARENTit), each representing 
one of the aforementioned two disclosure levels. However, we only include in the model these 
dummies16 as interaction variables with other variables, i.e. the recommendation changes 
(OPAQUE_DWit, OPAQUE_UPit, TRANSP_DWit and TRANSP_UPit), the recommendation levels 
(OPAQUE_GOODit, OPAQUE_NEUit, OPAQUE_BADit, TRANSP_GOODit, TRANSP_NEUit, and 
TRANSP_BADit) and the boldness measure ((OPAQUE_BOLDit and TRANSP_BOLDit). According 
to this point of view, the level of disclosure transparency has no value to the market by itself, but it 
may affect market reaction if considered together with recommendation upgrades or downgrades, 
good or bad news, and boldness levels. Therefore, this procedure allows us to detect potential 
asymmetric market reactions in correspondence to different combinations of transparency level and 
other information. 
Tables 3 and 4 report the descriptives for the sets of independent and control variables. 
Insert table 3 
Insert Table 4                                                         
16 In order to include all of the three variables of interest, we test the OLS model, omitting the constant α.  
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We find on average that approximately 30% of the reports which we analysed are transparent in 
terms of disclosure of their valuation methods. In the other 70%, the investors are also provided 
with specific information to enable them to understand the main method used for the analysis.17 
These percentages are similar regardless of the types of change in recommendation (downgrades, 
upgrades and reiterations). 
Furthermore, with respect to boldness, the analysts show a greater ‘boldness’ in relation to the 
reiteration of recommendations, rather than in upgrade or downgrade cases. 
We test the value relevance of the report disclosure transparency by running the following model: 
CARit(−1;+1) = β1OPAQUE _ DW it + β 2OPAQUE _UPit + β3TRANSP _ DW it+β4TRANSP _UPit + β 5TRANSP _GOOD it + β 6TRANSP _ NEU it+β7TRANSP _ BAD it + β8OPAQUE _GOOD it + β 9OPAQUE _ NEU it+β10OPAQUE _ BAD it + ε it
(2) 
 
Finally, we also consider an extended version of Model 2, which includes some control variables 
(see Model 3).  
At the analyst level, we control for the analyst’s reputation (REPUTATIONit) but experienced some 
problems related to the specific nature of our analyst sample. Since the most famous financial 
analysts’ rankings, i.e. those issued by Institutional Investor or The Wall Street Journal, are only 
focused on American investment banks and brokerage houses, many of the analysts in our dataset 
were not covered. To tackle this problem, we measured the analyst reputation variable using three 
different specifications.  Firstly, we used the rankings from the leading Australian analyst survey, 
the East Coles Survey (REP_ECSit). This is the Australian equivalent of the US Institutional 
Investor survey and is conducted on a large number of buy-side institutions annually. The data 
available from the East Coles Survey has a significant advantage over that from the Institutional 
Investor surveys as it provides significantly more detailed ranking information on analysts. For each 
industry and some stocks, we were able to observe the ranking for every analyst in that sector (e.g. 
down to the 56th-ranked small-cap analyst in 2000). This contrasts with the Institutional Investor 
survey where only the top three ‘All-American’ analysts (and up to four runners up) are shown for                                                         
17 We controlled whether the different levels of transparency among transparent reports may affect market reaction to 
report release. However, none of the results is statistically significant. We interpret these results as the market only 
capturing the difference between opaque and transparent reports, regardless of the different levels of transparency and 
opacity. They do not capture the scale of these variables. 
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each sector. However, following this ranking, many of the analysts in our dataset were excluded 
again from the analysis as they were not covered (e.g. many of the Italian investment banks and 
brokerage houses). This could bias the results since, in our dataset, the Italian investment banks 
issue reports more frequently than the others. Thus, we used other reputation proxies, such as 
brokers’ activity (BROKERWEIGHTit) and their nationality (NATIOit). We calculated the 
BROKERWEIGHT variable as the ratio of reports issued by each broker for a company divided by 
the total reports issued by that company. Our expectation is that more active brokers should be more 
trustworthy ones. With regard to the brokers’ nationality, we inserted the dummy variable NATIO 
into the model, which distinguishes between European and US analysts, since the evidence shows 
that the biggest and most trusted (i.e. with a wider reputation) brokers are usually American. 
We then investigate and control for the confounding effects of other information released 
simultaneously with the analyst report (CEFFECT). We focus on a type of information price 
indicator, that is, the earnings announcement, collect all of the quarterly earnings announcement 
dates from Factset and calculate three different measures for the confounding effect by declining 
CEFFECT into three alternative variables. 
Specifically, the first (CE_DISTANCEit) is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the report publication 
date is within a specific time window, 0 otherwise. The time window is obtained by adding or 
subtracting a certain number of days (e.g. ten days) to the quarterly earnings announcement dates. 
This measure allows for the capture of the level of closeness of the analyst’s report to the company 
earnings announcement, but suffers from a limitation in that it does not consider whether the report 
was issued before or after the event. To overcome this issue, we created a second measure 
(CE_TIMINGit). Given a specific time window, this variable takes a value equal to 1 if the report is 
issued after the quarterly earnings announcement, -1 if it was issued before and 0 if it was issued 
out of the time window considered. The third measure (CE_CONTit) is more sophisticated than the 
previous two as it is based on the exponential function e-rt, where r represents the information’s 
decay rate and t the time between two consecutive quarterly earnings announcements. By definition, 
this measure does not make any assumptions about the length of the time window around the 
company event.  
This variable is a continuous index between -1 and 1, so that values close to both 1 and -1 indicate 
reports which are very close to the announcement date but issued after and before the date 
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respectively, while if the index is close to 0, this means that the analyst’s report is contemporaneous 
with the announcement date.18 
Finally, since the market reaction to analysts’ forecasts change according to firms’ information 
environment, we control for firm growth, measured as the price-to-book value, PBVit. This variable 
allows us to determine whether the market’s reaction to analyst reports differs between growth and 
value firms.  
The final model we test is the following: 
CARit(−1;+1) = β1OPAQUE_ DWit + β2OPAQUE_UPit + β3TRANSP_ DWit +β4TRANSP_UPit + β5TRANSP_GOODit + β6TRANSP_ NEUit + β7TRANSP_ BADit+β8OPAQUE_GOODit + β9OPAQUE_ NEUit + β10OPAQUE_ BADit+β11OPAQUE_ BOLDit + β12TRANSP_ BOLDit + β13REPUTATIONit+β14CEFFECTit + β15LNSIZEit + β16GROWTHit + εit
(3) 
 
 6. Empirical results 
6.1. Market reaction to analysts’ recommendations: a further investigation 
We first analysed the market reaction to the issue of reports by looking at the daily AR trend over 
the event window (-10 to +10), distinguishing between bad, neutral and positive recommendations. 
The sample size is 2,415 for good recommendations, 441 for bad and 1,564 for neutral. The average 
abnormal returns and the market reaction plot are reported in Table 5 and Figure 1. 
Insert Table 5 
Insert Figure 1 
The results are consistent with the previous literature, on the strength of the recommendations 
having informative content for the market. The empirical evidence shows that both the sign and the 
intensity of the reaction are consistent with expectations and statistically significant around the 
event day (t=0). The effect of financial analysts on the rise of under-valued stocks or, conversely, 
the fall of over-valued stocks is, therefore, documented. 
Furthermore, negative recommendations have a bigger negative impact than other types of 
recommendation: the abnormal returns are slightly positive at the beginning of the event window,                                                         
18 In the tables, we report the final results based on a model only including the variable CE_TIMING, calculated with a 
two-day time window. The other two measures (CE_DISTANCE and CE_CONT) were not significant. 
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but immediately before the day of the event and during the few days following, they fall 
significantly.19 This is not really surprising as negative recommendations occur less frequently than 
others , so it is likely that investors give more weight to this type of recommendation rather others, 
therefore they have more informative value. 
The neutral recommendation effect can be assimilated into that of the negative recommendation. 
This behaviour is consistent with the conflict of interest hypothesis (e.g. Michaely and Womack 
(1999), Lin and McNichols (1998), and Dugar and Nathan (1995)): analysts who have to issue a 
negative recommendation prefer to issue a neutral one in order that their relationship with the 
company’s management is not compromised. Another behavioural explanation is related to the 
optimistic bias: analysts tend to have a too optimistic a view of the stocks which they evaluate.  
Focusing on the pre-event period, and consistent with previous results (see Womack (1996) and 
Belcredi et al. (2003)), there is an anticipated effect on the market with respect to the event date. 
Negative recommendations cause negative abnormal returns since t=-5, even though they only 
become statistically significant at t=-1. For positive and neutral recommendations, the anticipated 
effect is more evident and significant from t= -1 onwards. 
A possible explanation of this evidence (see also Belcredi et al. (2003), Michaely and Womack 
(1999), and Stickel (1995)) is that some private clients receive important news before the issue date 
printed on the report. This hypothesis, although widespread in the US, would violate the Italian 
regulation imposed on investment banks and brokerage houses to distribute their reports to all of 
clients on the date printed on the document; to select certain clients or transmit the documents in a 
selective way is prohibited. 
Another possible hypothesis could instead be related to the fact that some important news may 
become public before the report date and so the effect on the market is caused by that, rather than 
dissemination of the report. 
Looking at the post-event period, the abnormal returns disappear quite quickly in relation to 
positive and neutral recommendations, while the impact of negative recommendations does not 
have a clear trend after the event date, even though the abnormal returns are only statistically 
significant until t=1. This irregular variation in the market prices subsequent to the event could be 
related either to other news, independent of the report’s disclosures, or simply some noise in the 
                                                        
19 The t-test on the absolute value of the difference between the ARs is statistically significant at 1% level. 
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sample. This analysis needs further investigation taking into account, for instance, changes to the 
recommendations (upgrades vs downgrades). 
The CAR analysis confirms the daily evidence shown above.  
Insert Figure 1 
Insert Table 6 
Looking at the narrow pre-event window (-5 to -2), negative recommendations show a significant 
anticipatory effect on the market, but we do not find any significant abnormal returns for the other 
types of recommendation. On the contrary, and consistent with AR  daily data, we document a 
significant market price reaction around the event window, regardless of the nature of the 
recommendation. The stronger effect, however, is still recorded for negative advice.  
This asymmetry in market behaviour could simply be due to our recommendation classifications. 
We classified the recommendations in the three categories, neglecting to indicate whether they are a 
simple reiteration or a change from previous advice. It has been documented that there is a link 
between the size of reaction and the type of recommendation. As pointed out by Belcredi et al. 
(2003), for stocks added to a buy (sell) list, a stronger positive (negative) market impact may be 
expected than for those which are upgraded (downgraded) but still remain in the same category. In 
further investigations, we will control for this because if our results hold, they would confirm what 
has already been demonstrated by Womack (1996) and Stickel (1995) for the US market and by 
Belcredi et al. (2003) for Italy. 
Finally, the post-event analysis for the window (+2 to +5) does not show evidence of significant 
abnormal returns for any of our recommendation categories. 
Table 7 shows the correlation matrix among the variables. The tables do not suggest any 
multicollinearity issues. 
Insert Table 7 
 
6.2. Market reaction and the transparency of financial reports 
 
In this section, we first replicate previous studies by testing Model 1. We then test the main crux of 
this work, i.e. whether the market reacts to the content of financial analyst reports and its level of 
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transparency (Model 2). We also control for other variables both at firm- and analyst-level, included 
in the regression for firm size and growth, the confounding effect variable and a proxy for analysts’ 
reputation (see Model 3). 
Table 8 provides the results of Model 1. 
Insert Table 8 
Consistent with prior research, we find that the coefficients DGOOD and DBAD are in line with our 
expectations and statistically significant, suggesting that good (bad) news released by analysts has a 
positive (negative) impact on market returns. In addition, revisions of their investment 
recommendations have an informative value. As documented by existing research, changes to 
recommendations affect market reaction depending on their starting point. Specifically, the signs 
DDW and DUP suggest that an increase (decrease) in analyst recommendations positively 
(negatively) affect the market’s abnormal returns. 
Table 9 reports the results for Model 2. 
Insert Table 9 
The results show that the information transparency level of reports is important for the market, 
although in an asymmetric way. In particular, in relation to changes in recommendations, Column 4 
shows that only the sign TRANSP_DW  is significant, while OPAQUE_DW is not, suggesting that 
the market reacts to downgrades only when they are supported by additional information. 
OPAQUE_UP and TRANSP_UP are both not significant, meaning that the market is not interested 
in recommendation upgrades at all. However, looking at the recommendation levels, the signs 
TRANSP_GOOD and OPAQUE_GOOD are both significant, while in the case of bad and neutral 
recommendations, only the TRANSP_BAD and TRANSP_NEU variables are statistically significant, 
indicating that investors trust in the transparency of analysts’ report disclosures when they issue 
negative opinions.  
Overall, these findings confirm our hypothesis. They show that investors give different weights to 
analysts reporting good or bad news, depending on the level of information transparency. In 
particular, the market interprets as value-relevant positive recommendations, i.e. those which are 
good, regardless of the level of disclosure transparency. However, it needs more information in 
order to trust bad or neutral recommendations.20 On the contrary, in terms of recommendation                                                         
20 In line with the literature (e.g. Michaely and Womack (1999), Lin and McNichols (1998), and Dugar and Nathan 
(1995)), the neutral recommendation effect can be assimilated into the negative recommendation (see Column 4). 
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changes, the market reacts to downgrades which are well supported informationally, ignoring 
upgrades.  
These asymmetric behaviours are complementary and not contradictory. They suggest that in order 
for it to be interpreted by the market as positive news, a good recommendation (i.e. a buy 
recommendation) is enough and does not need any additional specifications. The market does not 
consider it to be price informative to know whether the stock recommendation improves (i.e. from 
sell to buy) and its behaviour is not dependent on the transparency level of the reports released. The 
reaction to negative news is different. Investors respond to bad recommendations and downgrades 
only when there is a high level of disclosure. This evidence could suggest that investors react to 
good signals by using a different information set which is not captured in our models, but the result 
could also be driven by the market’s habit of receiving positive recommendations. Investors often 
view analysts as experts on important sources of information about the securities they cover and, as 
demonstrated, they rely on their advice. For this reason, investors are used to positive 
recommendations and may be attracted more by unusual negative reports. Therefore, they would in 
these cases pay more attention to report details; in other cases, they ignore them.  
In addition, the results in Columns 3 and 4 show that investors prefer transparent analysts with 
higher boldness in their target prices. They pay more attention to those analysts whose target prices 
are not too close to the consensus, provided that their extreme forecasts are justified in a 
comprehensible way and in great detail. 
These results are interesting since they add an important piece of evidence to the findings of 
previous literature. The evidence shows that the market considers as value-relevant some of the 
synthetic information of the report, i.e. recommendations and target prices, but only conditional on 
other information.  
Table 10 presents the results from estimating Model 3, including the control variables, such as the 
confounding effect, broker reputation and the firm-specific characteristics proxies.  
Insert Table 10 
The results do not change and, therefore, confirm the previous evidence. 
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7. Conclusions 
This paper analyses the reaction of the market to the transparency of the information in financial 
analysts’ reports. The work aims to examine the value-relevance of the report content, testing 
whether the level of disclosure transparency affects the market reaction to the news contained in the 
report.  
This work is related to two main research fields which are well developed in the literature: the study 
of the properties of analysts’ reports and their information value for the market. This research is 
also strongly related to Asquith et al. (2005)’s research, which assessed the market value of the 
information contained in security analysts’ reports. They found that investors reacted to the content 
of a security analyst report conditionally with regard to whether the report was an upgrade, 
reiteration or downgrade. With regard to the evaluation methods used by the analysts, the authors 
failed to observe any systematic association between these and market reaction. 
This work improves on the previous results and differs from Asquith et al. (2005) in many aspects. 
It analyses the valuation methods employed by analysts from a new point of view. First, we propose 
a new approach for collecting and cataloguing the most important information of financial analysts’ 
reports. Specifically, we build a structured approach in order to catalogue their valuation methods. 
Furthermore, we elaborate on the disclosed information in order to identify the level of information 
disclosure transparency provided to the market. In this way, we revisit previous studies on the 
market impact of analyst recommendations and target prices, and provide new evidence on the 
value-relevance of other report components. 
Finally, the structure of this research allows us to cope with the selection bias which characterizes 
Asquith et al.’s research. Since they only employed top-ranked US analysts, they incurred selection 
bias with respect to the analysts’ evaluation methods. In order to differentiate ourselves from them, 
we extend the analysis to a new and more comprehensive sample of 4,603 reports issued by 50 
different international investment banks and brokerage houses. This heterogeneity minimises any 
possibility of selection bias in relation to valuation methods.  
The results partially replicate the findings of previous research, showing that changes in 
recommendation are significantly associated with market reaction to the release of analyst reports. 
The results also show that the target prices may contain important information for the market, 
depending on how bold and unconventional the forecasts (target prices) are. In particular, we find 
that market reaction to analyst changes of recommendation is stronger (greater R2) when target 
prices move away from the consensus price rather than when they move toward the consensus target 
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price for that stock. This result may indicate that the effect of changes in recommendation is partly 
driven by analysts’ tendency to follow the herd. In fact, a convincing explanation for the relevance 
of the target price boldness proxy could lay in behavioural herding models. In these models, 
observable actions by agents act as signals of the quality of an agent’s private information. Thus, 
everything else being equal, actions which differ markedly from what many other agents (analysts) 
do lead the market to assess that the agent with the unconventional action is more likely to be 
‘smarter’ than the others. 
These findings also add new information about the nature and source of market reaction to the 
release of analyst reports. The results, in fact, indicate that market reaction is not symmetric and the 
cause of this asymmetry is the level of disclosure transparency in the report. This means that, in 
general, the market reacts consistently with the signal provided by recommendations and target 
prices, but it also modifies its reaction depending on the additional information provided. 
Interestingly, investors’ positive reaction to good news is unconditional with regard to the level of 
information disclosed by analysts. On the other hand, they only trust negative news when they are 
provided with supporting elements which help them to understand the valuation procedure which 
underpins the estimates. 
We then investigate whether the results are affected by other variables, such as the broker’s 
reputation or the confounding effect derived from information releases which occur 
contemporaneously with the release of the analyst report. However, none of the variables used as a 
reputation measure or confounding effect proxy are statistically significant. 
In summary, the results confirm prior evidence which demonstrated the market response to changes 
in financial analysts’ recommendations. Furthermore, they show that the addition of boldness in 
analysts’ forecasts is important in explaining the documented market reaction to financial analysts’ 
reports.  They also indicate that the report’s transparency about the method used by the analyst to 
process information and thereby arrive at their final recommendation do affect market reaction. 
These results hold regardless of whether other information is announced contemporaneously by the 
company and also controlling for firm-specific variables. 
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Tables and Graphs 
 
Table 1. Report frequency by recommendation 
 
RECOMMENDATION 
CATEGORY Freq. % 
Bad 441 9.73%
Good 2415 53.30%
Neutral 1564 34.52%
Not available 111 2.45%
Total 4531 100.00
Notes. This table reports descriptive on the recommendation categories composing the sample. 
 
Table 2. Report frequency by industry, year and broker 
Panel A: by industry and year 
VARIABLES 
REPORT  
TRANSPARENCY LEVEL  
RECOMMENDATION              
LEVEL RECOMMENDATION CHANGE 
INDUSTRY TRANSPARENT OPAQUE DGOOD DBAD DNEU DDW DUP 
Insurance 381 112 308 23 156 45 36
Banking 939 571 725 173 566 151 112
Utilities 1136 669 1090 138 534 109 104
Industrial 514 209 292 107 308 74 39
              
Total 2970 1561 2415 441 1564 379 291
               
 REPORT TRANSPARENCY LEVEL 
RECOMMENDATION              
LEVEL RECOMMENDATION CHANGE 
YEAR TRANSPARENT OPAQUE DGOOD DBAD DNEU DDW DUP 
2000 380 230 401 34 169 27 23
2001 788 371 612 108 417 107 74
2002 698 432 582 118 408 119 89
2003 1104 528 819 181 570 126 105
              
Total 2970 1561 2415 441 1564 379 291
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Panel B: by broker 
 REPORT TRANSPARENCY LEVEL 
RECOMMENDATION              
LEVEL RECOMMENDATION CHANGE 
BROKER TRANPARENT OPAQUE DGOOD DBAD DNEU DDW DUP 
ABN Amro 62 19 40 13 26 6 7
Actinvest Group 105 7 62 14 33 14 12
Albertini & C. 31 19 27 3 20 3 1
BNP Paribas 5 6 6 0 5 2 2
Banca Akros 64 46 61 6 39 12 8
Banca Aletti & C 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
Banca Commercial 9 3 10 1 1 0 0
Banca Finnat Eur 5 0 3 0 2 0 0
Banca Leonardo 28 24 37 3 12 3 6
Banca Popolare Di 
Verona e Novara 4 0 3 0 1 0 0
Banca Popolare d 3 0 1 0 1 0 0
Banca Sella 6 0 2 0 4 0 0
Banca d'Intermed 113 92 83 21 96 25 18
Bipielle Sim 1 2 3 0 0 0 0
Bnp Paribas 11 10 11 2 8 0 2
Borsaconsult Sim 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
Caboto Sim 137 65 112 7 73 23 14
Cazenove 8 2 4 0 6 0 0
Centrosim 30 109 68 9 59 6 6
Cheuvreux 112 12 83 36 0 11 4
Citigroup 21 1 13 1 6 1 1
Cofiri Sim 5 10 9 0 5 0 2
Consors 0 29 23 6 0 2 2
Credit Lyonnais 24 8 25 7 0 3 3
Credit Suisse 64 11 29 11 34 7 5
Deutsche Bank 213 253 261 27 178 28 22
Dresdner Kleinwo 92 28 71 3 41 6 7
Eptasim 60 16 40 5 28 7 6
Euromobiliare 319 86 264 32 107 34 29
Fortis Bank 12 18 18 11 0 2 1
Gestnord 3 0 2 0 0 0 0
Goldman Sachs 52 35 25 19 32 8 7
Idea Global 0 10 5 2 2 3 1
Ing Barings 20 11 7 1 23 2 2
Intermonte Secur 281 87 202 39 124 41 40
IntesaBCI 9 2 9 1 1 0 0
JP Morgan 8 0 6 0 2 0 1
Julius Baer 92 8 57 9 33 13 6
Lehman Brothers 88 9 54 20 21 6 5
Massimo Mortari 4 1 2 0 3 1 0
Mediobanca 93 73 97 2 61 11 11
Merrill Lynch 236 108 156 48 126 24 8
Metzler Italia 7 3 7 0 3 0 0
Rasbank 6 3 5 2 0 1 0
Rasfin 40 38 45 5 25 10 7
SG Securities Mi 11 13 21 1 2 1 0
Santander Centra 44 24 33 6 28 4 3
SocietÈ Generale 34 52 44 3 39 6 4
UBS Warburg 214 13 75 36 108 19 11
Unicredit Banca 168 188 182 25 139 33 27
Uniprof Sim 8 3 6 1 4 0 0
WebSim 7 3 4 3 3 1 0
          
Total 2970 1561 2415 441 1564 379 291
 Notes. This table describes the dataset with respect to the report transparency, investment recommendation and 
recommendation changes by year, industry and broker. 
OPAQUEit and TRANSPARENTit are two dummies, each one representing alternatively one of the two disclosure levels. 
DGOODit, DBADit, DNEUit are three dummy variables indicating whether the investment recommendation is good, bad 
or neutral. DDWit is a dummy standing for downgrade in recommendations while DUPit is for upgrades. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the main independent variables 
  VARIABLES 
STATISTICS OPAQUE_UP OPAQUE_DW 
OPAQUE_ 
GOOD OPAQUE_BAD OPAQUE_NEU 
OPAQUE_ 
BOLD  
max 1 1 1 1 1 2.802 
min 0 0 0 0 0 -.773 
mean .0194 .025 .181 .028 .132 -.021 
sd .138 .156 .385 .164 .338 .154 
  VARIABLES 
STATISTICS TRANSP_UP TRANSP_DW TRANSP_ GOOD TRANSP_BAD TRANSP_NEU TRANSP_ BOLD 
max 1 1 1 1 1 .713 
min 0 0 0 0 0 -.660 
mean .045 .059 .365 .072 .222 -.005 
sd .207 .235 .481 .259 .416 .0811 
Notes. This table reports descriptives of the main independent variables of the models. 
OPAQUE_DWit, OPAQUE_UPit, TRANSP_DWit, TRANSP_UPit) are interaction variables between the disclosure level 
and the recommendation changes; OPAQUE_GOODit, OPAQUE_NEUit, OPAQUE_BADit, TRANSP_GOODit, 
TRANSP_NEUit, TRANSP_BADit are interaction variables between the disclosure and the recommendation levels; 
OPAQUE_BOLDit and TRANSP_BOLDit are interaction variables between the disclosure level and the analyst boldness. 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics on the control variables 
 BOLDNESS BROKERWEIGHT CE_TIMING PBV 
mean -0.026 0.069 0.227 2.913 
sd 0.173 0.054 0.768 2.731 
median -0.014 0.055 0.000 1.976 
skewness 1.410 1.670 -0.410 2.698 
kurtosis 26.266 7.019 1.799 12.676 
p1 -0.473 0.005 -1.000 0.591 
p5 -0.317 0.012 -1.000 0.737 
p25 -0.105 0.031 0.000 1.204 
p75 0.060 0.098 1.000 3.763 
p95 0.218 0.165 1.000 7.913 
p99 0.417 0.281 1.000 15.409 
Notes. This table reports the descriptive statistics of the main control variables used in the different model 
specifications. 
BOLDNESSit represents the analyst forecast boldness and it is calculated as current target price divided by the average 
target price (the consensus) for the company i in year t, minus 1. BROKERWEIGHTit indicates the broker activity and it 
is measured as the ratio of reports issued by each broker for a company over the total reports issued by for that 
company; NATIO, is a dummy variable distinguishing between European analysts and US ones. CE_TIMINGit takes 
value equal to 1 if the report is issued after the quarterly earnings announcement, -1 if it was issued before, 0 if the 
analyst’s report was issued out of the time window considered; PBVit is the company price-to-book value.  
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Table 5. Average Abnormal Return in correspondence to the report date 
 Good news Bad news Neutral news 
T AR T test Sign. AR T test Sign. AR T test Sign.
-10 -0.0417% -1.1765  0.1500% 1.5798  0.0560% 1.2321  
-9 -0.0030% -0.0829  0.0407% 0.4241  0.0995% 2.0249 ** 
-8 0.0073% 0.1982  -0.0480% -0.5226  0.0589% 1.2180  
-7 -0.0018% -0.0446  0.2025% 1.9420 * -0.0679% -1.5555  
-6 -0.0366% -0.9499  -0.0612% -0.6439  -0.0698% -1.4340  
-5 0.0316% 0.8128  -0.1178% -1.2333  -0.0832% -1.6992 * 
-4 0.0458% 1.2197  -0.2312% -2.0574 ** -0.0494% -0.8461  
-3 -0.0062% -0.1530  -0.1450% -1.3415  -0.0187% -0.3840  
-2 0.0401% 0.9952  -0.2041% -1.7407 * 0.0070% 0.1263  
-1 0.2067% 4.7467 *** -0.2741% -2.0288 ** -0.0591% -0.8935  
0 0.1017% 2.2003 ** -0.5835% -3.4680 *** -0.1798% -2.8844 *** 
1 0.1067% 2.5650 *** -0.1149% -1.0623  -0.1267% -2.3733 ** 
2 0.0595% 1.5914  -0.0364% -0.3124  -0.0638% -1.0178  
3 -0.0538% -1.2544  0.2205% 1.8142 * -0.0462% -0.7242  
4 0.0446% 1.1684  0.0085% 0.0782  0.0356% 0.7151  
5 0.0106% 0.2883  -0.2074% -2.2500 ** 0.0887% 1.7927 * 
6 0.0105% 0.2672  -0.0528% -0.2899  -0.0355% -0.7317  
7 0.0002% 0.0047  -0.2467% -1.4330  -0.0432% -0.9224  
8 0.0519% 1.3824  0.2158% 2.2198 ** 0.0141% 0.3038  
9 -0.0367% -0.8081  -0.1323% -1.4020  -0.0685% -1.4610  
10 -0.0131% -0.3047  -0.0149% -0.1510  -0.0024% -0.0544  
Statistical significance: *** = at 1%, **  = at 5%, * = at 10%. 
Notes. This table report the Abnormal Returns and their significance levels, calculated over a -10;+10 days window 
around the event date. 
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Figure 1. Average Abnormal Return in correspondence to the report date 
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Notes. This graphs indicates the Abnormal Return trends, depending on the investment recommendation type. 
 
Table 6. Cumulative Abnormal Return in correspondence to the report date 
Recomm. Good news Bad news Neutral news 
N report N = 2415 N = 441 N = 1564 
 CAR T test Sign. CAR T test Sign. CAR T test Sign.
(-5; -2) 0.1112% 1.3804  -0.6982% -2.97673 *** -0.1442% -1.3088  
(-1;+1) 0.4151% 5.7609 *** -0.9725% -5.1923 *** -0.00365 -3.9530 *** 
(+2;+5) 0.0609% 0.8120  -0.0148% -0.08025  0.0142% 0.1437  
Statistical significance: *** = at 1%, **  = at 5%, * = at 10%. 
Notes. This table reports the Cumulative Abnormal Returns and theis significance levels, depending on the investment 
recommendation type. 
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Table 7. The correlation matrix among variables.  
Panel A - The Pearson’s correlation. 
 
CAR(-
1;+1) DUP DDW 
DGOO
D DBAD DNEU 
BOLDNES
S 
CAR(-1;+1) 1             
DUP 0.0366* 1      
DDW -0.0629* -0.0792* 1     
DGOOD 0.1049* 0.1097* -0.2563* 1    
DBAD -0.0747* -0.0659* 0.1922* 
-
0.3654* 1   
DNEU -0.0624* -0.0729* 0.1464* 
-
0.8122* -0.2464* 1  
BOLDNESS 0.0926* 0.0167 -0.1987* 0.3036* -0.2777* -0.1445 1 
OPAQUE_UP 0.014 0.5372* -0.0425* 0.0461* -0.0414* -0.0220    0.0063 
OPAQUE_DW -0.0281* -0.0419* 0.5293* 
-
0.1326* 0.0817* 0.0869*  -0.0836* 
TRANSP_UP 0.0341* 0.8267* -0.0654* 0.0992* -0.0504* -0.0717*   0.0154 
TRANSP_DW -0.0555* -0.0654* 0.8266* 
-
0.2139* 0.1722* 0.1148*  -0.1776* 
OPAQUE_GOOD 0.0384* 0.0222 -0.1113* 0.4290* -0.1567* -0.3484*   0.1094* 
TRANSP_GOOD 0.0778* 0.0957* -0.1760* 0.6907* -0.2524* -0.5610*   0.2225* 
TRANSP_BAD -0.0753* -0.0519* 0.1670* 
-
0.3061* 0.8378* -0.2064*  -0.2521* 
OPAQUE_BAD -0.0177 -0.0386* 0.0880* 
-
0.1849* 0.5061* -0.1247*  -0.1070* 
TRANSP_NEU -0.0454* -0.0539* 0.1314* 
-
0.5865* -0.1779* 0.7222*  -0.1406* 
OPAQUE_NEU -0.0324* -0.0369* 0.0455* 
-
0.4274* -0.1296* 0.5262*  -0.0308* 
OPAQUE_BOLD 0.0106 0.0017 -0.1027* 0.1388* -0.1111* -0.0760*   0.4609* 
TRANSP_BOLD 0.0988* 0.018 -0.1696* 0.2687* -0.2541* -0.1227*   0.8833* 
CE_TIMING -0.0189 0.0294* -0.0061 -0.0236 0.0169 0.0139    0.0328* 
PBV -0.001 -0.0156 0.0081 
-
0.0509* 0.0646* 0.0124 -0.0044 
BROKERWEIGH
T -0.0003 -0.0054 0.0061 -0.0019 -0.02 0.0146 0.0104 
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Panel B - The Pearson’s correlation. 
 OPAQU
E_UP 
OPAQU
E_DW 
TRANS
P_UP 
TRANS
P_DW 
OPAQUE
_GOOD 
TRANSP_
GOOD 
TRANSP
_BAD 
OPAQU
E_BAD 
OPAQUE_
UP 1        
OPAQUE_
DW -0.0225 1       
TRANSP_
UP 
-
0.0305* -0.0346* 1      
TRANSP_
DW 
-
0.0351* -0.0399* 
-
0.0541* 1     
OPAQUE_
GOOD 0.1929* -0.0193 
-
0.1022* -0.1182* 1    
TRANSP_
GOOD 
-
0.1068* -0.1217* 0.1844* -0.1266* -0.3569* 1   
TRANSP_
BAD 
-
0.0393* -0.0448* 
-
0.0353* 0.2262* -0.1313* -0.2114* 1  
OPAQUE_
BAD -0.0137 0.2201* 
-
0.0366* -0.0423* -0.0793* -0.1277* -0.0470* 1 
TRANSP_
NEU 
-
0.0753* -0.0858* -0.0137 0.2116* -0.2516* -0.4051* -0.1491* -0.0900* 
OPAQUE_
NEU 0.0614* 0.2283* 
-
0.0846* -0.0978* -0.1833* -0.2952* -0.1086* -0.0656* 
OPAQUE_
BOLD -0.0227 -0.2188* 0.0156 0.017 0.1133* 0.0526* 0.0187 -0.2683* 
TRANSP_
BOLD 0.0191 0.0214 0.0091 -0.2091* 0.0638* 0.2227* -0.2933* 0.02 
CE_TIMIN
G -0.0061 -0.0306* 0.0389* 0.0131 -0.0637* 0.0266* 0.0183 0.002 
PBV -0.011 0.0093 -0.0112 0.0034 -0.0392* -0.0212 0.0659* 0.0141 
BROKER
WEIGHT 0.0102 0.0119 -0.0132 -0.0007 0.0313* -0.0270* -0.0163 -0.0109 
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Panel C - The Pearson’s correlation. 
 TRANSP_
NEU 
OPAQUE_
NEU 
OPAQUE_
BOLD 
TRANSP_B
OLD 
CE_TIM
ING PBV 
BROKERWE
IGHT 
TRANSP_NE
U 1        
OPAQUE_N
EU -0.2081* 1       
OPAQUE_B
OLD 0.0348* -0.1599* 1      
TRANSP_B
OLD -0.1763* 0.0491* -0.0088 1     
CE_TIMING 0.0260* -0.0122 0.0300* 0.0211 1    
PBV 0.0358* -0.0264* 0.0103 -0.0104 0.0168 1   
BROKERWE
IGHT -0.0138 0.0375* -0.0043 0.014 0.0165 
0.077
3* 1 
* denotes significance at the 10% 
Notes. These tables report the correlation matrix of the different model specification variables. They are based on the 
Pearson’s correlation definition. Some of the correlations are missing because of the variables definition. 
DGOODit, DBADit, DNEUit are three dummy variables indicating whether the investment recommendation is good, bad 
or neutral. DDWit is a dummy standing for downgrade in recommendations while DUPit is for upgrades. BOLDNESSit 
represents the analyst forecast boldness and it is calculated as current target price divided by the average target price 
(the consensus) for the company i in year t, minus 1. OPAQUEit and TRANSPARENTit are two dummies, each one 
representing alternatively one of the two disclosure levels. OPAQUE_DWit, OPAQUE_UPit, TRANSP_DWit, 
TRANSP_UPit are interaction variables between the disclosure level and the recommendation changes; 
OPAQUE_GOODit, OPAQUE_NEUit, OPAQUE_BADit, TRANSP_GOODit, TRANSP_NEUit, TRANSP_BADit are 
interaction variables between the disclosure and the recommendation levels; OPAQUE_BOLDit and TRANSP_BOLDit 
are interaction variables between the disclosure level and the analyst boldness.  
BROKERWEIGHTit indicates the broker activity and it is measured as the ratio of reports issued by each broker for a 
company over the total reports issued by for that company; NATIO, is a dummy variable distinguishing between 
European analysts and US ones. CE_TIMINGit takes value equal to 1 if the report is issued after the quarterly earnings 
announcement, -1 if it was issued before, 0 if the analyst’s report was issued out of the time window considered; PBVit 
is the company price-to-book value.  
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Table 7. The correlation matrix among variables.  
Panel D - The Spearman’s correlation. 
 
CAR(-
1;+1) DUP DDW DGOOD DBAD DNEU BOLDNESS
CAR(-1;+1) 1       
DUP 0.0409* 1      
DDW -0.0591* -0.0792* 1     
DGOOD 0.0998* 0.1097* -0.2563* 1    
DBAD -0.0529* -0.0659* 0.1922* -0.3654* 1   
DNEU -0.0707* -0.0729* 0.1464* -0.8122* -0.2464* 1  
BOLDNESS 0.0594* 0.0123 -0.1976* 0.3393* -0.2435* -0.2036  
OPAQUE_UP 0.018 0.5372* -0.0425* 0.0461* -0.0414* -0.0220 0.0048 
OPAQUE_DW -0.0310* -0.0419* 0.5293* -0.1326* 0.0817* 0.0869* -0.0826* 
TRANSP_UP 0.0364* 0.8267* -0.0654* 0.0992* -0.0504* -0.0717* 0.0112 
TRANSP_DW -0.0491* -0.0654* 0.8266* -0.2139* 0.1722* 0.1148* -0.1769* 
OPAQUE_GOOD 0.0383* 0.0222 -0.1113* 0.4290* -0.1567* -0.3484* 0.1282* 
TRANSP_GOOD 0.0725* 0.0957* -0.1760* 0.6907* -0.2524* -0.5610* 0.2442* 
TRANSP_BAD -0.0501* -0.0519* 0.1670* -0.3061* 0.8378* -0.2064* -0.2212* 
OPAQUE_BAD -0.0176 -0.0386* 0.0880* -0.1849* 0.5061* -0.1247* -0.0936* 
TRANSP_NEU -0.0474* -0.0539* 0.1314* -0.5865* -0.1779* 0.7222* -0.1945* 
OPAQUE_NEU -0.0418* -0.0369* 0.0455* -0.4274* -0.1296* 0.5262* -0.0481* 
OPAQUE_BOLD -0.0039 -0.0021 -0.0761* 0.1185* -0.0608* -0.0863* 0.4688* 
TRANSP_BOLD 0.0728* 0.0168 -0.1584* 0.2950* -0.2068* -0.1801* 0.8310* 
CE_TIMING 0.0053 0.0279* -0.0085 -0.0260* 0.0179 0.0158 0.0370* 
PBV -0.0219 0.0011 -0.0042 -0.0004 0.0251* -0.0153 0.0199 
BROKERWEIGHT -0.0069 0.0131 0.0256* 0.0058 -0.0092 -0.0003 0.0006 
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Panel E - The Spearman’s correlation. 
 OPAQU
E_UP 
OPAQU
E_DW 
TRANS
P_UP 
TRANS
P_DW 
OPAQUE
_GOOD 
TRANSP_
GOOD 
TRANSP
_BAD 
OPAQU
E_BAD 
OPAQUE_
UP 1        
OPAQUE_
DW -0.0225 1       
TRANSP_
UP 
-
0.0305* -0.0346* 1      
TRANSP_
DW 
-
0.0351* -0.0399* 
-
0.0541* 1     
OPAQUE_
GOOD 0.1929* -0.0193 
-
0.1022* -0.1182* 1    
TRANSP_
GOOD 
-
0.1068* -0.1217* 0.1844* -0.1266* -0.3569* 1   
TRANSP_
BAD 
-
0.0393* -0.0448* 
-
0.0353* 0.2262* -0.1313* -0.2114* 1  
OPAQUE_
BAD -0.0137 0.2201* 
-
0.0366* -0.0423* -0.0793* -0.1277* -0.0470* 1 
TRANSP_
NEU 
-
0.0753* -0.0858* -0.0137 0.2116* -0.2516* -0.4051* -0.1491* -0.0900* 
OPAQUE_
NEU 0.0614* 0.2283* 
-
0.0846* -0.0978* -0.1833* -0.2952* -0.1086* -0.0656* 
OPAQUE_
BOLD -0.0205 -0.1595* 0.01 0.0109 0.1111* 0.0337* 0.012 -0.1501* 
TRANSP_
BOLD 0.0218 0.0244 0.0062 -0.1979* 0.0724* 0.2426* -0.2421* 0.0227 
CE_TIMIN
G -0.0051 -0.0296* 0.0365* 0.0097 -0.0560* 0.018 0.0179 0.0045 
PBV -0.0136 0 0.0104 -0.005 -0.016 0.0124 0.0208 0.013 
BROKER
WEIGHT 0.0162 0.016 0.0048 0.0196 0.0227 -0.0121 -0.0001 -0.0166 
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 Panel F - The Spearman’s correlation. 
 TRANSP_
NEU 
OPAQUE_
NEU 
OPAQUE_
BOLD 
TRANSP_B
OLD 
CE_TIM
ING PBV 
BROKERWE
IGHT 
TRANSP_NE
U 1       
OPAQUE_N
EU -0.2081* 1      
OPAQUE_B
OLD 0.0223 -0.1588* 1     
TRANSP_BO
LD -0.2464* 0.0558* -0.0065 1    
CE_TIMING 0.0233 -0.0063 0.0204 0.0203 1   
PBV 0.0124 -0.0369* 0.0420* 0.0134 0.0051 1  
BROKERWE
IGHT -0.0219 0.0264* -0.0001 0.009 0.0257* 
0.01
87 1 
 
* denotes significance at the 10% 
Notes. These tables report the correlation matrix of the different model specification variables. It is based on the 
Spearman’s correlation definition. Some of the correlations are missing because of the variables definition. All the 
variables have been defined above. 
DGOODit, DBADit, DNEUit are three dummy variables indicating whether the investment recommendation is good, bad 
or neutral. DDWit is a dummy standing for downgrade in recommendations while DUPit is for upgrades. BOLDNESSit 
represents the analyst forecast boldness and it is calculated as current target price divided by the average target price 
(the consensus) for the company i in year t, minus 1. OPAQUEit and TRANSPARENTit are two dummies, each one 
representing alternatively one of the two disclosure levels. OPAQUE_DWit, OPAQUE_UPit, TRANSP_DWit, 
TRANSP_UPit are interaction variables between the disclosure level and the recommendation changes; 
OPAQUE_GOODit, OPAQUE_NEUit, OPAQUE_BADit, TRANSP_GOODit, TRANSP_NEUit, TRANSP_BADit are 
interaction variables between the disclosure and the recommendation levels; OPAQUE_BOLDit and TRANSP_BOLDit 
are interaction variables between the disclosure level and the analyst boldness.  
BROKERWEIGHTit indicates the broker activity and it is measured as the ratio of reports issued by each broker for a 
company over the total reports issued by for that company; NATIO, is a dummy variable distinguishing between 
European analysts and US ones. CE_TIMINGit takes value equal to 1 if the report is issued after the quarterly earnings 
announcement, -1 if it was issued before, 0 if the analyst’s report was issued out of the time window considered; PBVit 
is the company price-to-book value.  
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Table 8. The market reaction to the report release: the effect of recommendations, their 
revisions and analyst boldness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES CAR(-1;+1) CAR(-1;+1) CAR(-1;+1) CAR(-1;+1) 
     
DGOOD  0.00415***  0.00410*** 
  (2.19e-07)  (6.58e-06) 
DBAD  -0.00972***  -0.00702** 
  (0.000480)  (0.0130) 
DNEU  -0.00365***  -0.00215* 
  (0.000941)  (0.0961) 
DUP 0.00605**   0.00410 
 (0.0166)   (0.150) 
DDW -0.0102***   -0.00737** 
 (0.000174)   (0.0250) 
BOLDNESS   0.0214*** 0.0115** 
   (0.000207) (0.0365) 
     
Observations 4,531 4,420 3,439 3,391 
R-squared 0.005 0.013 0.008 0.022 
pval in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes. This table reports the results of model (1) testing the market reaction to the report release: the effect of 
recommendations, their revisions and analyst boldness. DGOODit, DBADit, DNEUit are three dummy variables 
indicating whether the investment recommendation is good, bad or neutral. DDWit is a dummy standing for downgrade 
in recommendations while DUPit is for upgrades. BOLDNESSit represents the analyst forecast boldness and it is 
calculated as current target price divided by the average target price (the consensus) for the company i in year t, minus 
1.  
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Table 9. The market reaction to the report release: the effect of the transparency disclosure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES CAR(-1;+1) CAR(-1;+1) CAR(-1;+1) CAR(-1;+1) 
     
OPAQUE_GOOD  0.00354***  0.00431*** 
  (0.00840)  (0.00459) 
TRANSP_GOOD  0.00445***  0.00401*** 
  (7.67e-06)  (0.000379) 
TRANSP_BAD  -0.0117***  -0.00742** 
  (0.000850)  (0.0244) 
OPAQUE_BAD  -0.00456  -0.00517 
  (0.269)  (0.332) 
TRANSP_NEU  -0.00368**  -0.00274* 
  (0.0121)  (0.0961) 
OPAQUE_NEU  -0.00361**  -0.00100 
  (0.0279)  (0.631) 
OPAQUE_UP 0.00417   0.00219 
 (0.249)   (0.620) 
OPAQUE_DW -0.00865*   -0.00747 
 (0.0726)   (0.236) 
TRANSP_UP 0.00687**   0.00476 
 (0.0352)   (0.177) 
TRANSP_DW -0.0108***   -0.00738* 
 (0.000942)   (0.0562) 
OPAQUE_BOLD   0.00512 -0.00616 
   (0.621) (0.542) 
TRANSP_BOLD   0.0259*** 0.0161** 
   (0.000195) (0.0144) 
     
Observations 4,531 4,420 3,439 3,391 
R-squared 0.005 0.013 0.009 0.024 
pval in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes. This table reports the results of model (2) testing the market reaction to the report transparency. OPAQUEit and 
TRANSPARENTit are two dummies, each one representing alternatively one of the two disclosure levels. 
OPAQUE_DWit, OPAQUE_UPit, TRANSP_DWit, TRANSP_UPit are interaction variables between the disclosure level 
and the recommendation changes; OPAQUE_GOODit, OPAQUE_NEUit, OPAQUE_BADit, TRANSP_GOODit, 
TRANSP_NEUit, TRANSP_BADit are interaction variables between the disclosure and the recommendation levels; 
OPAQUE_BOLDit and TRANSP_BOLDit are interaction variables between the disclosure level and the analyst boldness.  
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Table 10. The market reaction to the report release: the effect of the transparency disclosure 
with other control variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES CAR(-1;+1) CAR(-1;+1) CAR(-1;+1) CAR(-1;+1) 
     
OPAQUE_UP 0.00219 0.00221 0.00222 0.00223 
 (0.620) (0.617) (0.616) (0.614) 
OPAQUE_DW -0.00747 -0.00743 -0.00743 -0.00740 
 (0.236) (0.239) (0.239) (0.241) 
TRANSP_UP 0.00477 0.00475 0.00476 0.00476 
 (0.175) (0.178) (0.178) (0.177) 
TRANSP_DW -0.00738* -0.00742* -0.00737* -0.00740* 
 (0.0562) (0.0546) (0.0564) (0.0549) 
OPAQUE_GOOD 0.00432*** 0.00458*** 0.00466*** 0.00489*** 
 (0.00437) (0.00669) (0.00675) (0.00899) 
TRANSP_GOOD 0.00404*** 0.00431*** 0.00435*** 0.00462*** 
 (0.000383) (0.00151) (0.00267) (0.00483) 
TRANSP_BAD -0.00738** -0.00700* -0.00707** -0.00670* 
 (0.0244) (0.0528) (0.0342) (0.0658) 
OPAQUE_BAD -0.00515 -0.00484 -0.00488 -0.00459 
 (0.333) (0.373) (0.367) (0.403) 
TRANSP_NEU -0.00271 -0.00242 -0.00240 -0.00211 
 (0.103) (0.199) (0.212) (0.321) 
OPAQUE_NEU -0.000977 -0.000709 -0.000620 -0.000369 
 (0.641) (0.755) (0.795) (0.885) 
OPAQUE_BOLD -0.00612 -0.00607 -0.00617 -0.00606 
 (0.546) (0.548) (0.541) (0.549) 
TRANSP_BOLD 0.0161** 0.0161** 0.0161** 0.0162** 
 (0.0146) (0.0139) (0.0144) (0.0140) 
CE_TIMING -0.000118   -9.84e-05 
 (0.897)   (0.913) 
PBV  -0.000105  -9.61e-05 
  (0.742)  (0.763) 
BROKERWEIGHT   -0.00504 -0.00454 
   (0.734) (0.758) 
     
Observations 3,391 3,391 3,391 3,391 
R-squared 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 
pval in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes. This table reports the results of model (3) testing the market reaction to the report transparency, conditionally to 
some control variables. OPAQUE_DWit, OPAQUE_UPit, TRANSP_DWit, TRANSP_UPit are interaction variables 
between the disclosure level and the recommendation changes; OPAQUE_GOODit, OPAQUE_NEUit, OPAQUE_BADit, 
TRANSP_GOODit, TRANSP_NEUit, TRANSP_BADit are interaction variables between the disclosure and the 
recommendation levels; OPAQUE_BOLDit and TRANSP_BOLDit are interaction variables between the disclosure level 
and the analyst boldness.  
BROKERWEIGHTit indicates the broker activity and it is measured as the ratio of reports issued by each broker for a 
company over the total reports issued by for that company; NATIO, is a dummy variable distinguishing between 
European analysts and US ones. CE_TIMINGit takes value equal to 1 if the report is issued after the quarterly earnings 
ͻͷ  
announcement, -1 if it was issued before, 0 if the analyst’s report was issued out of the time window considered; PBVit 
is the company price-to-book value.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Paper III 
Proximity to Hubs of Expertise in Financial Analyst Forecast Accuracy 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Does geographical proximity enhance financial analysts’ accuracy? Results from recent literature 
about the financial analyst forecasting process show a systematic difference in earnings forecast 
accuracy dependent on the geographical distance of analysts from the companies which they follow 
(see, e.g. Malloy (2005) and Bae et al. (2008)).   
This paper investigates whether the geographical proximity of financial analysts to hubs of 
information and expertise can influence their forecasting accuracy. 
The literature argues that local analysts issue more accurate forecasts because they have an 
informational advantage over analysts who are further away.21  
In general, financial analysts are ‘intermediaries’ between the managers of the firms which they 
follow and financial markets. They use a heterogeneous set of information (hard and soft, explicit 
and tacit) about the company which they follow, the industry and the economic system in order to 
arrive at earnings forecasts, company value and an investment recommendation. Thus, the 
evaluation process performed by financial analysts has a sequential structure ‘input-processing-
output’.  
In this framework, local informational advantage could be related either to different information 
sets available to local and remote analysts or to the superior skills of local analysts in processing the 
same information set. Specifically, a different set of information could be derived from an analyst’s 
direct contact with company management and premises or from lower information gathering costs. 
In an international setting, the superior skills could be related to better knowledge of the local 
language, culture or customs.  
The purpose of this study is related to this latter idea, introducing a new concept of proximity. 
Drawing on both international- and industrial economics-based research and on network analysis                                                         
21 Alternative explanations are related to incentive arguments, including compensation and career incentives, and not to 
information asymmetries. 
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and cluster theories, this work aims to explore the role of proximity of analysts to centres of 
production of soft and not structured knowledge in order to explain the performance of financial 
analysts.  
Industrial centres can constitute important knowledge spillovers by creating formal and informal 
networks amongst firms and higher education and research institutions. In such a hub, information 
can easily flow and propagate. Our hypothesis is that physical proximity to these hubs is an 
advantage for financial analysts, leading to the issue of more accurate forecasts. 
Prior literature provides mixed results with respect to geographical advantage. We hypothesise that 
unstudied aspects of analysts’ locations may add important evidence to prior literature.  
We test our hypothesis by the collection of both macroeconomic data - to identify the hubs of 
expertise - and financial analyst data, specifically earnings forecasts, dates of research reports and 
details about the financial analysts’ location. The final filtered sample of 205 matched-observations 
related to 33 firms, across seven countries and ten sectors over four years (from 2004 to 2008). 
Specifically, we first establish the location of the hubs of expertise of the country and industry of 
our sample, drawing on concepts from industrial and international economics.  
Secondly, we test whether the accuracy of financial analyst forecasts depends on the location of 
financial analysts in regard to the hubs of expertise identified.  
Our results are consistent with the hypothesis. In order to establish the robustness of this approach, 
we employed different measures of both earnings forecast accuracy and proximity.  
Even though preliminary, and probably in part biased by sample selection issues, overall, the 
empirical evidence confirms the benefit of being part of a network, formal or informal, in which 
information, knowledge and expertise sharing can flow easily. We try to give some new evidence 
on what can cause variations in financial analyst accuracy by exploring these concepts, well known 
and analysed in other fields, but new in the context of financial analysts. 
We believe that the identification of the drivers which affect forecast accuracy is important for at 
least three reasons. First, investors should benefit from being able to identify more accurate 
forecasts (and forecasters) as a good knowledge of these drivers can help them to spot more reliable 
information sources. Second, as earnings forecast are part of the input to analysts’ valuation 
methods and their stock recommendations, more accurate forecasters could issue more profitable 
recommendations. Third, forecast accuracy is also important to brokerage houses and investment 
banks as it enhances the quality of their output. Trading commissions and portfolio performance, 
ͻͺ  
which are strongly based on analyst ability, in fact generate part of their revenues. Thus, forecast 
accuracy should be important in turn to analysts, who can be rewarded by their brokerage houses 
according to their accuracy.  Finally, the results of this study could also contribute to the 
organisation of the research operations and financial research departments of investment banks and 
brokerage houses.  The identification of a link between hubs of expertise and financial analyst 
performance could induce a change in the structure of financial research, from being country- or 
industry-based to expertise hub-based. 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 explains the literature on financial analyst accuracy; 
Section 3 reports the methodology adopted to measure proximity to hubs of expertise; Section 4 
describes the data and research design; Section 5 reports the main results; Section 6 illustrates the 
conclusions of this research, suggesting new patterns of analysis; and the Appendix reports the 
technical details of the procedure used to identify the hubs of expertise. 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
Many papers have investigated the link between geography and information asymmetries in a 
number of financial and economic contexts.  
Focusing on investors, for example, it is well known that they are biased towards their home 
country. The literature explaining this home bias is extensive, but still far from having obtained 
conclusive results. An important stream has underlined the differences in information available to 
domestic and foreign investors. Early papers focused on this area, for example Gehrig (1993) and 
Kang and Stulz (1997). A number of papers attempted to identify more directly whether foreign 
investors have an informational disadvantage. Hau (2001) investigated trading data for professional 
traders and showed that local investors perform better than foreign traders. Choe et al. (2005) and 
Dvorak (2005) found that foreigners trade at worse prices in Korea and Indonesia, respectively. 
On the institutional investors’ side, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) and Seasholes (2000) argued 
that better resources and access to expertise allows foreign institutions to perform better than 
domestic institutions. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) found that in the Finnish market over a two-
year period, foreign and domestic financial corporations bought more stocks which performed well 
over the next 120 trading days than domestic individual investors. Seasholes (2000) found that 
foreign investors buy (sell) ahead of good (bad) earnings announcements in Taiwan, while domestic 
investors do the opposite. Froot, O’Connell and Seasholes (2001) and Froot and Ramadorai (2001) 
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used flow data to show that foreign investors have some ability to predict returns. These papers are 
consistent with the better information and greater sophistication on the part of foreign investors.  
However, evidence on the performance of foreign investors is mixed. For instance, Shukla and van 
Inwegen (1995) showed that UK money managers underperform in comparison with their 
American counterparts when picking US stocks. Using 18 years of annual data, Kang and Stulz 
(1997) found no evidence that foreign investors outperformed domestic investors in Japan. 
A new strand of literature looked at the impact of distance on portfolio choice within countries. 
Coval and Moskowitz (1999), using only U.S. stock returns, provided evidence that investor 
location matters, in that mutual fund managers overweight the stocks of firms located closer to 
them. In another paper, the same authors (2001) found that mutual fund managers are better at 
picking stocks of firms which are closer to where they are located than those from a more distant 
location. Huberman (2001) found local concentration in the ownership of the Baby Bells in the US. 
Ivković and Weisbrenner (2005) used data from a large discount brokerage house and found the 
striking result that one out of six US individuals in their sample only invested in companies 
headquartered within 250 miles of their household. Recent papers show that social networks are 
also important for stock holdings. Hong, Kubik and Stein (2005) showed that mutual fund managers 
were more likely to hold a particular stock when other managers in the same city held the same 
stock. 
With specific regard to financial analysts, a number of papers have investigated how the geography 
of security analysts can affect their forecast performance. Some have analysed whether the country-
related features have an impact on financial analyst accuracy. Chang, Khanna and Palepu (2000) 
and others documented considerable variation across countries in the accuracy of analyst forecasts, 
depending on specific country characteristics. However, the international evidence seems mixed 
and inconclusive.  For instance, while Chang, Khanna and Palepu (2000) found evidence that a 
country’s legal system helps us to understand the accuracy of analysts, Ang and Ciccone (2001) 
reached the opposite conclusion. Hope (2003) found that the enforcement of accounting standards 
and firm-level disclosure were important determinants of forecast accuracy. 
Only a handful of papers investigate, directly or indirectly, how analysts’ physical distance to 
evaluated companies affects the accuracy of their forecasts. Malloy (2005), for instance, found 
evidence that, US analysts located close to the evaluated firm are more accurate than those who are 
further away. He argued that the ability of local analysts to make house calls rather than conference 
calls and the opportunity to meet CEOs and survey company operations directly provide them with 
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an opportunity to obtain valuable private information. Following this logic, geographic proximity is 
a proxy for the quality of analyst information.  
In an international setting, analysts cover those countries which are open to foreign investors. Bae et 
al. (2008) showed that the financial opening of a country22 is followed by the increasing interest of 
foreign analysts. Bacmann and Bolliger (2001) directly examined the relative performance of 
analysts from local and foreign brokerage houses in seven Latin American stock markets. They 
concluded that foreign analysts outperformed local analysts in their study which focused on seven 
Latin American countries. When they compared the mean difference in forecast error between local 
and foreign analysts, it was not significantly positive for all of the countries in their sample, with 
the exceptions of Mexico and Colombia. In contrast, Orpurt (2004) found evidence of a significant 
local advantage in a sample of seven European countries. In his study, local analysts were defined 
as resident in that country. He found that his evidence was driven by Germany. However, while 
Bolliger (2004) focused on local versus foreign brokerage houses (not analysts) and found an 
advantage for local brokerage houses in Europe, Orpurt (2004) did not find this type of local 
advantage. Conroy, Fukuda, and Harris (1997) also found a local brokerage house advantage in 
Japan. Finally, Chang (2003) compared specifically the stock recommendations of foreign and 
expatriate analysts covering Taiwanese firms. He found that there was a local advantage, as 
expatriate analysts outperformed foreign analysts. He also found that expatriate analysts 
outperformed local analysts working for domestic firms. This result is consistent with the 
hypothesis that local analysts working for foreign institutions have the advantage of belonging to 
more sophisticated and resourceful organisations. Bae et al. (2008) showed that there is a significant 
local advantage for analysts in a sample of 32 countries. This local analyst advantage holds after 
having controlled for analyst characteristics as well as firm characteristics. However, it varies 
substantially between countries. The local analyst advantage is stronger in countries where 
disclosure is weaker, institutional investors are less important and corporate ownership is more 
concentrated. 
These results are very interesting, consistent with and complement another part of the literature, 
which analyses the information needs of financial analysts. Previts et al. (1994), for instance, 
performing a content analysis of 479 sell-side analyst reports, showed that analyst information 
needs to extend beyond that contained in financial reports and include softer, more subjective 
information.  Breton and Tafler (2001) presented a content analysis of 105 analyst reports in order 
to assess the information used by analysts. Non-financial information seemed to be equally                                                         
22 By financial opening the authors mean the opening of the country to foreign investors. 
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important as financial information. The financial analysts were particularly interested in non-
financial information about management and strategy, as well as the trading environment of the 
firm. According to the distance-related literature, this information is probably easily gathered if the 
analysts are closer to the firm being evaluated. This is also supported by Barker’s results (1998). 
Performing a survey, he found that analysts considered personal contact to be more important than 
earnings announcements and financial statements. Since proximity can help analysts to keep 
frequent personal contact, according to the local information advantage hypothesis, the accuracy of 
analysts who are close to the evaluated company should improve. The author provided four possible 
reasons underlying this evidence. First, personal contact can improve the timeliness of the 
disclosure of information. Second, analysts can question company managers directly. Third, it helps 
analysts to have comparative advantage over their peers, and, fourth, they can focus on strategic and 
forward-looking issues. 
In summary, prior research has documented significant variation in the quality of analysts’ 
forecasts, with some being more accurate others. According to previous results, Brown et al. (1985) 
and Brown (1993), it is possible to conclude that the accuracy of earnings forecasts depends on the 
difficulty or complexity of the task. Proximity to a source of informational advantage can help and 
simplify the complexity of the valuation task, thus improving the forecasting accuracy. Empirical 
evidence is inconclusive on this issue, but there is some evidence that geographical distance 
between the analyst and the followed company is an important factor in forecast accuracy. Other 
authors argue that local analysts may gather better quality and more timely information about the 
company, thereby gaining an informational advantage over their peers, the so-called local 
information advantage.  
We do not fully agree with this theory. In fact, in such a globalised context, where physical 
presence can be easily substituted by virtual contact and distances are shortened by technology 
which facilitates communication, we argue that the physical proximity of analysts to firms is not 
associated with an informational advantage. Therefore, in our hypothesis, the information 
advantage derives from another form of geographical proximity which is more industry knowledge-
related.  
We therefore provide a new concept of proximity related to distance from centres of knowledge, 
which we define as hubs of expertise. While Malloy (2005) measured proximity as the number of 
kilometres between analysts and firms and Bae et al. (2008) defined an analyst as local if he or she 
was located in the same country of the followed firm, in our study, the distinction between local and 
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foreign analysts is based on the analyst’s location with respect to the hubs, which are identified by 
looking at the industrial specialisation of countries.23   
According to the comparative advantage theory (Ricardo (1963)), each nation tends to shift its 
resources to its more productive industries, while increasing trade for goods in their less productive 
industries. So, each nation tends to have a specialisation in a specific industry. This is often 
associated with the development of industrial clusters. In the sphere of financial services, for 
instance, previous research has shown that large, medium and small financial service companies 
have a tendency to cluster in metropolitan areas because of the need to access a large pool of 
specialist and support services (e.g. accounting, actuarial, legal etc.), be in close proximity to the 
markets, benefit from agglomeration economies, reduce transactions costs, develop and innovate 
intrinsic skills through the sharing of knowledge and practice (e.g. Davies, 1990). 
Since clusters provide knowledge-rich environments which are associated with innovation, 
knowledge spillover, the building of relationships and synergies, proximity to these centres of 
specialisation may allow financial analysts to improve their knowledge of value-relevant factors 
and use them to their advantage in the evaluation of companies in that industry. Therefore, in our 
opinion, the geographical proximity of financial analysts to hubs of expertise improves the quality 
of industry knowledge and allows analysts to develop unique expertise and skills, resulting in an 
informational advantage and greater forecast accuracy.  
 
3. Hypothesis development and research design 
3.1. Modelling the analyst accuracy 
The set of information that analysts use to evaluate a company can be divided in two groups. A 
first group composed by commercial and structured information, easily collected by all analysts 
and a second group of soft (tacit) information that can be privileged and produced by the 
environment in which analysts work. Therefore, an analyst has an information advantage if it has 
access to the soft information, derived by his context. 
Our basic hypothesis is that analysts located close to sources of soft knowledge have an 
information advantage. Therefore, the primary aim of this research is to test whether the accuracy 
of financial analysts depends of their proximity to hubs of expertise, generating soft knowledge.  
The conceptual model used is therefore:                                                         
23 See also Section 3 and the Appendix to the paper. 
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Analyst Forecast Accuracy = f (analyst stock of knowledge deriving from the proximity to the 
hubs, other control variables)  
We adopt two estimation techniques in order to investigate the accuracy of financial analysts and 
in both cases we employ the Newey-West procedure24 in order to provide consistent inferences on the 
estimated coefficients.  
The former is a classic OLS regression, assuming a linear relationship between the analyst's 
accuracy, which is our dependent variable, and all of the independent variables. 
The latter is a fixed effects model based on the within transformation. This model allows us to take 
into account the differences between the firms covered which are not controlled by our 
independent variables, thereby allowing us to manage time-series observations and cross-sectional 
units at the same time. We stress that the assumption underlying the fixed effect model is that the 
relationship between the explained and the explanatory variables is assumed to be constant both 
cross-sectionally and over time. 
As a measure of relative forecast accuracy, we initially made two different definitions of accuracy: 
a simple and a more sophisticated one. The simplest one (AFE) is the Absolute Forecast Error 
calculated as: 
AFE ijt = ACTUAL jt − FORECASTijt
ACTUAL jt      (1)
 
where ACTUAL indicates the actual earnings per share for the company j in the fiscal year t and 
FORECAST is the forecast of earnings per share, issued by the analysts i for the company j in fiscal 
year t, no more than 100 days before the announcement date. As previous research has proved, this 
measure is too naïve and can be biased.25 We also defined another measure, the Proportional Mean 
Absolute Forecast Error (PMAFE), calculated as: 
PMAFE ijt = AFE ijt − AAFE jt
AAFE jt
 (-1)      (2) 
 
This measures the difference between the absolute forecast error (AFE) of analyst i forecasting 
earnings for firm j in the fiscal year t and the average absolute forecast error across all analyst 
forecasts of firm j’s fiscal year t earnings, expressed as a fraction of the average absolute forecast                                                         
24Brooks (2008) explains that the Newey-West procedure implies ':HAC:' (Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent) 
standard errors. This adjustment allows us to deal with the coefficients' standard errors since it produces a variance-
covariance estimator which is consistent in the presence of both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. 
25 Clement (1998) documented that PMAFE improves the chances of identifying the differences in individual analyst 
forecast accuracy. Jacob et al. (1999) discussed these benefits in more detail. 
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error across all analyst forecasts of firm j’s fiscal year t earnings. PMAFE controls for firm-year 
effects by subtracting the mean absolute forecast error, AAFE, from the analyst’s absolute forecast 
error. Deflating by AAFE reduces heteroskedasticity in forecast error distributions across firms 
(Clement (1999)) and multiplying by -1 ensures that higher values for PMAFE correspond to higher 
levels of accuracy.26 
Jacob et al. (1999) explain that the PMAFE variable is a relative measure of forecasting accuracy 
which is not affected by inter-temporal changes and cross-sectional differences in the price-to-
earnings ratios. We rely on this variable in order to compare data from different firms and 
different years which could therefore allow us to provide more interesting figures on the 
relationship between knowledge and analyst accuracy. 
 
3.2. Modelling analysts’ stock of knowledge and other control variables 
 
In order to assess whether the analyst’s location with respect to hubs of expertise influences the 
quality of their knowledge and enhances the accuracy of their forecasts, we first identify the hubs, 
where the spill-overs of knowledge originate. Secondly, we test whether the accuracy of financial 
analysts’ forecasts depends on their proximity to the source of spill-overs (the hubs) identified. 
Since empirical measurement of knowledge spill-overs would be impossible because “knowledge 
flows are invisible, they leave no paper trail by which they may be measured and track[ed]” 
(Krugman, 1991, 125), we draw on concepts from industrial and international economics to find a 
proxy. 
Specifically, we assume that there are three alternative methods for the study of knowledge 
generation: cluster-, sector- and network-based approaches. All of these three approaches are based 
on the basic assumption that the intensity of knowledge generated by a sector is related to its level 
of production, but they offer different ways to measure it. 
The first approach is based on the idea that the knowledge derives from intensive and privileged 
exchanges amongst industries which are strongly related in agglomerates of sectors (clusters). In 
this approach, the structural relationships among sectors which characterise a cluster produce 
privileged knowledge. Therefore, even though a sector may be small, it is part of a cluster, and 
therefore generates an amount of knowledge dependent on the cluster of which it is part. Cluster 
                                                        ʹ͸  As  in  all  the  regressions  these  latter  accuracy  measures  were  the  best,  and  consistently  with  previous literature ȋsee Clement ȋͳͻͻͻ and ͳͻͻͺȌ and Jacob et al. ȋͳͻͻͻȌȌ, we report only the results obtained using this accuracy measure. 
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literature explains how clusters retain privileged knowledge which can be spread amongst their 
members. 
Since Marshall’s (1920) seminal discussion about highly localised districts in the UK, a new 
perspective has been developed about the geographical clustering of firms from similar industries.27 
More recently, some pieces of research have conceptualised clusters as sources of enhanced 
knowledge creation (e.g. Lawson & Lorenz, 1999; Lorenzen & Maskell, 2004; and Malmberg & 
Maskell, 2002). In this regard, participating in a cluster would increase the spill-over effects of new 
technologies, knowledge and innovations. For instance, Forni and Paba (2001) show how strong 
linkages induce a relatively fast diffusion of knowledge and new technologies. Cluster analysis 
provides a possible solution to the identification of strongly interrelated sectors. By dividing the 
economic system into clusters of interrelated sectors, the clusters show exactly which sectors are 
closely related to each other. 
Therefore, we associate this kind of ‘clustered’ knowledge with our concept of hubs of expertise, 
the source of shared knowledge.  
The very basic definition of an industrial cluster is “geographical concentrations of industries that 
gain performance advantages through co-location” (Doeringer and Terkla (1995), page 225). This 
definition of clusters is similar to that of agglomeration economies, but in fact it is within industrial 
clusters that agglomeration economies are likely to be observed.  Beyond the basic definition, 
however, there is little consensus on how to define an industrial cluster. Michael Porter extended 
the concept of industrial clusters in his book, The Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990) and 
developed the ‘Diamond of Advantage’, four factors which create a competitive advantage for 
firms.  The four corners of the diamond include factor conditions, demand conditions, industrial 
strategy, and related and supporting industries.  He used this diamond to determine which firms and 
industries had competitive advantage. A more in-depth discussion of the different definitions of 
industry clusters was presented by Jacobs and DeMan (1996) and Rosenfeld (1996, 1997).28  They 
expanded on the definitions of vertical and horizontal industry clusters in order to identify the key 
dimensions which can be used to define clusters.  These include the geographic or spatial clusters of 
economic activity, the horizontal and vertical relationships between industry sectors, the use of 
common technologies, the presence of a central actor (e.g., a large firm, research centre, etc.), the 
quality of the firm’s network and its level of co-operation (Jacobs and DeMan (1996)). In addition 
to vertical and horizontal relationships, Rosenfeld (1997) included criteria for defining a cluster, 
including its size, economic or strategic importance, the range of products produced or services                                                         
27 See Storper (1997) for a review. 
28 Jacobs and DeMan (1996, p. 425) argue that “there is not one correct definition of the cluster concept…different 
dimensions are of interest.”  
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used and the use of common inputs.  He did not define clusters exclusively by the size of the 
industries or the scale of employment. 
We assume that analysts have access to enhanced and privileged knowledge on the basis of their 
geographical proximity to clusters and also benefit from a cultural information advantage that 
improves forecasts issued for companies (local or not) which belong to the same sectors of the 
proximate cluster. To be close to a cluster is in fact a source of informative advantage. 
The second perspective that we use is a sector-based approach.  The theory behind this approach is 
that if a sector is very productive in terms of output, it also has a strong competitive position with 
respect to other sectors. This advantaged position within the national economy generates 
specialisation and greater knowledge generation than other sectors less relevant for the economy. 
To be close to relevant sectors in terms of output can be a source of informational advantage. 
Finally, the third approach is based on network logic. The basic assumption is that knowledge is 
generated by sharing and is the effect of cross-fertilisation between sectors, composing a network., 
The intensity of the knowledge therefore depends on the exchanges between the sectors of the 
network. In this case, proximity to the most relevant nodes of a network could be a source of 
informational advantage.  
Our operational framework is therefore based on three steps in order to assess three proxies of 
knowledge intensity. 
The first step is to define the hubs as industrial clusters. The empirical identification of clusters is 
not a straightforward procedure and the related literature shows how tricky it can be. There are 
no conclusive solutions for this.  
Economic theory suggests several methods for identifying clusters. However, Hoen (2002), after 
describing how cluster analysis contributes to the study of linkages among sectors, shows that the 
cluster identification method based on a block diagonal matrix,29 called the diagonalisation method, 
gives the best results. For this reason, we use this latter method in our analysis. According to this 
approach, we start from the input-output (I-O) matrix of each country. First, we calculate an I-O 
matrix of only the intermediate consumption30 of different industries of a country. Therefore, the 
main diagonal elements, which represent the intermediate consumption of the same industry, are 
zeros. The off-diagonal elements are expressed as a percentage of the largest intermediate 
consumption between two industries, the benchmark for which has been set as equal to 100%. As 
per the literature, we also set a minimum threshold for input and output entries for being part of the                                                         
29 A block diagonal matrix can be split up in parts that have no connection with each other. By rearranging sectors 
appropriately (details of this method are reported in Appendix A), the matrix would look like blocks of matrices along 
the main diagonal. 
30 The intermediate consumption is an economic concept that represents the monetary value of goods and services 
consumed or used as inputs in production by firms of a sector in a country. 
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matrix at 2%. After setting all of the elements that do not satisfy these restrictions to zero, putting 
the matrix in the block diagonal form shows which sectors belong to which clusters.31 Each off-
diagonal value (Sij) in the same block (cluster) indicates the intermediate consumption between 
two sectors that is greater than the selected threshold. According to Hoen (2002), Sij represents the 
strength of the link between two industries, i and j, belonging to the same cluster.  
Once the different clusters (hubs) have been identified, we need to attribute a value for the 
knowledge spill-overs coming from each one. Assuming that the level of knowledge spill-over 
depends on the level of total production achieved by related sectors belonging to the same cluster, 
as defined by Hoen’s procedure, we define a first proxy (CLUSTER). It is measured as the log 
transformation of the sum of Sij of each cluster. In more formal terms, CLUSTER is: 
   ∑=
ij
jiz
SLnCLUSTER  x      (3) 
where z indicates the country, and i and j two of the sectors composing the cluster x.  
In other words, CLUSTER is a proxy of the level of information spill-over of which local analysts 
can take advantage of and it is based on the relevance of a sector depending on the cluster 
(approximated by the total production) of which it is part. Therefore, focusing on analysts’ 
geographical location, we associate with each of them the value of the CLUSTER variable, 
depending on their location.  
Let us assume, therefore, that a UK-based analyst evaluates (UK or foreign) companies in the oil 
industry. According to our framework, we will attribute to this analyst the stock of knowledge 
measured by the CLUSTER variable assigned to the UK of the cluster containing the oil sector. 
Should a specific sector not be contained in any of the identified UK clusters, the value of the 
variable will be forced to zero. Therefore, analysts located in different countries will benefit from 
different stocks of knowledge assigned to the clusters identified in their own country. 
Analysts close to the most important clusters will show higher CLUSTER values, indicating higher 
spill-overs and informational advantages, which help them to issue more accurate forecasts in 
relation to national or international companies in industries belonging to that cluster. Thus, we 
expect this variable to have a positive impact on the accuracy of earnings forecasts. 
The second approach when dealing with the hub identification issue is sector-based.  Input-output 
tables are a useful tool used in the literature for studying the linkages between industries as they                                                         
31 There are several possible algorithms for making the block diagonal matrix by rearranging sectors. Appendix A 
describes an algorithm which does not involve complex computations and is easy to program. An algorithm based on 
eigenvalues, which has the advantage of ordering clusters according to the strength of their linkages, can be found in 
Dietzenbacher (1996). 
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allow the measurement of the effect of a specific sector on the other sectors or the effect of each 
sector on the economic system as a whole.  Therefore, by using the input-output tables, we can 
measure the importance of a sector in a country in terms of its production and level of 
specialisation. We can then assume that the value of production of a sector is a proxy for the 
knowledge produced. According to this framework, each sector represents a hub, but hubs with 
higher values of production contain more important sectors for the overall economy of a country.  
We start with a Use table32 and calculate the variable OUTPUT by industry, which is defined as the 
sector output at basic prices (without considering relationships with other sectors). The reason for 
doing this is to measure the total output value produced by each sector. This variable is measured 
as the log transformation of the sum of the intermediate consumption and the value added of each 
sector, scaled for the country’s power purchase parity (PPP), in order to compare the same 
variables across different countries. In more formal terms: 
 
⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ += z zizizi PPP )dvalue addeptionate consum(intermediLnOUTPUT   (4) 
 
where z indicates the country, while i the industry. The informative value of OUTPUT is that it 
shows how much a sector is relevant in terms of production for the economy. 
Therefore, since our framework production is associated with knowledge, a higher value of the 
variable with respect to a certain sector i are in general related to higher levels of knowledge spill-
over spreading to that sector. Hence, similarly to the CLUSTER variable, we predict this variable to 
have a positive impact on the accuracy of local analysts’ forecasts as a higher level indicates a 
greater informative advantage for them. For example, let us assume that a UK-based analyst 
evaluates a (UK or foreign) bank. According to our framework, we attribute to this analyst the 
stock of knowledge, measured by the OUTPUT variable, assigned to the financial sector in UK. 
Therefore, analysts located in different countries benefit from different stocks of knowledge 
depending on the sector’s relevance, in terms of output, for the country. 
Finally, we also apply a third approach in order to identify hubs, based on methods from social 
network analysis. We assume that the economy of a country can be represented as a network of 
sectors (nodes) which are more or less interrelated. The ties among the nodes measure the strength 
of their relationships. 
                                                        
32 Please see Appendix A for a detailed general definition of this table. 
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Similarly to clusters, networks can also produce spill-overs of knowledge. The extensive literature 
on this field has generated a wide set of techniques and related measurements for capturing the 
many facets of information embedded in the network structure. 
One of the primary aims of social network analysis is to identify the ‘important’ actors in the 
network. The concepts of centrality and prestige have been introduced in the network field in order 
to quantify an individual actor’s prominence within a network by summarising structural 
relationships among the g nodes.  We draw from this literature to assess the prominence of 
economic centres (hubs) across countries, using the tools which it suggests. 
In order to do this, we replicate the procedure proposed by Cetorelli and Peristiani (2009). The 
authors, using methodologies developed in social network analysis, elaborate measures to rank the 
relative degree of dominance of financial centres around the world. With such measures, they were 
able to assess more effectively whether US financial markets have lost their position of global 
leadership and the extent to which competition from other centres may have strengthened over time. 
The most complete measure which they implemented was the ‘prestige index’. In network analysis, 
indices of prestige allow for the measurement of the dispersion or inequality of the prominence of 
all of the actors. Formally, the prestige index (Pr) for a node (in our case, a sector) i (ni) is 
calculated as: 
Pr (ni) = x1i P(n1)+ x2i P(n2)+ …+ xNi P(nN)  (5) 
 
where the weights are represented by the flows from each of the nodes of the network onto ni. 
Therefore, by adapting and applying Cetorelli and Prestiani (2009)’s procedure for financial 
centres, we assess a prestige index for each sector (node) of all the countries (networks) of the 
dataset. 
In order to represent the network, its nodes and the ties between nodes, we assume that the 
production value between sectors and within the same sector can be a proxy of the links of the 
network and indicate its knowledge intensity. Therefore, we measure flows between nodes through 
tables of intermediate consumption and the values added of each country. Specifically, the 
production of each country is represented by a matrix which exhibits the flow of intermediate 
consumption between each pair of sectors on the off-diagonal entries, while the main diagonal 
shows the sum of the intermediate consumption flow within each sector and the sector value 
added. 
We apply the algorithm (5) proposed in the literature by Cetorelli and Peristiani (2009) to the 
whole network. Therefore, we have N equations in N unknowns for each network. 
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As shown by Katz (1953), this system has a finite solution if one first standardises the original 
network matrix. For this reason, firstly, we divide each column of the matrix by the column’s 
sum. 
After this standardisation, the system of equations becomes a more common matrix-characteristic 
equation, where the solution (that is, the vector of prestige indicators) is the eigenvector associated 
with the largest eigenvalue of the standardized matrix (SM). Since we do not use any specific 
mathematical software to calculate the eigenvalue of the matrix, we apply the ‘power method’.33 
This is an iterative method and thus does not require any specific software to solve the problem.  
In order to apply this method, we raise each cell value to the nth power until the matrix converges 
into a table of equal vectors (by column) so that we can find out the eigenvector associated with 
the largest Eigen value of the matrix.34 This eigenvector contains the index of prestige associated 
with each sector. We call this eigenvector a NET variable and it is dependent on the flows 
exchanged (approximated to the intermediate consumption) between sectors in the same country. In 
more formal terms, for a country/network z, the variable NET can be calculated as: 
 
NETz = eigenvector of SMz    (6) 
 
A node (sector) will thus have high prestige if it is chosen, in terms of flows, by a low number of 
highly prestigious other nodes or by a high number of other nodes with lower index value.  
NET is therefore also our proxy for the extent of knowledge spill-overs of different sectors in a 
specific country. Its informative value is that it allows the knowledge of how much a sector is 
relevant in terms of exchanged flows of knowledge (approximated by the intermediate 
consumption) between the different sectors of the network. A greater value of this variable is 
associated with higher levels of knowledge spill-overs spreading from the specific sector i. Each 
analyst will be associated with a NET value, depending on their location and the sector which they 
are evaluating. For instance, a UK-based analyst evaluating a (UK or foreign) bank has a stock of 
knowledge measured by the NET variable, which is assigned to the financial sector in UK in 
relation to the ‘prestige’ of this sector with respect to others in the same country. Therefore, 
                                                        ͵͵ In mathematics, the power iteration is an algorithm: given a matrix A, the algorithm will produce a number λ (the 
eigenvalue) and a non-zero vector v (the eigenvector), such that Av = λv. The algorithm is also known as the Von Mises 
iteration.  ͵Ͷ Appendix B reports further technical details.  
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analysts located in different countries will benefit from different stocks of knowledge depending 
on the sector’s relevance to the country. 
Hence, similarly to the aforementioned proxies, we predict that this variable has a positive impact 
on the accuracy of local analysts’ forecasts as a higher level indicates a greater informative 
advantage for them.  
Therefore, in more formal terms, the model that we test is: 
 
ii2i1 i εARIABLES CONTROL Vβ NOWLEDGESTOCK OF KβαACCURACY +++=   (7) 
 
where the ACCURACY variable is defined in Section 3.1 and the STOCK OF KNOWLEDGE is 
alternatively measured by the CLUSTER, OUTPUT and NET variables.  
With regard to the CONTROL VARIABLES, we include in the model a limited number of control 
variables because of the small size of the sample. Specifically, we insert the variable AGE, 
measuring the number of days from the date of the release of the report to the end of the fiscal 
year and VOL, which is a control variable measuring the coefficient of the variation in the firm's 
quarterly EPS over the past three years.  We hypothesise that the greater the variability of the 
actual EPS over time, the greater the complexity of the analysts’ forecasts. Finally, we employ 
dummy variables in order to control for the inter-temporal changes in analyst accuracy.35 We do not 
expect to find any significant results as the PMAFE variable provides an adjustment for the inter-
temporal variability of the analysed topic itself (see Section 3.1.). 
 
4. Data 
The sample construction started with a rich dataset of observations on analyst forecasts collected 
from Factsect over four fiscal years, from 2005 to 2008.  
For each earnings forecast, we have the research date, the recommendation issued, the previous 
research date and forecast by the same analyst, and the type of report issued. We also collected 
information about analyst characteristics, such as their full name, brokerage house and office 
telephone number. The latter allowed me to infer their geographical location. As we had some 
missing data with regard to the last piece of information, we collected some of them by hand from 
Nelson’s Directory of Investment Research, which provides extensive information about analysts, 
which companies they follow and brokerage houses. Each volume of Nelson’s Directory in year t is                                                         
35 We include D05, which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation obtained was in 2005, 0 otherwise; D06 is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation obtained was in 2006, 0 otherwise; and D07, which is equal to 1 if the 
observation obtained was in 2007, 0 otherwise. 
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based on the analysts’ information from year t-1. As the 2008 volume is not available, we used the 
2007 volume as a proxy for the 2007 analysts’ missing data. As we did not find any clear 
information on some analysts, we excluded these missing observations. 
These raw data needed to be filtered in order to match the restrictions based on the aim of our 
research. 
Firstly, since the computation of the knowledge variable based either on the cluster or the sector 
concept is only available for specific countries, i.e. Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom and 
France, we eliminate all of the observations associated with analysts who are not located in these 
countries. Moreover, we cancel out all of the observations produced by teams of analysts placed in 
different countries. Following these adjustments, we can manage a dataset which satisfies our 
assumptions about the relevance of the proximity between the location of analysts and the hubs of 
expertise. 
Secondly, we identify the end date of the fiscal year and eliminate all of the analyst reports released 
more than one hundred days before this reference point. We adjust the data in this way in order to 
have homogenous annual EPS forecasts.  
Furthermore, Jacob et al. (1999) point out that each analyst benefits from both public information 
released by firms and previous information released by other analysts. In order to control for 
these sources of information, we compute a control variable which represents the age of the 
forecast, assuming that more recent reports benefit from the information released in earlier firm 
reports and from new public information. 
The CLUSTER variable is adjusted to the data from the 2002 input-output tables because of a lack 
of data availability. Moreover, the OUTPUT variable is also based on these 2002 input-output 
tables. The NET variable is entirely based on data from 2000 and 1995 for the UK. We expect that 
this is not a big issue as our variables capture the structural relationships amongst the sectors which 
should not constantly change over time. 
The final dataset is composed of 205 observations related to 33 firms, from 2005 to 2008.  
The stated variables can be summarised by their descriptive statistics in Table 1. 
 
Insert Table 1. 
 
On the basis of these statistics, we could assert that, on average, analysts provide accurate forecasts 
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but with relevant outliers and high variability amongst them. Moreover, in looking at the 
coefficients of variation, we can appreciate how the analyst accuracy variable exhibits a coefficient 
which should require more explanatory variables in order to be almost completely explained. 
However, since this research aims to focus on the role of knowledge in analyst accuracy and the 
sample size is not large, we only focus on the aforementioned explanatory variables. Table 2 reports 
the correlation matrix among variables. 
 
Insert Table 2. 
 
Furthermore, we notice that the literature on the argument provides regressions in which the 
adjusted R-squared hits a value of approximately 0.15, which is an argument for this type of 
research in order to shed more light on the topic. 
The firms which comprise the final sample belong to ten different sectors and seven countries, as 
summarised in Table 3. 
 
Insert Table 3. 
 
The dataset does not have many control variables but we assert that this provision could be 
sufficient since this attempt only represents the preliminary stage of the research on the relationship 
between knowledge and analyst accuracy. 
5. Results 
We start the empirical analysis by applying the OLS technique, running different models in order to 
examine the impact of each knowledge variable on PMAFE, which represents analyst accuracy. 
 
Insert Table 4. 
 
All of the models are somewhat poor in explaining analyst accuracy. Firstly, all of the values of the 
F-statistic only allow us to argue that all of the coefficients are not significantly different from zero. 
Similarly, all of the t-statistics of the knowledge variables only allow us to argue that each 
knowledge variable is not significantly different from zero. Finally, the adjuster R-squared is 
negligible for all of the models; therefore the dependent variable could be better explained by 
looking at its mean. 
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From this discussion we could appreciate the apparent relevance of the AGE coefficient, which 
confirms our expectation that more recent reports would benefit from past analyst reports and 
incremental public information. 
We explain these preliminary results by recognising that the OLS estimate does not account for the 
differences between firms. In order to control for these unexplained dynamics, we should analyse 
the analysts’ accuracy conditionally on the firm’s identity. Indeed, by using this perspective, we can 
appreciate the impact of the independent variables in explaining the variability of the analysts’ 
accuracy without the requirement of control variables at the firm level. Moreover, these firm level 
control variables could be regarded as omitted variables, and thus their absence could debase the 
OLS results. 
Since we only have the VOL variable as a control variable at the firm level, we employ a within 
transformation at firm-level in order to tackle this issue. We label the new variables with the suffix 
‘D’ and eliminate the constant term on the basis of the within transformation. 
 
Insert Table 5. 
 
After controlling for company identity, we notice that AGE is still significant, which is consistent 
with our expectation. Indeed, we can confirm that an analyst gains in accuracy when he or she 
provides his or her report close to the actual EPS issue. This figure could be motivated by our 
assumption of the benefits of incremental public information and the information contained in 
reports previously released by other analysts. 
The control variable VOL is not significant. On the basis of this result, we cannot confirm our 
expectation of a negative relationship between the coefficient of variation of the historical actual 
EPS and analyst accuracy. A plausible reason for this result is that the literature refers to the 
variability of the actual EPS only in order to explain the distribution of the analyst forecasts, not the 
topic of analyst accuracy. 
We also note that the dummy variables do not provide any contribution to the explanation of the 
dependent variable. This is probably due to the formulation of the PMAFE variable, since it 
accounts for inter-temporal changes in analyst accuracy. 
This introduction allows us to focus on the explanatory power of our knowledge variables. First of 
all, we notice that CLUSTER_D is not significantly different from zero (Model 2). This result could 
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derive from the aforementioned difficulties in measuring cluster boundaries and the knowledge 
contained therein. Therefore, this inconsistency could be caused by the drawbacks in the procedure 
of identification of clusters and in the representation of cluster knowledge. 
Following this argument, we use the NET_D variable, which recognises hubs of expertise at a sector 
level rather than at a cluster level (Model 3). From this setting, we report a coefficient that is 
significantly different from zero. Focusing on knowledge at a sector level allows us to confirm our 
expectations on the role of proximity in increasing analysts’ stock of knowledge. The positive sign 
of the coefficient means that the proximity between the analyst and the hub of expertise represents a 
source of analyst accuracy. Moreover, the adjusted R-squared of Model 3 increases significantly 
after the inclusion of the NET_D variable. Above all, if we multiply the coefficient of NET_D by 
this standard deviation, we can evaluate the variable impact on analyst accuracy between -8% and 
8%. 
This result is a preliminary confirmation of the relevance of analyst proximity to hubs of expertise. 
It is obtained by elaborating on the input-output tables on the basis of network analysis. As 
explained above, we measure sector knowledge on the basis of an index which represents the sector 
prestige recognised by all of the other sectors of the national economy. In order to check the 
usefulness of the network analysis, we define a third variable which considers sector output as a 
proxy of the stock of knowledge within the sector. In reality, this choice of proxy is not arbitrary 
since it represents the variable which we have split in the network information matrix and then 
elaborated in order to obtain the NET_D variable. If we obtained the same results, we could assert 
that all of the information on sector knowledge is contained in the sector attributes. Therefore, the 
analysis of sector ties should not provide incremental information. 
We notice that the coefficient of the OUTPUT variable (Model 4) is not significantly different from 
zero. On the basis of this result, we confirm the benefits of exploiting network analysis in order to 
trace the availability of knowledge amongst units of analysis.  
To sum up, network analysis synthesises network interactions, thereby providing a holistic analysis 
of knowledge amongst sectors within a national economy. Moreover, thanks to this approach, we 
demonstrate the relevance of knowledge about production to explain analyst accuracy on the basis 
of proximity to centres of knowledge. 
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6. Conclusions 
This research aims to provide new insights on the issue of analyst accuracy, by developing a set of 
variables which should represent part of the stock of knowledge owned by analysts and help them 
in their task. 
First of all, we point out that the analysis of analyst accuracy is essential in order to increase 
employers’ reputations. Investment banks and brokerage houses would offer the services of analysts 
for free in order to benefit from analysts’ reputations, a fact which is recognised by the financial 
markets. 
Secondly, we argue that prior research on analyst accuracy has been  more about analysts’ 
characteristics rather than on the knowledge which is available to them. We recognise the utility of 
the first approach but try to develop the knowledge framework in order to provide a new stream of 
research. 
We point out that each analyst has a certain stock of knowledge available: the firm’s public 
information and the information contained in previous reports. The definition of our knowledge 
variables refers to the analyst’s personal knowledge. We assume that the concept of proximity is 
essential for the detection of this source of personal expertise. 
The results of this research confirm our main expectation since we find some evidence of greater 
accuracy associated with forecasts issued by analysts who are close to so-called hubs of expertise. 
This result is not based on the concept of cluster since the empirical identification of clusters is not 
straightforward. We ground our results by considering that hubs of expertise represent knowledge 
associated with single sectors of a national economy. Using this perspective, we report on the 
relevant role of sector knowledge on production for local analysts, even if they cover firms which 
are established abroad. 
We conclude this research by suggesting plausible steps in order to improve the analysis. Firstly, 
further improvements are needed in terms of cluster identification and the knowledge available to 
the analyst. We have suggested network analysis as a reliable algorithm which could be used to 
detect concentrations of sectors within the input-output framework, thus providing a new approach 
to the evaluation of the stock of knowledge within the clusters. We suggest the development of this 
network analysis in order to measure the stock of knowledge within each unit of analysis. In the 
next steps of this work, each analyst will represent a unit of analysis. 
Secondly, we suggest increasing the number of observations since the size of this sample is only 
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reliable for preliminary results and insights. The plausible direction is to expand the group of 
countries analysed, thereby providing a more comprehensive picture of the European continent. 
Furthermore, it would be useful to collect firms’ quarterly EPS’s in order to increase the number of 
observations over time. 
Finally, we propose the merger of these knowledge variables with the explanatory variables based 
on analyst characteristics. Using this, we could verify the relationships between these two classes of 
explanatory variables in order to improve our understanding of analyst accuracy. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Summary statistics of the main variables of the dataset. 
Statistics PMAFE AGE VOL CLUSTER NET OUTPUT 
Mean 0.0204 50.85 0.2462 6.75 0.0379 11.31 
Median 0.0277 49.00 0.2102 7.90 0.0276 11.36 
Max. 0.9947 100.00 0.9141 10.41 0.2108 12.65 
Min. -2.0789 2.00 00.0267 0.00 0.0023 9.94 
Std. Dev. 0.4667 24.27 0.1928 3.17 0.0433 0.5932 
Coeff. of 
variation 
22.87 0.47 0.78 0.46 1.14 0.05 
Notes: This table reports the main descriptives of the model variables. The PMAFE, representing the analyst 
accuracy, while CLUSTER, NET and OUTPUT are defined above and represent alternatively measures of 
different analysts knowledge. VOL and AGE are 2 control variables indicating, respectively, the company 
earnings volatility and the age of the analysts forecast. 
 
Table 2. The correlation matrix among variables 
Panel A. The Pearson’s correlation. 
 pmafe age lncluster net lnoutput vol 
pmafe 1      
age -0.1489* 1     
lncluster -0.0623 -0.1864* 1    
net 0.0451 0.0458 0.2062* 1   
lnoutput -0.0482 0.0334 0.5081* 0.5157* 1  
vol -0.0025 0.0315 -0.0601 -0.1307* 0.044 1 
 
This table reports the correlation matrix of the different model specification variables. It is based on the Spearman’s 
correlation definition.  
* denotes significance at the 10%. 
Table 2. The correlation matrix among variables 
Panel B. The Spearman’s correlation. 
 pmafe age lncluster net lnoutput vol 
pmafe 1      
age -0.1980* 1     
lncluster -0.1288* -0.0872 1    
net 0.0923 -0.0793 0.0218 1   
lnoutput -0.1431* 0.0071 0.6989* 0.2171* 1  
vol -0.1187* 0.0693 -0.0766 -0.076 0.0222 1 
 
Notes. This table reports the correlation matrix of the different model specification variables. It is based on the 
Spearman’s correlation definition. 
* denotes significance at the 10% 
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Table 3: Sector and country weights in the dataset.  
Sector weight % Country weight % 
Banks 24.24% Finland 0.00% 
Insurance 12.12% France 18.18%
Telecommunications Services 15.15% Germany 18.18%
Technology 9.09% Italy 9.09% 
Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods 
& Services 9.09% Netherlands 18.18%
Energy 6.03% Spain 6.06% 
Pharmaceuticals 12.12% Sweden 0.00% 
Utilities 3.03% Switzerland 9.09% 
Healthcare 6.06% United Kingdom 21.21%
Basic Materials 0.00%   
Cyclical Consumer Goods & 
Services 3.03%   
Notes. This table reports the weights of each industry and country in the whole dataset. 
ͳʹͲ  
 
Table 4: The effect of different knowledge variables on the analysts’ accuracy – OLS 
estimation 
Independent 
variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant 0.247*** 0.267*** 0.225** 0.527 0.986 
AGE -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** 
VOL -0.023 -0.023 -0.007 -0.019 0.015 
CLUSTER  -0.003   -0.0001 
NET   0.697  12.013 
OUTPUT    -0.025 -0.069 
D05 -0.094 -0.088 -0.087 -0.093 -0.081 
D06 -0.104 -0.098 -0.106 -0.099 -0.093 
D07 -0.108 -0.100 -0.124 -0.103 -0.121 
R-squared 0.031 0.032 0.035 0.032 0.041 
Adj. R-squared 0.007 0.002 0.006 0.003 0.002 
Durbin Watson 2.055 2.052 2.056 2.05 2.061 
Prob (F-stat) 0.266 0.366 0.299 0.357 0.397 
OLS Estimates; *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Notes: This table describes the main results obtain by OLS estimations of different model specifications. The 
independent variable is always PMAFE, representing the analyst’s accuracy, while CLUSTER, NET and 
OUTPUT are defined above and represent alternatively measures of different analysts knowledge. VOL and 
AGE are 2 control variables indicating, respectively, the company earnings volatility and the age of the analysts 
forecast. Finally, D05, D06 and D07 are dummy variables controlling for a time effect. 
 
 
 
Table 5: The effect of different knowledge variables on the analysts’ accuracy – Fixed 
effect estimation 
Independent 
variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
AGE_D -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
VOL_D 0.060 0.068 0.166 -0.005 0.16 
CLUSTER_D  -0.026   -0.023 
NET_D   9.59*  9.40* 
OUTPUT_D    -0.164 -0.009 
D05 0.0008 0.001 0.007 -0.0005 0.007 
D06 0.0013 0.002 0.016 0.006 0.017 
D07 0.0002 -0.0008 -0.016 -0.003 -0.017 
R-squared 0.041 0.047 0.069 0.045 0.075 
Adjusted R-squared 0.021 0.024 0.045 0.022 0.042 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.084 2.072 2.10 2.08 2.09 
Fixed-effect Estimates; *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Notes: This table describes the main results obtain by Fixed effect estimations of different model 
specifications. The independent variable is always PMAFE, representing the analyst’s accuracy, while 
CLUSTER, NET and OUTPUT are defined above and represent alternatively measures of different analysts 
knowledge. VOL and AGE are 2 control variables indicating, respectively, the company earnings volatility and 
the age of the analysts forecast. Finally, D05, D06 and D07 are dummy variables controlling for a time effect. 
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APPENDIX A 
This appendix illustrates how we identify and define the hubs of expertise following a cluster-based 
approach.  
The key point is the definition of an index allowing us to rank the European sectors by knowledge 
intensity. The methodology, based on the literature about cluster theory, is for the identification of 
two different proxies of hub of expertise. 
Firstly, in order to identify the boundaries and size of hubs of expertise, we apply the Hoen 
algorithm (Hoen, 2002), based on symmetric input-output tables.36 Hoen asserts that any sector 
needs linkages with other sectors in order to develop its own business. The symmetric input-output 
tables of different countries should represent these relations. Therefore, by analysing the input-
output tables, we identify the strongest linkages between sectors and thus the clusters, i.e. 
aggregations of sectors within a national economy.  
Input-output analysis can be used to evaluate the impact of different policies on macroeconomic 
variables, such as gross domestic product, employment, consumption, productivity, 
competitiveness, etc, as well as the environment. In the 1930s, the economist Wassily Leontief 
described the inter-industry relations in the economy from which it had developed. The structure of 
each sector’s production activity was represented by appropriate structural coefficients, which 
described in quantitative terms the relationships between the inputs that it absorbs and the output 
that it produces. The input-output framework was based on three types of table: supply tables, use 
tables and symmetric input-output tables. A synthetic description of each table is given below. 
Eurostat defines the supply table as a product-by-industry-based table, in which products are placed 
in the rows and industries and imports in the columns. A simplified illustration can be represented 
in the following way: 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
36 The OECD defines an input-output table as a tool for the presentation of a detailed analysis of the process of 
production and the use of goods and services (products), and the income generated in that production for any European 
country. 
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Industries 
Product 
Industries Import Total 
Agriculture Industry Services Activities 
Agricultural 
products 
Output by product and by industry 
Import by 
product 
Total supply by 
product 
Industrial 
products 
Services 
Total Total output by industry Total imports Total supply 
Table A.1. A simplified supply table. Source: Eurostat (Eurostat, 18) 
The supply table’s rows exhibit the supply of goods and services to sectors by the type of product, 
differentiating between domestic supply and imports. The columns indicate the domestic output of 
industries by product. 
The use table is a product-by-industry-based table with products and components of value added in 
the rows and industries, categories of final use and imports in the columns. A use table shows the 
use of goods and services by product and by type of use, i.e. as intermediate consumption by 
industry, final consumption, gross capital formation or export. A simplified illustration is the 
following: 
Industries 
Product 
Industries Final uses Total 
Agriculture Industry Services 
Activities 
Final 
consumption
Gross 
capital 
formation 
Exports 
Agricultural 
products 
Industrial 
products 
Services 
Intermediate consumption by 
product and by industry 
Final uses by product and by 
category 
Total use 
by product 
Value 
added 
Value added by component and by 
industry 
 Value 
added 
Total Total output by industry Total final uses by category  
Table A.2. A simplified use table. Source: Eurostat (Eurostat, 20) 
The symmetric input-output tables are analytical tables derived from the supply and use system. An 
input-output table is a quantitative economic tool which represents the interdependencies between 
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different branches of the national economy or different, even competing, economies. The 
transformation procedure converts the product-by-industry system of the supply and use tables into 
a product-by-product system or industry-by-industry system. Input-output tables are used to identify 
economically-related industry clusters and also so-called ‘key’ or ‘target’ industries of a specified 
economy. 
Products 
 
 
Products 
Homogeneous units of production Final uses Total 
use 
Agricultural 
products 
Industrial 
products 
Services 
Final 
consumption
Gross 
capital 
formation 
Exports 
Agricultural 
products 
Intermediate consumption by 
product and by 
homogeneous units of production 
Final uses by product and by 
category 
Total 
use by 
product 
Industrial 
products 
 
Services 
Final uses by product and by 
category 
Value 
added 
Value added by component and by 
homogeneous units of production 
  
Imports for 
similar 
products 
Total imports by product   
Supply 
Total supply by homogeneous 
units 
of production 
Total final uses by category  
Figure A.3. A simplified input-output table. Source: Eurostat (Eurostat, 25) 
Input-output tables often contain an enormous amount of detailed data. In order to deal with these 
data, it is necessary to aggregate the data. One possibility is to search for clusters of sectors with 
strong linkages. The clusters then denote how the sectors may be aggregated (Aroche-Reyes, 2001). 
Hoen (2002) developed an algorithm based on these symmetric input-output tables. His algorithm 
aggregates sectors into clusters after the following rule: two sectors compose a cluster if their 
relations, the so-called linkages, to economic growth, are large, compared to the whole economic 
system.  
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This algorithm is based on the matrices of intermediate consumption across industries. Then, to 
identify a cluster empirically, the author uses the block diagonal matrix method37.  
As suggested by Hoen, to apply his procedure we first have to set a threshold of significance level 
for the elements of the input-otput matrix that we use. We use a cut-off point of 2%. Then, we have 
to select all elements that belong to the 2% of largest elements. Elements that do not satisfy this 
restriction are put to zero. 
Then we have to select, check if the intermediate consumption matrix is decomposable and 
rearrange the sectors so that the elements are given in blocks.  
A block diagonal matrix can be split up into parts with no connections to each other. The algorithm 
reported below rearranges the sectors appropriately. All of the elements between sectors which are 
not in the same block are zero. Hence, all off-diagonal blocks would consist entirely of zeros. The 
zeros denote the boundaries of the clusters, while each block of matrix represents a cluster.  
According to Hoen, (Hoen, 2002, 25), the algorithm to use for rearranging sectors and dividing 
them into clusters is the following one:   
Step 1. Start at the upper-left part of the input-output table, with the element in the first column and 
the first row. The sector belonging to this element is the first temporary cluster.   
Step 2. Move to the sector in the next row. Compute the sum of the deliveries from this sector to all 
sectors of the temporary cluster and the deliveries from all sectors of the temporary cluster to this 
sector. If this number is zero, go to step 3. Otherwise, add this sector to the temporary cluster and 
repeat step 2.  
Step 3.  Move to the next sector and compute the sum of the deliveries from this sector to all sectors 
of the temporary cluster and the deliveries from all sectors of the temporary cluster to this sector. If 
this number is zero, go to step 4. Otherwise, repeat step 3.  If the last sector is reached, go to step 5.   
Step 4. Swap the sector just found with the first sector right below the last sector of the temporary 
cluster. (For example, if the temporary cluster consists of the sectors 1, 2, and 3, and sectors 4 and 5 
have no linkages with the first three sectors whereas sector 6 does, swap sectors 4 and 6). Swap the 
rows and the columns. Next, add the sector just found and swapped to the temporary cluster (in the 
example, add sector 6 to the temporary cluster). Continue with the last sector of the temporary 
cluster (in the example, let’s say, sector 6, which is now the fourth row (and column) of the new 
matrix) and move to step 2.   
                                                        
37 Hoen (2002) shows that this method brings to same results also selecting other input-output tables. 
ͳʹͷ  
Step 5. The temporary cluster is now a definitive cluster. Go to the first sector directly beneath the 
last sector of this cluster. This sector is the starting sector of the new temporary cluster. Move to 
step 2. 
Hoen’s algorithm allows us to identify hubs by the intermediate consumption flow in a national 
perspective. 
 
APPENDIX B 
 
This appendix illustrates how we identify and define the hubs of expertise following a network-
based approach.  
We base our methodology on Cetorelli and Presotiani (2009)’s approach, which adopted network 
analysis to deal with a comparison of stock exchanges in a global perspective. Following their 
procedure, we determine the so-called prestige index which allows us to compare hubs of expertise 
from different countries. We regard each country as a network and the sectors of tha country as 
nodes of the network. The production patterns are indicates ties between nodes.  
As in the approaches used previously, we start from an input-output matrix and we build a network 
matrix. Each element of the matrix is considered as a bidirectional flow.  
Figure B.1 describes a typical network matrix, used in our framework. The row entries represent the 
origin of the flow, while the column entries present the destination of it. In this way, the main 
diagonal accounts for flows due to the sector activity (measured by the sum of intermediate 
consumption and value added of each sector) and off-diagonal entries represent interactions 
between different nodes. For instance, I.C.11+V.A.11 indicates the flow produced and accumulated 
by industry 1 itself, I.C.12 indicates the flow of intermediate consumption from industry 1 (origin) to 
industry 2 (destination), while I.C.21 is the flow of intermediate consumption from industry 2 to 
industry 1.  
 Industry 1 Industry 2 Industry 3 Industry 4 Industry 5 
Industry 1 I.C.11+V.A.11 I.C.12 I.C.13 I.C.14 I.C.15 
Industry 2 I.C.21 I.C.+V.A. 0 0 0 
Industry 3 I.C.31 I.C.32 I.C.+V.A. I.C.34 0 
Industry 4 I.C.41 0 0 I.C.+V.A. 0 
Industry 5 I.C.51 0 0 0 I.C.+V.A. 
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Figure B.1. A network matrix example 
By analysing the matrix by row, we can identify the intensity of the interaction of each unit towards 
other destination nodes. This indicator is called the out-degree index and is calculated as the row 
sum, excluding the main diagonal entry. In examining the matrix by column, it is possible to 
compute the so-called in-degree index, which represents the ability to influence the origin of flows. 
Neither index offers details about where flows are coming from.  
In order to consider the out-degree and in-degree indices simultaneously, Cetorelli and Peristiani 
(2009) suggested using the betweenness index, which exploits network ties and captures the 
uniqueness of a given node in a network. Let mjk(ni) be the maximum flow between nodes (nj ,nk) 
which goes through node ni. Aggregate across all possible pairs of nodes in the network, other than 
ni, and obtain the overall betweenness of node ni as . In order to allow for comparison 
over time, normalisation is recommended, so that the betweenness index of node ni is: 
       (eq. B1) 
 
Therefore, the prestige index of node ni is: 
Pr (ni) = x1i P(n1)+ x2i P(n2)+ …+ xNi P(nN)   (eq.B2) 
where the weights are represented by the flows from each of the nodes onto ni . We have N 
equations in N unknowns for each network. 
This sophisticated and standardised index allows for the judgement of the importance of each node 
in a network, fully exploiting the information contained in the entire network structure.  
This metric allows us to normalise the data from symmetric input-output tables and identify an 
international ranking for hubs of expertise. This index is a proxy for the knowledge level of every 
industry in each country. The greater values in this index are associated with the greater influence 
of the sector in the production of goods and services for the whole economy. 
In basic terms, we dispose the flows of intermediate consumption between every pair of sectors on 
the off-diagonal entries, while the main diagonal includes the sum of the intermediate consumption 
flows within every sector with the sector value added. This matrix represents all of the data on a 
country’s production. We divide every column of the matrix by the column sum and apply the 
power method in order to calculate the eigenvector associated with the largest eigen value of the 
matrix. This eigenvector contains the index of prestige of any sector. Lastly, we identify the main 
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sector of each firm and assign to each analyst covering that firm the index of prestige associated 
with that analyst’s country location.  
 
APPENDIX C 
This appendix illustrates and summarises the application of the theoretical framework through an 
illustrative example: calculate the variables CLUSTER, OUTPUT and NET for the UK, assuming 
that this economy has just six sectors. 
 
The cluster-based approach: 
 
We start from the following input-output table38 where the off-diagonal elements are the 
intermediate consumption between two industries. The main diagonal elements are the sum of the 
intermediate consumption and the value added of a sector: 
Sectors 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 33000 200 57 4500 7000 5000
2 200 500 3000 20000 30000 100
3 57 3000 10000 300 1000 1500
4 4500 20000 300 2000 2500 3000
5 7000 30000 1000 2500 20000 6000
6 5000 100 1500 3000 6000 45000
Table C.1. Input-output tables among UK industries. 
We calculate an I-O matrix of only the intermediate consumption between a country’s different 
industries. The off-diagonal elements are expressed as a percentage of the largest intermediate 
consumption between two industries, the benchmark for which has been set as equal to 100% (in 
this case, 45,000 is set as 100%). The main diagonal elements, which represent the intermediate 
consumption of the same industry, are zeros. We also set a minimum threshold for input and output 
entries to be part of the matrix at 2%. Therefore we should delete the elements highlighted in 
yellow.  
Sectors 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 0,00 0,44 0,13 10,00 15,56 11,11
2 0,44 0,00 6,67 44,44 66,67 0,22
3 0,13 6,67 0,00 0,67 2,22 3,33
4 10,00 44,44 0,67 0,00 5,56 6,67
5 15,56 66,67 2,22 5,56 0,00 13,33
6 11,11 0,22 3,33 6,67 13,33 0,00
Table C.2. Input-output tables of intermediate consumption among industries express as 
percentages.                                                         
38 These numbers are hypothetical. This is just an exemplification. 
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Hence, the matrix becomes: 
 
Sectors 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 0,00 0,00 0,00 10,00 15,56 11,11
2 0,00 0,00 6,67 44,44 66,67 0,22
3 0,00 6,67 0,00 0,00 2,22 3,33
4 10,00 44,44 0,00 0,00 5,56 6,67
5 15,56 66,67 2,22 5,56 0,00 13,33
6 11,11 0,22 3,33 6,67 13,33 0,00
Table C.3. Input-output tables of intermediate consumption among industries express as 
percentages and values greater than the threshold. 
 
That can be expressed in absolute values as: 
Sectors 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 0 0 0 4500 7000 5000
2 0 0 3000 20000 30000 100
3 0 3000 0 0 1000 1500
4 4500 20000 0 0 2500 3000
5 7000 30000 1000 2500 0 6000
6 5000 100 1500 3000 6000 0
Table C.4. Input-output tables of intermediate consumption among industries express in 
absolute values and values greater than the threshold. 
 
Putting the matrix in the block diagonal form by rearranging sectors according to Hoen (2002)’s 
algorithm, the matrix shows which sectors belong to which clusters.  
Let us assume that the diagonalisation technique applied to this example,39 result in the 
identification of the two clusters coloured in the diagonal blocks below. The elements of the matrix 
are the intermediate consumptions. 
 Sectors 1 6 4 3 2 5
1 0 5000 4500 0 0 0
6 0 0 3000 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 3000 
2 0 0 0 0 0 30000
5 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table C.5. Input-output tables of intermediate consumption among industries rearranged 
by clusters.                                                         
39 The diagonalisation procedure implemented by Hoen is reported step by step in the Appendix A. In this example, we 
are not following the indicated steps, because it is difficult to make it effective in this simplified example. Therefore, we 
are assuming its implementation and the results indicated in Table 5. 
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We can now calculate the CLUSTER value for each sector composing the cluster. 
Clusters Sector Sum of Sij CLUSTER=LN( Sum of Sij)
Cluster 1 1 12500 9.434 
6 12500  9.434 
4 12500 9.434 
Cluster 2 3 33000 10.404 
2 33000 10.404 
5 33000 10.404 
Table C.6. Input-output tables of intermediate consumption among industries rearranged 
by clusters in UK. 
Cluster 1 is composed of sectors 1, 4 and 6, while cluster 2 contains sectors 2, 3 and 5. We 
associate the sum of the intermediate consumption of the corresponding cluster to each sector and 
by applying the natural log transformation, we obtain the variable CLUSTER. 
The second step is to attribute the CLUSTER values to analysts. Following our hypothesis, analysts 
located in the UK who evaluate companies based either in the UK or in another country, and 
belonging to one of the sectors 1, 4 or 6, will have a stock of knowledge of about 9.43. The same 
analysts who evaluate companies belonging to sectors of cluster 2 (sectors 2, 3 or 5) will have a 
higher stock of knowledge of about 10.40. 
Let us assume that another country, for example Italy, could have the same sectors agglomerated in 
a different way. The stock of knowledge (CLUSTER) values would be different. Let us suppose, 
for instance, that Italy has a cluster value for sector 1, 2 and 3 equal to 5 and for sectors 4, 5 and 6 
equal to 12, as summarized in the following table: 
Clusters Sector CLUSTER=LN( Sum of Sij)
Cluster 1 1 5
2 5
3 5
Cluster 2 4 12
5 12
6 12
Table C.7. Input-output tables of intermediate consumption among industries rearranged 
by clusters in Italy. 
 
According to our framework, an Italian analyst evaluating a company belonging to sector 4, 5 or 6 
would perform better than the UK analyst because he or she has a bigger stock of knowledge 
produced by the agglomeration of these sectors (12 vs 10.404), while the UK analyst will issue 
better forecasts for companies in sectors 1, 2 or 3 (9.434 vs 5). 
 
 
ͳ͵Ͳ  
The sector- based approach: 
In order to apply the sector-based approach and calculate the variable OUTPUT, we start with a 
Use table (see Appendix A for a detailed definition)40 using the same numbers used in the previous 
approach: 
 
Sectors 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 33000 200 57 4500 7000 5000
2 200 500 3000 20000 30000 100
3 57 3000 10000 300 1000 1500
4 4500 20000 300 2000 2500 3000
5 7000 30000 1000 2500 20000 6000
6 5000 100 1500 3000 6000 45000
Intermediate 
consumption 
33000 500 10000 2000 20000 45000
V.A. 100 150 300 50 20 500
Total output 
at basic price 
33100 650 10300 2050 20020 45500
Table C.8. Use table of UK industries. 
 
We then scale the total output values for the country power purchase parity (PPP) in order to 
compare the same variables across different countries.  
If UK PPP is equal to 0.98, applying the formula of OUTPUT, our variable assumes the following 
values for each of the six sectors. 
 
Sectors 1 2 3 4 5 6
OUTPUT 10,42749127 6,49717507 9,260101882 7,645797779 9,92468976 10,74567031
Table C.9. Output values for UK industries. 
 
Therefore, we have to associate the OUTPUT variable for each analyst in the dataset.  
According to our framework and to these numbers, an analyst located in UK evaluating a firm 
from sector 1 will have a bigger stock of knowledge (10.42) than a colleague evaluating firms 
belonging to sector 2 (a stock of knowledge equal to 6.49), regardless to the company’s location. 
At the same time, if France, for instance, has different OUTPUT values, all else being equal, 
analysts located in that country will have a different informational advantage in evaluating the 
same companies. It depends on the stock of knowledge produced by France in relation to the six 
sectors. 
                                                         
40 A Use table is a product-by-industry-based table with products and components of value added in the rows and 
industries, categories of final use and imports in the columns 
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The network-based approach: 
Finally, in order to implement this procedure, we assume that the production value between sectors 
and within the same sector can be a proxy of the links of the network. Specifically, the production 
of each country is represented by a matrix which exhibits the flow of intermediate consumption 
between each pair of sectors on the off-diagonal entries, while the main diagonal shows the sum of 
the intermediate consumption flow within each sector and the sector value added. 
 
Therefore, if the matrix we are looking for is the following one: 
Sectors 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 33100 200 57 4500 7000 5000
2 200 650 3000 20000 30000 100
3 57 3000 10300 300 1000 1500
4 4500 20000 300 2050 2500 3000
5 7000 30000 1000 2500 20020 6000
6 5000 100 1500 3000 6000 45500
Table C.10. Table of the UK production.  
 
We apply the algorithm (5) proposed in the literature by Cetorelli and Peristiani (2009) to the 
whole network.  
As indicated above, we divide each column of the matrix by the column’s sum. 
 
Sectors 1 2 3 4 5 6
Sum per 
column 
49857 53950 16157 32350 66520 61100
Table C.11. Sum of the UK production values by column (sector). 
 
And we obtain the standardised matrix (SM): 
Sectors 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 0,66 0,00 0,00 0,14 0,11 0,08
2 0,00 0,01 0,19 0,62 0,45 0,00
3 0,00 0,06 0,64 0,01 0,02 0,02
4 0,09 0,37 0,02 0,06 0,04 0,05
5 0,14 0,56 0,06 0,08 0,30 0,10
6 0,10 0,00 0,09 0,09 0,09 0,74
Table 12. The standardized matrix (SM) of UK production values. 
 
After this standardisation, the system of equations becomes a more common matrix-characteristic 
equation, where the solution (that is, the vector of prestige indicators) is the eigenvector associated 
with the largest eigenvalue of the standardised matrix. 
ͳ͵ʹ  
Since we do not use any specific mathematical software to calculate the eigenvalue of the 
matrix, we apply the ‘power method’. 
 
Sectors 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 0,48 0,11 0,02 0,12 0,12 0,13
2 0,12 0,49 0,16 0,08 0,17 0,08
3 0,01 0,05 0,42 0,04 0,04 0,04
4 0,08 0,05 0,09 0,25 0,20 0,05
5 0,15 0,21 0,17 0,40 0,37 0,12
6 0,16 0,09 0,14 0,10 0,11 0,58
   
Sectors 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 0,29 0,15 0,09 0,16 0,16 0,17
2 0,16 0,31 0,20 0,16 0,19 0,13
3 0,03 0,06 0,20 0,06 0,05 0,05
4 0,10 0,10 0,11 0,16 0,15 0,08
5 0,21 0,23 0,22 0,30 0,29 0,18
6 0,21 0,15 0,18 0,16 0,16 0,39
   
Table 13. First two iterations to calculate the eigenvalue of the SM. 
 
And after a number of iterations, the matrix converges to the following: 
Sectors 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 0,011 0,011 0,011 0,011 0,011 0,011
2 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,004 0,004
3 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001
4 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001
5 0,020 0,020 0,020 0,020 0,020 0,020
6 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Table 14. The eigenvectors of the SM. 
 
Where all the equal columns are the eigenvectors of the SM. 
NET for the UK is therefore equal to the following vector of values which represents the prestige 
index of each sector in that country: 
 
Sector NET 
1 0,011
2 0,004
3 0,001
4 0,001
5 0,020
6 0,000
Table 15. NET values for UK sectors. 
ͳ͵͵  
 
According to this approach, a UK analyst evaluating companies belonging to sector 1 has a stock 
of knowledge equal to 0.011, whereas whilst evaluating companies in sector 6 he or she has an 
informational advantage equal to zero. Each country (network) has a proper NET vector and, 
therefore, analysts located in different countries have different informational advantages deriving 
from the network to which they are closest. 
 
ͳ͵Ͷ  
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